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Recent research into automotive security has shown that once a single electronic ve-
hicle component is compromised, it is possible to take control of the vehicle. These
components, called Electronic Control Units, are embedded systems which manage
a significant part of the functionality of a modern car. They communicate with each
other via the in-vehicle network, known as the Controller Area Network, which is the
most widely used automotive bus.
In this thesis, we introduce a series of novel proposals to improve the security of
both the Controller Area Network bus and the Electronic Control Units.
The Controller Area Network suffers from a number of shortfalls, one of which is
the lack of source authentication. We propose a protocol that mitigates this funda-
mental shortcoming in the Controller Area Network bus design, and protects against
a number of high profile media attacks that have been published. We derive a set of
desirable security and compatibility properties which an authentication protocol for
the Controller Area Network bus should possess. We evaluate our protocol, along
with other proposed protocols in the literature, with respect to the defined properties.
Our systematic analysis of the protocols allows the automotive industry to make an
informed choice regarding the adoption suitability of these solutions.
However, it is not only the communication of Electronic Control Units that needs
to be secure, but the firmware running on them as well. The growing number of Elec-
tronic Control Units in a vehicle, together with their increasing complexity, prompts
the need for automated tools to test their security. Part of the challenge in designing
such a tool is the diversity of Electronic Control Unit architectures. To this end, this
thesis presents a methodology for extracting the Control Flow Graph from the Elec-
tronic Control Unit firmware. The Control Flow Graph is a platform independent rep-
resentation of the firmware control flow, allowing us to abstract from the underlying
architecture. We present a fuzzer for Electronic Control Unit firmware fuzz-testing via
Controller Area Network. The extracted Control Flow Graph is tagged with static data
used in instructions which influence the control flow of the firmware. It is then used to
create a set of input seeds for the fuzzer, and in altering the inputs during the fuzzing
process. This approach represents a step towards an efficient fuzzing methodology for
Electronic Control Units. To our knowledge, this is the first proposal that uses static
analysis to guide the fuzzing of Electronic Control Units.
This research was funded by Jaguar Land Rover and the Engineering and Physical Sciences
Research Council (Industrial CASE Award 14220107) as part of the project Lightweight Cryp-
tography for Next Generation Vehicle Electrical Architecture.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
The automotive industry has recently undergone a significant digital transformation,
which has given rise to serious security threats [59, 34, 93]. The increasing number
of wireless interfaces available in today’s cars exposes them to new attack vectors.
Modern cars have dozens and sometimes even over a hundred Electronic Control Units
(ECUs). Whilst more technology is being introduced in modern vehicles, transforming
them into smart, connected cars, the underlying security infrastructure has struggled
to keep up with the pace of these changes.
While vehicle owners think about the condition of their car, if it is fit to be driven, if
it has enough oil or fuel, they are less likely to consider whether their vehicle is secure,
from the point of view of cyber security. Even standards and ratings of vehicle have
only just realised that automotive cyber security is crucial. Most countries or areas of
the world have a New Car Assessment Programme (NCAP), which assesses the safety
of new vehicles and provide ratings for occupants protection, pedestrian protection
or driver assistance technologies. The automotive industry has mostly been focused
on detection of states or actions that would impact driver safety or impair a vehicle’s
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ability to run as expected, for example notifications for service, clogged filters, skid-
ding or uneven traction. Failure-recovery protocols have been implemented to guard
against vehicles becoming unresponsive and uncontrollable in the case that a critical
functionality stops working. Anti-theft solutions have also been of interest as a general
means of preventing badly intended individuals from gaining access to a vehicle. Until
recently, the implications of vehicles relying on electronic components which run soft-
ware were not well understood. The earliest attempt at providing some guidelines for
the automotive industry in relation to cyber security, is the SAE J3061 Guidebook [37].
The document describes a framework to allow automotive stakeholders to understand
cyber security concepts, such as threats, vulnerabilities, attacker models, and consider
them in the development cycle of a vehicle. A new ISO standard is currently under
development, ISO/SAE 21434 [86], scheduled to be released in 2020. The standard is
expected to outline guidelines for risk management based approaches to cyber secu-
rity, focusing on software development and cyber security testing.
The Controller Area Network (CAN), standardised in [75], is the most commonly
used automotive bus nowadays. Its purpose is to connect the ECUs of a car, and al-
low them to communicate without a source or destination address. As the in-vehicle
network has traditionally been considered a trusted environment, and there were no
wireless interfaces, resilience against cyber-attacks has not been of prime concern. The
CAN bus is a broadcast network, whereby any message sent can be read by all con-
nected ECUs. By design, it does not provide security features, such as authenticity (the
source or destination of a message is unknown), or confidentiality (messages are not
encrypted, therefore they can be eavesdropped) [158]. Most attacks presented in the
literature could be prevented if authentication was present on the network, or at least
their impact would be localised and mitigated.
Existing attacks rely on the fact that messages can be sent on the CAN network by
a malicious attacker or a compromised ECU, and they are accepted by other ECUs as if
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they were legitimate. The lack of source authentication is an enabler for all these types
of attacks. While vehicles are designed to tolerate random failures, they cannot cur-
rently cope with malicious cyber-attacks. The lock-down of components is not a viable
solution, both from a legislative point of view (e.g. right-to-repair legislation) or from
the economic point of view of the manufacturer. When dealing with the security of the
in-vehicle network, current research in the field is focused on two main solutions, one
being introducing authentication protocols on the network (and we will delve further
into this in Part II), or using Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSes). Maple et al. offer a
review of Intrusion Detection Systems in [5], investigating 42 published works of such
systems.
The use of complex electronic systems within cars has become more prevalent, and
the technological trend is moving towards driverless, fully autonomous vehicles (lev-
els 4 or 5, according to SAE J3016 [146]). These cars will communicate with each other
and with road-side infrastructure. In light of these advancements, research into the
state of security in current vehicles is essential. Findings from such research are often
alarming, and have led to a number of recalls, such as the case of Fiat Chrysler which
had to recall 1.4 million vehicles, after researchers showed they could remotely kill the
engine of a car [59].
The security of common embedded devices we have surrounded ourselves with
(e.g. routers, smartphones) has received notable attention from researchers. However,
ECU security is an area which has yet to reach maturity. The large number of ECUs
in a modern vehicle means the manufacturers do not have the resources to completely
produce the components themselves. They rely on first tier suppliers, which are com-
panies that work directly with manufacturers, and outsource a large part of their ECU
production to them. In the case where the firmware is outsourced, the manufacturers
do not receive the source code, just the firmware image. Therefore, they cannot easily
verify the code is free of bugs or vulnerabilities. The supply chain for ECUs is complex,
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and can go deeper than first tier suppliers, with tier 2 suppliers being companies that
create parts which end up in a vehicle, but do not directly interface with manufacturers
(e.g. chip manufacturers), and tier 3 suppliers being providers of “raw” materials (e.g.
plastic). Creating a tool which manufacturers can use to test the ECUs, using a grey
box and non-invasive approach, would allow them to gain some security guarantees
about the firmware of the electronic components they outsource.
1.1 Contributions and Thesis Overview
Within this thesis we explore the security of the CAN bus, which allows ECUs to com-
municate with each other, and the security of the ECUs themselves. We present below




In this chapter we discuss the required background knowledge for understanding the
internal vehicle network, its components and how they communicate with each other.
We present the standards which specify the behaviour of the most used in-vehicle net-
work, the CAN bus, and what approaches the industry is taking for standardisation of
ECU software development.
Chapter 3: Vehicle Security Threats
In this chapter, we review offensive research into vehicle security. We aim to explore
how a vehicle can be compromised by a cyber attacker, what are possible entry vectors
and which are the components or protocols that are vulnerable. Later in the thesis we
propose solutions for weaknesses which we highlight throughout this chapter.
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Part II: CAN Bus Authentication
Chapter 4: Lightweight Authentication Protocol for CAN
As we will see from the Background and Related Work chapters, the lack of authen-
tication for the messages sent by ECUs on the CAN bus appears throughout the lit-
erature as a weakness which enables attackers to take control of a vehicle. Therefore,
we present a new design for an authentication protocol for the CAN bus. The pro-
tocol, LEIA, is a software-only solution, and does not require any additional hardware
components, therefore not increasing the manufacturing cost of a vehicle. The pro-
tocol is designed to satisfy the stringent resource requirements of low/medium level
Microcontroller Units (MCUs), the chips most often used in ECUs and is flexible in
terms of frequency of message authentication. This allows manufacturers to decide
how often messages should be authenticated, for each CAN id, based on their own se-
curity assessment. The protocol is also backwards compatible with the existing CAN
configuration, requiring minimal changes at application layer. LEIA features a resyn-
chronisation procedure to ensure counters, used to prevent replay attacks, can reach a
new shared state, in case their values become desynchronised. It is also compatible
with the AUTOSAR standards, discussed in Chapter 2, therefore being ready to be
implemented by manufacturers. We use provable security techniques to reduce the
security of LEIA to that of the Message Authentication Code algorithm chosen when
implementing it.
The chapter is based on the following publication: LEIA: A Lightweight Authen-
tication Protocol for CAN, by the author and Flavio D. Garcia [140], presented at The
European Symposium on Research in Computer Security (ESORICS’16).
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Chapter 5: CAN Authentication Protocols: Review and Evaluation
In this chapter, we present a systematic analysis of CAN bus authentication pro-
tocols proposed in the literature. We evaluate them with respect to a set of desirable
security and compatibility properties we define. The properties are based on the spec-
ifications of the standards presented in Chapter 2 and the lessons learnt from under-
standing the vulnerabilities presented in Chapter 3, therefore incorporating the views
of both academia and industry. We also discuss their performance, giving particular
attention to the overhead and latency these protocols add. These play an important
role, especially in the case of ECUs used for safety-critical functionality.
Part III: Towards Large-Scale Fuzzing of Automotive Electronic Com-
ponents
This part of the thesis is based on the following publication: Grey-box Analysis and
Fuzzing of Automotive Electronic Components via Control-Flow Graph Extraction, by the
author and Flavio D. Garcia [141], presented at The 4th ACM Computer Science in Cars
Symposium (CSCS ’20).
Chapter 6: Extracting the Control Flow Graph from ECU Firmware
The hardware that ECUs are built on is diverse, with multiple architectures being used,
and the number of tools available for analysing ECU firmware is highly limited. In
this chapter we discuss the reasons why we believe having an automated method
for analysing ECU firmware is important and we present a methodology for ECU
firmware analysis, which allows us to abstract the architecture-dependent firmware
and represent it through its Control Flow Graph (CFG). The CFG represents the execu-
tion paths of the firmware, and can be enriched with other relevant information, such
as static data used in flow-influencing instructions. The CFG can be used in develop-
ing other tools, which are not dependent on a specific architecture, therefore removing
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one of the challenges of analysing ECU firmware. We also provide an overview of the
scripts we developed in order to aid in decreasing the manual labour required for this
task.
Chapter 7: Fuzzing Electronic Control Units
This chapter presents the design of an ECU fuzzer, which communicates with the ECU
via the CAN bus and uses the previously extracted CFG. We annotate it with informa-
tion about static data comparisons that affect the control flow of the firmware and what
branch instruction was used to determine the flow of the execution path. This infor-
mation is used to create initial seeds for the fuzzer. It is also used to adapt the input
messages in order to cover hard to reach execution paths. We debate what a crash
means, within the context of an ECU, and how we can detect it. We evaluate the
fuzzer on three ECUs, from different manufacturers. The tool was able to crash two of
the ECUs. Our fuzzer is the first approach that uses static analysis when forming CAN
messages.
Part IV: Concluding Remarks
Chapter 8: Directions for Future Research
We discuss possible future research directions within the area of vehicle security which
pertain to the thesis subject: key management, future automotive networks, highlight-
ing the upcoming move towards Ethernet, autonomous vehicles, in the context of se-
curing sensors input, spoofing prevention and adversary-resilient machine learning,
and automotive fuzzing.
Chapter 9: Conclusion
We conclude the thesis by looking at how the research presented herein contributes to
the improvement of cyber security within the automotive field, and discuss possible







This chapter provides the required background for understanding how the ECUs in
a vehicle communicate with each other, elaborating on the existing standards for the
CAN bus and what directions the automotive industry is taking with respect to soft-
ware development for ECUs, through the AUTomotive Open System ARchitecture
(AUTOSAR) standards.
2.1 Controller Area Network
The large number of ECUs in the vehicle means that point-to-point communication
is not efficient and therefore the exchange of messages is done via a bus. The most
popular and widely used automotive bus is CAN. Each ECU is equipped with a CAN
controller which implements the CAN protocol, and a CAN transceiver, which trans-
lates the bus signals to the appropriate logical values.
The CAN is a serial bus designed for the automotive industry, with applications in
other contexts as well, such as the marine industry [71], aviation [9, 10] or industrial












































APIM - accessory protocol interface
BCM - body control
PCM - powertrain control
HCM - headlamp control
RCM - restraint control
OCSM - occupant classification system
ADIM - auto dimming interior mirror
PW radar - proximity warning radar unit
ABS - anti-lock brakes
PSCM - power steering control
SCCM - steering column
HUDM - heads up display
VDM - vehicle dynamics
TRCM - transmission range control
FSCM - front seat climate control
PMCSM - passenger multi contour seat
CCM - cruise control
ACM - air conditioning
FCDM - front control interface
ICP - instrument cluster pannel
ADSPM - audio digital processing
GPSM - global positioning system
FCIM - front control interface
RTM - radio transceiver
DDM - driver door
DSM - driver seat
SODL - side obstacle detect left
SODR - side obstacle detect right
HSWM - heated steering wheel
DMCSM - driver multi contour seat
RGTM - read gate trunk
SODCM - side obstacle detection control
Figure 2.1: Example of CAN bus networks architecture from a Ford Fusion, 2014 (based
on [114]).
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control systems [35, 72]. Its data transmission rates are limited, but it can achieve up
to 1Mbit/s over short distances (up to 40 meters). Typically, vehicles are equipped
with a high speed CAN which connects safety-critical nodes which require real-time
communication, and several low/medium speed CAN buses (Figure 2.1). A Gateway
ECU acts as a bridge between all the CAN buses of the vehicle.
In the current context of increased digitalisation of car components, together with
the trend of increasing the number of said components, the CAN bus falls short, by
design, in providing any protection against a cyber attacker. Designed in the 1980s,
its major shortfall relies on the assumption that the network is a trusted environment.
At the time, inter-connectivity and external facing interfaces were not at the forefront
of potential issues. The CAN bus aims to provide real-time, fault-tolerant communi-
cation between ECUs in a simple, cost-efficient manner. However, it suffers from the
following issues [180, 69, 158]:
• No confidentiality: any node on the network can eavesdrop;
• No authenticity: the sources of a message is unknown, as it only contains the
identifier (id) of the destination node;
• As any node can broadcast, it is easy to carry out a denial of service attack;
• No integrity: a fake message or an altered message cannot be detected;
• No non-repudiation: a network node cannot prove it has sent or received a cer-
tain message.
2.1.1 CAN Bus Protocol (ISO 11898)
The CAN bus was officially released in 1986, at the Society of Automotive Engineers
(SAE) conference and is standardised in ISO 11898-1 [84], describing the data layer and
physical layer in accordance with the ISO reference model ISO/IEC 7598-1 [73], and in
SAE J2284 [68]. The current CAN versions are 2.0A and 2.0B; version 2.0A uses 11 bits
to represent the data identifier, whereas version 2.0B uses 29 bits (and it is called an




























































where SoF = Start of Frame;
RTR = Remote Transmission Request;
IDE = Identifier Extension Flag;
r* = reserved bit;
DLC = Data Length Code;
ACK = Acknowledge Slot;
SRR = Substitute Remote Request;
EoF = End of Frame;
IFS = Inter Frame Space.
Figure 2.2: CAN data frame structure.
Extended Identifier). The two versions are compatible and can co-exist in the same
network [96]. In a nutshell, the identifiers are used as an indication of the contents of
a message transmitted, and nodes on the network decide whether to disregard or act
upon the data of a message based on the identifier associated to it.
Information on the CAN bus is sent in frames, or Protocol Data Units (PDUs). The
structure of a data frame is shown in Figure 2.2. Up to 8 bytes of data can be sent in one
data frame, with the Data Length Code (DLC) field specifying the number of bytes of
the message. As the DLC field has 4 bits, it can take any value up to 15, inclusive, but
values greater than 8 are automatically considered to be 8. Error frames, remote frames
and overload frames are also used for signalling faults, triggering data re-transmission
and synchronisation, and they do not transport any message data. The bit stream of a
frame is coded according to the Non Return Zero (NRZ) method. For synchronisation
purposes, the Start of Frame (SoF), arbitration, control and data fields, and the Cyclic
Redundancy Check (CRC) sequence are coded according to the bit stuffing method.
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Figure 2.3: CAN bus arbitration between two nodes.
This means, for every five consecutive bits of the same value, a stuff bit of complemen-
tary value is transmitted on the bus (i.e. for a sequence of five 1s, a 0 is sent, and for a
sequence of 0s, a 1 is sent). The End of Frame (EoF) field is not coded according to the
bit stuffing method, and neither is the entirety of error frames and overload frames.
Nodes which want to send messages on the CAN bus at the same time have to ne-
gotiate which one will transmit first (Figure 2.3). The CAN bus uses the Carrier Sense
Multiple Access with Collision Detection and Arbitration Message Priority
(CSMA/CD+AMP) method. Recessive and dominant bits are represented by a logi-
cal one and a logical zero, respectively, with the dominant bit overwriting the recessive
bit, if transmitted at the same time. Two nodes may start transmitting at the same time,
with the first bit sent being the SoF. The value of the arbitration field is used in deciding
which node gets the priority as follows: the two ECUs send the bits of their arbitration
field and read back the logical value on the bus; if a recessive bit has been sent but a
dominant bit has been read, the node considers this a bit-error and will stop transmit-
ting. This means that messages which have an identifier with a lower numerical value
will have priority.
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Furthermore, frame correctness is acknowledged by the other nodes on the bus.
The transmitting node will send a recessive bit as the ACK bit of the ACK field, and
monitoring nodes will overwrite this with a dominant bit, if a syntactically correct
frame has been observed so far. At least one other node needs to be online on the bus
for the acknowledgement process to be successful.
Failures and errors on the bus are monitored by the CAN transceivers of all con-
nected nodes and faulty units will be logically disconnected from the bus, such that
they cannot transmit or receive any frames. A node can be in one of three states, with
respect to its error status: error-active, error-passive or bus-off. Two error counters per
node are used in order to determine the error level: Receive Error Counter (REC) and
Transmit Error Counter (TEC). The error handling is implemented at hardware level, in
the CAN Integrated Circuit.
A node in the error-active state has both REC and TEC at most 127, this being the
normal operation mode of a CAN node. If at least one of the counters is greater than
127, and TEC is less than 256, the node is in the error-passive state. An error-passive
node can send and transmit messages normally, but it can only send a passive error flag
(consisting of 6 recessive consecutive bits, without bit stuffing). This means the node
cannot hinder the traffic generated by the other CAN nodes. An error-passive node can
transition back to error-active once both counters are less than or equal to 127. Finally,
a node goes into bus-off state if TEC is greater than 255, and cannot send or receive any
frames or send dominant bits on the bus. The error handling mechanism is intrinsic to
the CAN controller, and the counters are constantly updated by it, as communication
takes place on the network.
The rules for the error counters are as follows:
1. If a receiving node detects an error (except for when transmitting an active error
flag or an overload flag, each consisting of 6 dominant bits, without bit stuffing),
the REC is incremented by 1;
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2. If a receiver samples a dominant bit after sending an error flag, the REC is incre-
mented by 8;
3. If a transmitter node sends an error flag, TEC is incremented by 8;
4. If a transmitter node samples a bit error when sending an active error flag or an
overload flag, TEC is incremented by 8;
5. If a receiver detects a bit error when sending an active error flag or an overload
flag, REC is incremented by 8;
6. If a node detects 14 consecutive dominant bits after an active error flag or an
overload flag, or it detects 8 consecutive dominant bits after a passive error flag,
it will increment REC by 8 if it is a receiver, or TEC by 8 if it is a transmitter; the
counters will also be incremented as they correspond, by a value of 8, for each
sequence of additional 8 consecutive dominant bits detected;
7. If a frame has been successfully transmitted, TEC is decremented by 1;
8. If a frame is successfully received, REC is decremented by 1 if it is in error-active,
and it is set to a value between 119 and 127 if it is in error-passive.
The mechanism for error handling ensures that communication failures at the level
of the CAN bus protocol are dealt with in an appropriate manner, but it does not ac-
count for communication which is maliciously sent, with the aim of breaking the proto-
col. Therefore, it is important to note that the fault confinement process can be abused
by an active attacker.
2.1.2 CAN-TP Protocol (ISO 15765-2)
The transport protocol and network layer services for CAN are defined in ISO 15765-2
[85]. Due to the small payload of the CAN data frame, the standard sets out how a
data payload longer than 8 bytes will be split across frames. The network layer com-
munication protocol is intended for ECU to ECU communication, or between ECU and
external test equipment. The network layer services support the Unified Diagnostics
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Services (UDS) standard, as specified in [82] and various application-layer implemen-
tations, mainly aimed at diagnostic services (emission related on-board diagnostics
[77], world-wide harmonised diagnostics [79], end of life activation of on-board py-
rotechnic devices (e.g. airbag) [76]).
Under the transport layer protocol, messages with up to 232 − 1 bytes of data can
be transmitted. Messages with up to 7 bytes of data are sent unsegmented, and these
frames are known as single frames. If a message requires segmentation, it will be split
across multiple CAN data frames. The first frame will contain the total length of the
data to be transmitted, in bytes, in the Protocol Control Information (PCI) field, and
the first 6 bytes of the message. Subsequent consecutive frames will carry the rest of
the data, split into chunks of 7 bytes. Sequence Numbers (SNs) are used to signal the
order of the frames, for reassembly purposes on the receiving node. The first frame
does not have an explicit SN, it is assumed to be 0. The first consecutive frame will
have an SN with the value of 1, and each additional consecutive frame will increment
the SN by 1. The SN can take values up to 15, after which it wraps up to 0 and carries
on. Finally, flow control frames are used by the receiving node to send information on
whether the sender node can go ahead with the data transmission (Flow Status (FS) pa-
rameter) and about its acceptable transmission parameters: block size (the maximum
number of PDUs a node can transmit before being required to await authorisation to
continue transmission) and minimum separation time (the minimum acceptable time
delay between two transmitted PDUs). The FS parameter informs the sender node if it
can continue sending the data, if it needs to wait, or if an overflow occurred, in which
case the transmission is aborted. An overflow is signalled after the first frame of a
transmission is received, if the length of the data to be transmitted exceeds the buffer
size of the receiver node. Figure 2.4 shows all four types of CAN transport layer frames
and their structure.
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8 bytes (CAN data field)
Single frame 0x0DL Data






0x3 FS BS STmin
Data
where:
DL - data length
SN - sequence number
FS - flow status
BS - block size
STmin - minimum separation time
PCI - protocol control information
Figure 2.4: CAN transport layer frame types.
2.1.3 UDS (ISO 14229)
The Unified Diagnostics Services (UDS) are defined in [82] and specify the ‘data link
independent requirements of diagnostic services, which allow a diagnostic tester (client) to con-
trol diagnostic functions in an on-vehicle Electronic Control Unit (ECU, server)’ (Part 1 [80]),
the requirements of session layer services (Part 2 [81]) and the implementation of UDS
over CAN (UDSonCAN, Part 3 [83]).
Communication occurs in a request-response manner. The request specifies the
service required, by Service Identifier (SID), a sub-function (optional), parameters and
data length. The response contains information whether the request was successful
via a positive response message, or unsuccessful, by employing a range of negative
response codes. The SID encodes the service type in the 6th bit. For requests, the bit is
set to 0, and for positive responses, the bit is set to 1.
The UDS are split into six groups, based on the functional unit they belong to. An
overview of each unit is given below, mentioning the services it contains.
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Diagnostic and Communication Management functional unit
SID Name SFa DSb Description
0x10 Diagnostic session
control
X X By default, the control unit is in the default session. The
programming session is used for firmware uploads. The
extended diagnostic session is used for advanced diagnos-
tic functionality (e.g. sensor calibration). Safety-critical
diagnostic functions (e.g. airbag tests) require the safety
system diagnostic session.
0x11 ECU reset X X Power supply shutdown via hard reset, drain and igni-
tion turn on via key off on reset and soft reset for program
units and storage structures initialisation.
0x27 Security access X X Enables access to security-critical services, via a
challenge-response protocol.
0x28 Communication control X X Switch off sending and/or receiving of messages.
0x3E Tester Present X X Keep current session active.
0x83 Access timing
parameter




X X Transmission of data that is protected against attacks
from third parties.
0x85 Control DTC setting X X Toggle detection of any/all errors.
0x86 Response on event X X Toggle response transmission on specific event.
0x87 Link control X X Gain bus bandwidth for diagnostic session (change
baudrate).
Data Transmission functional unit
SID Name SFa DSb Description
0x22 Read data by identifier 7 X Request data record values from the server, based on
some data identifier (e.g. sensor reading).
0x23 Read memory by
address
7 X Request memory data based on starting address and
data size.
0x24 Read scaling data by
identifier
7 X Read scaling data stored in the server using data iden-
tifier.
0x2A Read data by periodic
identifier
7 X Request periodic transmission of data records.
0x2C Dynamically define data
identifier
X X Dynamically define a data identifier that can be read
at a later time (by a source identifier or by a memory
address).
0x2E Write data by identifier X X Write data at internal location defined by the data iden-
tifier.
0x3D Write memory by
address
X X Write data at a specified memory address.
a Sub-Function; b Default Session
Stored Data Transmission functional unit
SID Name SFa DSb Description
0x14 Clear diagnostic
information
7 X Clear Data Trouble Codes (DTCs).
0x19 Read DTC information X X Request info on DTCs by status, time of occurrence,
severity, function group, memory, etc.
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InputOutput Control functional unit
SID Name SFa DSb Description
0x2F Input output control by
identifier
X 7 Gives control to a client over the internal/external sig-
nals (e.g. RPM, pedal position); used for simple input
substitution/output control.
Routine functional unit
SID Name SFa DSb Description
0x31 Routine control X X Execute a defined sequence of steps and obtain any rel-
evant results (e.g. erasing memory, resetting or learning
adaptive data, running a self-test).
Upload Download functional unit
SID Name SFa DSb Description
0x34 Request download 7 7 Download data onto the server, at the specified mem-
ory address.
0x35 Request upload 7 7 Upload data from the server to the client, from the spec-
ified memory address.
0x36 Transfer data 7 7 Transfer data between client and server (direction spec-
ified by one of the previous commands).
0x37 Request transfer exit 7 7 Request data transfer termination.
a Sub-Function; b Default Session
The CAN transport protocol, together with UDS, enables powerful functionality,
for diagnostics purposes. However, this functionality can be taken advantage of by
a knowledgeable adversary. It has been shown in [113] that attacks via diagnostics
are possible, such as rendering the brakes not functional, killing the engine, or even
re-flashing an ECU with modified firmware.
2.2 AUTOSAR Classic Platform Standards
The AUTomotive Open System ARchitecture (AUTOSAR), founded in 2003, is a world-
wide partnership between the parties involved in the automotive industry (vehicle
manufacturers, suppliers, electronics and semiconductors manufacturers, and soft-
ware
providers) [159]. The goal of AUTOSAR is to standardise basic functionality and in-
terfaces, with the purpose of abstracting from hardware-specific implementations and
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improving software/firmware development for ECUs. The standard has been gaining
popularity among manufacturers and suppliers, with a number of companies creating
software compatible with it ([128, 52, 51, 110, 111]), or tools to ensure software develop-
ment respects the guidelines ([106]). AUTOSAR uses a layered software architecture,



















































Figure 2.5: AUTOSAR architecture software layers overview.
Of interest to this thesis are the Classic Platform specifications [13], which are aimed
at embedded real-time ECUs, within vehicles that do not heavily rely on automation or
driverless feature. More precisely, the specifications for Secure Onboard Communication
(SecOC), for the Crypto Stack and for the Key Manager are discussed below.
At the time of writing, AUTOSAR Classic Platform 4.4 is the latest standard (re-
leased October 2018).
2.2.1 Secure Onboard Communication
SecOC [18] is part of the Communication Services and its functional aims are to pro-
vide resource-efficient authentication and integrity for sensitive data, at PDU level,
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ensuring protection against malicious manipulation of messages and replay attacks.
It describes the protocols by using symmetric key cryptography, and provides details
for the scenario where public key cryptography is used. SecOC sets out the software
requirement specification for how CAN messages should be authenticated and how
freshness, used in preventing replay attacks, should be handled, both for regular CAN
frames, as well as CAN-TP messages.
With respect to authentication, a sender ECU and (all) receiver ECU need to have a
shared secret (key) between them. An ECU which wants to send an authenticated mes-
sage needs to compute an Authenticator (e.g. Message Authentication Code (MAC)).
The Authenticator is generated based on a key, the CAN id of the message, the pay-
load and an Freshness Value (FV). An ECU receiving an authenticated message needs
to check the FV (which is the element that protects against replay attacks), and needs to
verify the authentication information that belongs to the message. The Authenticator
may be truncated to the most significant bits, however MAC sizes of at least 64 bits are
recommended. Similarly, a recommendation for key size is provided, which is at least
128 bits. The standards also state that authentication build counters and authentication
verify attempt counters need to be maintained, such that no ECU is stuck in trying to
authenticate/verify one message.
According to the specification, freshness can be provided via counters or via times-
tamps. In the case of counters, there will be one counter corresponding to each CAN id
to authenticate. The counter must be incremented prior to the message being verified,
on the receiver side. With respect to timestamps, a global syncronised time source can
be used, with the possibility of defining an acceptance window. A Freshness Manager
deals with providing the FV required for computing the Authenticator.
If asymmetric key cryptography is preferred, instead of a shared secret, a key pair
is to be used (a private key and a public key). The private key is used to sign the
message by the sender, and the public key is used to verify the message, by the receiver.
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Signatures cannot be truncated.
2.2.2 Crypto Stack
The Crypto Stack provides access to cryptographic functionality, either supplied by a
software library or a hardware module, to the various applications, services and sys-
tems an ECU runs. The Crypto Drivers (CRYPTO), Crypto Interface (CRYIF) and Crypto
Service Manager (CSM) are the components of the Crypto Stack. Each component maps
over one of the three layers of AUTOSAR (drivers, hardware abstraction, services), as
described below.
The Crypto Drivers are part of the microcontroller abstraction layer, and hold the
actual implementations of the available cryptographic primitives. They also deal with
key storage, key configuration and key management. Keys may be stored in either
cryptographic hardware, or in Non-volatile Random-Access Memory (NvM). A Crypto
Driver has one or more Crypto Driver Objects. The Crypto Driver Object is ‘the end-
point of a crypto channel’ [14]. An ECU may have multiple Crypto Drivers, in the case
it uses implementations from different vendors (e.g. it could have a hardware module
and a software library, both implementing the same primitives). The Crypto Drivers
are called by the Crypto Interface, compute the operation on the requested primitive,
and return the result to the interface.
The Crypto Interface is the intermediate layer between the Crypto Drivers and
the CSM, representing the interface to the services of the Crypto Drivers [15]. CRYIF
maintains a map from the cryptographic operations the CSM could request, to the
Crypto Driver services that could supply said operation. The interface may manage
multiple Crypto Drivers, providing seamless access to the underlying hardware or
software solutions.
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The Crypto Service Manager facilitates the concurrent access of software mod-
ules to cryptographic functionality, by interfacing with the Crypto Interface. The CSM
represents the highest abstraction layer of the cryptographic services available on an
ECU. The software modules requesting access to crypto operations are oblivious of
their specific implementation, handled by the Crypto Driver. The CSM may pro-
vide a queuing mechanism, with job prioritisation, for software accessing the same
cryptographic primitives. CSM provides services for hash computation, MAC gener-
ation/verification, signature generation/verification, symmetric and asymmetric en-
cryption/decryption, random number generation, secure counters and key manage-
ment [16]. Each service can be configured and initialised according to the required
algorithms, as long as they are supported by the Crypto Driver. The module also pro-
vides a service for key derivation and a service for key exchange.
2.2.3 Key Manager
The Key Manager deals with both symmetric keys and certificates, and is part of the
crypto services layer. It works together with CSM to allow software modules to access,
update or create cryptographic key material [17]. In the case of authenticated commu-
nication, as described by the SecOC, the Key Manager is responsible for supplying the
adequate keys to the CSM, which will request the appropriate crypto job (e.g. verify
MAC). With respect to certificates, these are stored by the Key Manager, either as root,
or as part of a hierarchical chain. Certificates can be verified on demand or at run-
time, and the CSM can request full certificates or elements of a certificate, in order to
perform crypto jobs. The manager provides a service for destroying all data used as
cryptographic key material that is held in RAM, KeyM_Deinit.
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Algorithm (Key) Length Comments
Symmetric key
AES 128, 256 bits modes: ECB, CBC, CTR, GCM, OFB,
CFB, XTS









SHA-2 224, 256, 384, 512 bits
SHA-3 224, 256, 384, 512 bits
BLAKE 224, 256, 384, 512 bits
RIPEMD-160 160 bits
Table 2.1: AUTOSAR recommendations for symmetric and public key, and hash algo-
rithms.
2.2.4 Cryptographic Algorithms Recommendations
AUTOSAR also specifies which cryptographic algorithms should be supported, as well
as key length suggestions (where appropriate) for both symmetric and asymmetric
key cryptography, and hash lengths. The recommendations are presented in Table 2.1.
For MAC algorithms, they recommend using Cipher-based Message Authentication
Code (CMAC), Galois Message Authentication Code (GMAC) or Hash-based Message
Authentication Code (HMAC). A deterministic random number generator and a true
random number generator should also be supported [14].
The ECB mode recommended by AUTOSAR is well known for its weakness: the
lack of difussion. Two encryptions of the same plaintext in ECB mode will result in
identical ciphertexts. Therefore, an attacker would be able to determine the same mes-
sage was sent twice. In the context of CAN communication, where some messages
only take a limited amount of values, this would possibly allow an attacker to map a
ciphertext to an action executed by an ECU, without needing to know the plaintext of
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the message. Similarly, CBC and CTR are susceptible to bit flipping attacks, whereby
changing the value of a bit in the ciphertext results in a different plaintext when de-
crypting it. This would allow an attacker to e.g. turn on the left indicator when in
reality the right one was activated by the driver.
2.3 Summary
In this chapter we have reviewed the standards surrounding CAN bus communica-
tion, in order to understand how ECUs communicate with each other on the in-vehicle
network; we have also reviewed key parts of the AUTOSAR industry standard, which




This chapter explores literature related to vehicle security, in particular looking at of-
fensive research. Understanding how cars can be hacked aids in elaborating solutions
which could prevent or limit the damage an attacker can do.
While transitioning from mostly mechanical systems to complex systems with dig-
ital components, manufacturers have overlooked the possibility of a cyber-attacker in
their designs. We present works which have as focus the security of the in-vehicle CAN
bus. We explore whether vulnerabilities in components connected to it can be lever-
aged into developing attacks which allow an adversary to (fully) control a vehicle.
However, we would like to point out that the field of automotive security is extensive,
and research which assesses the security of other components with high risk implica-
tions exists. For example, the KeeLoq block cipher, used by various car manufacturers
in anti-theft mechanisms, was first attacked by Bogdanov in [27]. Later, this attack
was improved in [40, 74, 89]. Verdult et al. proposed an attack against the Megamos
Crypto [173] and Hitag2 [174] vehicle immobilisers. These attacks allow an adversary
to start the vehicle without the car key.
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3.1 From Hypothesising Security Risks. . .
One of the early works on the security of automotive bus systems belongs to Wolf,
Weimerskirch, and Paar [179], in which they discuss the importance of securing the
buses existent in a car (Local Interconnect Network (LIN), CAN, FlexRay, Media Ori-
ented Systems Transport (MOST)), as well as the gateways which allow information to
flow from one network to another. The authors remark that safety was the most crucial
factor in automotive design. However, vehicles have powerful diagnostics functional-
ity which is unprotected and, can therefore be easily abused, and the trend of introduc-
ing more connectivity, for convenience, opens up new attack vectors. They also draw
attention to the fact that one compromised bus system can affect the whole in-vehicle
communication network, due to the interconnection of all the buses. Denial of Ser-
vice (DoS) is highlighted as a possible CAN attack, as well as the ability to disconnect
every CAN controller on the network. The authors recommend controller authentica-
tion, communication encryption and gateway firewalls as solutions to achieve secure
bus communication within vehicles.
Larson and Nilsson argue in [95] for the need to employ the defence-in-depth de-
sign style, focusing on prevention of unauthorised access with the vehicle and within
it, detection of unauthorised access attempts, deflection systems, such as honeypots,
active countermeasure protections, such as intrusion detection systems, and recovery
abilities, in order to allow systems to return to a stable state after an attack.
3.2 To Assessing ECUs Under Local Access. . .
The work of Hoppe, Kiltz and Dittmann [69] is among the first in which the security
of the CAN bus is experimentally tested. Their research analyses the security of the
electric window lift, warning lights and airbag control system, all of which they suc-
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cessfully attack. The attacks they showcase range from minor nuisances to a driver, to
major distractions or life-threatening (e.g. if the airbag were to deploy suddenly, with-
out warning, while the vehicle is being driven in normal conditions). They also identify
the underlying problems which allowed them to carry out the attacks. The lack of au-
thentication, integrity or confidentiality on the CAN bus are repeatedly highlighted as
issues throughout the existing literature. The authors extend their work in [70] to show
an attack on a gateway ECU as well, being able to break the network isolation which
the gateway should enforce.
Koscher et al. [93] provide an extensive description of attack vectors under the as-
sumption that an attacker has access to the in-vehicle network, either via physical ac-
cess (e.g. through the On-Board Diagnostics (OBD-II) port or via malicious aftermarket
components), or though the various wireless interfaces modern vehicles have.
The experiments were conducted in a laboratory setting, on a test bench and on
the road, proving their viability and effects in a real-world scenario. The aim was to
observe the communication on the CAN bus and identify valid and relevant packets
for different ECUs. The authors also partially reverse-engineered the telematics unit to
understand its functionality. This was an important step as the telematics unit acts as a
bridge between the low and high CAN buses. Their research shows it is possible to con-
trol ECUs across a range of trust boundaries, e.g. low trust components such as radio,
Instrument Panel Cluster (IPC), Heating, Ventilation and Air Conditioning (HVAC),
Body Control Module (BCM) (which controls door locks, interior and exterior lights,
horn, windows, wipers, ignition), as well as safety-critical functionality of the engine
and brakes. They launched a generic DoS attack which disabled communication on the
CAN bus and froze the instrument panel cluster. The attacks can also be combined, for
example showing falsified speed in the dashboard requires both intercepting the ac-
tual packets and transmitting purposefully crafted speed update packets. The telem-
atics unit was an important attack vector, especially due to its position on both buses.
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By reprogramming the unit, an ECU from the low speed CAN could deliver packets
on the high speed bus. This implies that by compromising any ECU, irrelevant of its
placement, the attacker can gain complete control over the entire in-vehicle network,
and therefore affect safety-critical components. Also, vulnerabilities in the telematics
allowed malicious code to be uploaded to the ECU Random Access Memory (RAM).
The code sent messages on the CAN network, then force the unit to reboot and the
evidence of its existence is wiped.
Miller and Valasek [113] provide an extensive and thorough analysis of the ECUs in
two vehicles: a Ford Escape and a Toyota Prius, both from 2010. They experimentally
investigate each ECU the vehicles have, showing that each can be controlled, to some
degree. Table 3.1 summarises their findings, with the mention that all the attacks were
carried out over the CAN bus, and involved sniffing CAN traffic, reverse engineering
CAN packet payloads and the ability to send CAN messages crafted by the researchers.
Their attack entry vector was the OBD-II port for all but one tests.
As explained in Subsection 2.1.3, some Unified Diagnostics Services require an ele-
vated level of access, achieved through challenge-response authentication, via the Se-
curityAccess service. While investigating this service for the Ford ECUs the authors
noted that for the Parking Assist Module (PAM) module, the challenge nonce is always
the same. Therefore, sniffing a genuine response once allows an attacker to replay it
and successfully authenticate. The other ECUs had properly programmed challenge-
response protocols. They then set out to reverse engineer the Ford Integrated Diag-
nostic Software tool, and noticed that all the keys, for all ECUs, can be recovered from
it, as the tool has the capability of performing diagnostics on a vast range of modules.
They also reverse engineered the code responsible for computing the response for the
challenges. On the Toyota, the SecurityAccess service appeared to only be required if
re-flashing an ECU. The challenge-response protocol generates a new seed every time
the car is restarted, or after a number of invalid attempts, thus making brute forcing





FORD — Normal CAN packets
Driver door Any Dashboard indicates driver door ajar
Speedometer Any Speed and Rotations Per Minute (RPM) shown on combination
meter can be set to any arbitrary value
Odometer Any Odometer can increase at a faster pace than distance actually
travelled
Steering Any DoS causes Power Steering Control Module (PSCM) to shut-
down, steering wheel is difficult to move; driver cannot take
sharp turns
Steering <5 MPH Make steering wheel turn more/less (only small offsets work)
Diagnostic CAN packets
Brakes Stopped Proprietary diagnostic services which allow for the brakes to be
engaged
Brakes <5 MPH Ignore physical brakes input, disabling them
Engine Any Kill any/all cylinders, therefore killing the engine; even after the
attack is stopped, the engine continues to be affected
TOYOTA — Normal CAN packets
Speedometer Any Speed shown on combination meter can be set to any value
Brakes Cruise
Control
The vehicle is prevented from accelerating, eventually coming to
a halt
Acceleration Any CAN injection tool must be directly connected to CAN bus go-
ing to Power Management ECU; gasoline internal combustion
engine must be engaged, then disengaged; vehicle continues ac-
celerating even when pedal not pressed
Steering <4 MPH Vehicle must believe it is in reverse gear; take control of the servo
packet of the Intelligence Park Assist System (IPAS), therefore
controlling the steering wheel
Steering Any Vehicle must believe it is in reverse gear & CAN must be flooded
with fake speed messages; take control of the servo packet of the
IPAS, therefore controlling the steering wheel
Steering Any Lane Keep Assist is misused to allow steering wheel movements




Control individual solenoidsa in the Anti-lock Braking System
(ABS) and Electronically-Controlled Braking System (EBS)
Engine Stationary
in park
Kill fuel to any/all cylinders, therefore killing the engine
Lights Any Switch must be in auto state; turn headlights on/off
Horn Any Turn horn on/off; horn on state persists for a while, even after
car is turned off
Seat belt Any Pre-tighten driver/passenger seat belts
Doors Any Lock or unlock any/all doors; if doors are locked, they can still
be opened from the inside
Fuel gauge Any Spoof fuel gauge to show any desired level, regardless of how
much fuel the vehicle actually has
a A cylindrical coil of wire acting as a magnet when carrying electric current
Miles Per Hour (MPH)
Table 3.1: Summary of Charlie Miller and Chris Valasek findings, Adventures in Auto-
motive Networks and Control Units [113].
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the key difficult. The Toyota service tool Toyota Calibration Update Wizard was re-
verse engineered. The code which computes the response was identified, which lead
to the discovery of the keys for the Engine Control Module (ECM), Power Management
System and ABS.
For the last part of their research, Miller and Valasek set out to modify the firmware,
of the Ford PAM. The firmware was extracted through a debug interface available on
the ECU Printed Circuit Board (PCB) and the CodeWarrior debugger from NXP1. The
authors reverse engineered the code responsible for CAN communication, the CAN-
TP communication and the UDS services handling. They also found the functions that
implement the challenge-response protocol for the SecurityAccess service. They note
that the challenge is initially computed correctly, but it is then overwritten with the
value 0x11 0x22 0x33. Miller and Valasek speculate this was done for testing pur-
poses, but the developers forgot to remove the overwrite before the firmware went
into production. Therefore, the authentication is broken by using the same fixed chal-
lenge. By sniffing the communication between the Ford diagnostic tool and the ECU,
the researchers were able to understand how to upload code to the PAM and have it
executed. By using the RequestDownload service, the tool uploads binary blobs to the
ECU, at a fixed address. The code they upload is prefixed with a 4 byte signature,
followed by 4 offsets into the uploaded code. After the transfer is complete, the Rou-
tineControl service is used to start a routine, which inspects the uploaded code. If the
code starts with the magic signature, it will be executed from the first offset provided.
Therefore, the authors created a proof of concept attack by using the previously gained
knowledge about how the CAN communication is handled in the firmware, and wrote
a snippet of code which sends a pre-established message, then reads a message from
the bus, slightly modifies it, and sends it back.
1CodeWarrior Debugger Manual
(https://www.nxp.com/docs/en/reference-manual/Engine_PPCRM.pdf)
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3.3 Then Gaining Access Remotely. . .
The work of Koscher et al. raised a key issues: how would an attacker get access to the
vehicle. The assumption that prior physical access to the car was criticised as an un-
realistic scenario. Therefore, Checkoway et al. explore the external attack surface of
vehicles in [34]. Besides the internal networks (e.g. CAN buses), modern vehicles have
a variety of wireless interfaces: keyless entry, telematics, anti-theft systems, entertain-
ment systems or vehicle to vehicle networks, all use wireless communication and add
value and functionality to the overall system. However, they can also be used as access
points by a malicious adversary in launching remote attacks. Checkoway et al. classify
the wireless attacks under three categories, based on the entry points: indirect physical
access, short-range wireless access or long-range wireless access.
Indirect physical attacks are achieved through the OBD-II port or the entertainment
module. The OBD-II port provides direct access to the internal network of the car and,
therefore, complete control can be acquired. The OBD-II is used by service providers
and repair shops for routine maintenance and upgrades. By compromising the di-
agnostics tools (e.g. PassThru devices) or the laptops connected to these devices, an
attacker can manipulate the data sent to the vehicle. Taking the attack scenario one
step further, the authors compromise a PassThru device and install malicious software
which, in turn, installs malware on the telematics unit. They then modify the malicious
code to act like a worm, actively seeking other PassThru devices on the same Wi-Fi net-
work, and infecting them. Vulnerabilities in the media player read file functions and in
the Windows Media Audio (WMA) parser allowed the researchers to engineer a WMA
audio file that would play on a PC but would send random CAN packets when used
in the car. As discussed previously, any controlled ECU can affect the car in its entirety.
Short-range wireless attacks take advantage of networks operating over short dis-
tances, such as Bluetooth, remote keyless entry, Radio-Frequency Identification (RFID),
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Wi-Fi or Tyre Pressure Monitoring System (TPMS). Bluetooth is the most common way
of connecting the mobile phone with the vehicle and uses the car’s telematics unit. Vul-
nerabilities in the feature integration code allowed the researchers to execute arbitrary
code on the telematics unit. Compromising a phone which was previously paired with
the car’s Bluetooth is one way of exploiting this weakness. Without a paired device,
the effort of the attacker is considerably greater, as they need to sniff the car’s Bluetooth
MAC (Media Acess Control) address and brute-force the PIN needed for pairing.
The long-range wireless attacks were carried over the cellular network. Modern ve-
hicles incorporate this feature for Internet-based features (via 3G data channel) or for
safety purposes (via voice channel). This functionality if fulfilled by the telematics unit,
which runs a program (Gateway) to deal with both voice and data cellular communi-
cation. An in-band tone-based signalling protocol2 is used for switching between voice
and data mode. By reverse engineering the AqLink software responsible for convert-
ing between analogue waveforms and digital bits, contained in the Gateway program,
incompatibilities were found between the packet size and expected input size by the
command protocol, thus allowing for a buffer overflow exploit. However, the attack
is prevented by a caller authentication protocol which closes the connection within 12
seconds, if it does not receive a valid response (sending the buffer overflow payload
required about 14 seconds). The caller authentication protocol was not securely imple-
mented either. The challenge was produced by a random number generator which was
initialised with the same seed each time the telematics unit rebooted, thus enabling a
replay attack. Furthermore, for approximately 1 in 256 authentication attempts, incor-
rect responses, which have been carefully crafted, were accepted as valid. Putting all
the vulnerabilities together, the authors were able to create an attack by which they
repeatedly called the vehicle until they successfully authenticated, they changed the
2In-band signalling refers to control information sent over the same physical channel whereas tone-
based signalling refers to a ‘steady or pulsating periodic sound’ used to indicate a specific condition
should be entered or is happening [176]
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timeout to 60 seconds, and closed the connection. They then re-called the vehicle, ex-
ploited the buffer overflow vulnerability, and forced the telematics unit to download
and run additional malicious code from the Internet. The attack could also be deliv-
ered by encoding the exploit payload in an audio format, calling the car, and playing
the audio over telephone.
Miller and Valasek also provide a survey of the remote automotive attack surfaces
in [116]. They investigated 20 vehicles, from 11 manufacturers, released between 2006
and 2015. They were the first to provide a review of automotive network architectures.
They note that a remote attack may have up to three stages, depending on the aims
of the attacker. First, an ECU with wireless functionality needs to be compromised.
This could be the target of the attack in some situations, e.g. the telematics unit is com-
promised, and the goal is audio exfiltration. However, if the aim is controlling some
safety-critical ECU (which, typically, is connected to a different bus), the next step is
taking control of the gateway, which is responsible for forwarding messages to the
various networks connected in the car. Finally, the attacker needs to have a very good
understanding of the CAN messages used by the vehicles and any safety features that
might be built-in to the target ECU. Therefore, a large effort towards reverse engineer-
ing the CAN traffic is required; also, this will be manufacturer, or even vehicle specific,
therefore it is not easily scalable. The researchers identify the following features/ECUs
as possible remote attack vectors, in order of likelihood of success of code exploitation:
passive anti-theft system, TPMS, remote keyless entry, Radio Data System, Bluetooth,
telematics/cellular/Wi-Fi, Internet/apps. The last category, Internet and apps, is es-
pecially dangerous as it would open up vehicles to web browser exploits, malicious
apps or internet service exploitation, all of which have well established compromise
methodologies, which are also known to attackers.
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3.4 To the Ultimate Remote Pwn!
Miller and Valasek set out to remotely compromise an unaltered vehicle in [115]. Draw-
ing on their previous research, they choose a 2014 Jeep Cherokee as target. The car has
a number of possible wireless entry points for an attacker, such as remote keyless en-
try, TPMS, Bluetooth, Radio Data System, cellular, Wi-Fi hotspot and Internet-based
apps. After a preliminary investigation, the UConnect system is chosen as focus for
the task. The system provides Internet, radio, cellular communication and apps, hav-
ing all infotainment features in one module, which is conveniently connected to both
vehicle CAN buses. Most of the functionality of the ECU is fulfilled by a Texas In-
struments OMAP-DM3730 (32-bit ARM chip). However, the CAN communication is
handled by a second chip, a 32-bit Renesas 850V . The two chips can communicate
via an Serial Peripheral Interface (SPI) interface. UConnect runs QNX3, an Unix-like
real-time Operating System (OS), and an image of the system could be downloaded
from the Internet. Therefore, the researchers were able to obtain the filesystem, with
all binary and configuration files.
As the vehicle has the ability to create a Wi-Fi hotspot (paid subscription service),
the authors decided to examine it further. Wi-Fi security is a well established research
area, and the methodologies for both attacking and securing such networks are well
established and documented. The Wi-Fi hotspot had a 12 character lowercase and
uppercase alphabetical preset password, which did not present obvious biases. The
password generation algorithm was identified in the WifiSvc binary, and reverse en-
gineered. The password was generated during the first ever boot of the ECU, and is a
function of the epoch time. This could be abused by an attacker, who could generate a
list of possible passwords, by taking into account the year the car was manufactured.
3QNX in automotive
(https://blackberry.qnx.com/en/solutions/industries/automotive/index)
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However, the service responsible for setting the time had a condition that, if the time
could not be retrieved, it was set to 1st of January 2013 GMT, 00:00:00. If the time could
not be retrieved when the unit first booted, the time would be incorrect, therefore the
search space for possible passwords is greatly reduced. After testing this hypothesis,
it was found that the Wi-Fi password on the Jeep corresponded to the time 00:00:32 1st
of January 2013. If this behaviour was prevalent for all other vehicles using this sys-
tem, their passwords would be easily crackable. By performing port scanning on the
Wi-Fi hotspot, nine ports were found to be open. One of the most interesting ones was
an unauthenticated D-Bus4 daemon (on port 6667). The service allows for a number
of direct interactions with the head unit, such as adjusting radio volume or retrieving
Global Positioning System (GPS) data. One other service, NavTrailService, pro-
vides an execute method which allows for shell command execution.
Cellular connectivity was provided by Sprint, and it seemed the IP address allo-
cated to the vehicle on the internal Sprint network was limited to 21.0.0.0/8 or
25.0.0.0/8, and the D-Bus service was exposed. Furthermore, Sprint did not use
device isolation on their network, therefore any Sprint device could communicate with
any other Sprint device. Scanning the aforementioned address ranges for devices with
port 6667 open, the authors were able to identify 2695 vehicles with an unauthenticated
D-Bus service, which could be queried (Fiat Chrysler recalled 1.4 million vehicles due
to this research [23]).
The final step was being able to send CAN messages, which meant reverse engi-
neering the firmware of the V850 chip and finding a way of transmitting the data from
the OMAP chip to the V850. They identified how the CAN read and write functional-
ity works, and also investigated how communication over SPI is handled, as this was
used as a channel to convey commands and messages between the two chips. The
4D-Bus is a software bus, used for inter-process communication, and for remote procedure calls; it
allows multiple processes running on the same host to communicate with each other (Wikipedia D-bus
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/D-Bus)
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firmware was modified such that a specific command sent over SPI jumps to attacker
code in the firmware, from where arbitrary CAN messages can be sent, and the vehicle
can be controlled, following the same processes as explained in Subsection 3.2.
To recap, the authors could remotely address the vehicle, from any Sprint device,
and they had a way of executing shell commands on it via the exposed D-Bus daemon.
This access allowed them to re-flash the firmware on the V850 chip, introducing the
ability to send messages on both CAN networks, from input taken from the SPI. On
the OMAP chip, any preferred method of interacting with the SPI could have been
used, in this case Lua5 scripts were chosen.
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The authors demonstrated the attacks live, on the road, for Wired Magazine [59],
showing they could completely control the vehicle over the Internet: the car’s
dashboard functions, steering, brakes, heating system, radio, windshield wipers,
the car’s digital display, engine and transmission.
3.5 Summary
In this chapter we have reviewed related research to automotive security, to firmware
analysis and fuzzing. Understanding literature related to vehicle threats allows us to
identify what enabled the attacks to be carried out, and the lack of authentication on
the CAN bus appears throughout the works presented here.







This chapter describes LEIA, which was the first AUTOSAR compliant, lightweight
authentication protocol for CAN in the literature, at the time it was published. The
protocol respects the requirements laid out to become a standard in the automotive
industry, as described in the Secure Onboard Communication Module Specification of
the AUTOSAR standards.
4.1 Motivation
As seen in Chapter 3, most of the attacks presented in the literature have as basis the
ability of an attacker to send arbitrary CAN messages, which the other ECUs on the
network receive and act upon. This is enabled by the fact that there is no source authen-
tication within the CAN messages and no way for a receiver ECU to verify the message
it received does, indeed, come from the intended party. The protocol presented in this
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chapter aims to limit and mitigate this fundamental flaw in the CAN bus protocol, by
introducing source authentication.
4.2 Contribution
LEIA does not require additional hardware components or substantial implementation
costs thus is less expensive than previously proposed solutions, while providing higher
security levels. The protocol has been designed by taking into consideration real-world
requirements and limitations of the CAN bus such as limited bandwidth, short data
frames and publisher-subscriber broadcast architecture where newly arrived messages
may overwrite older ones in the receiver’s buffer [166].
Furthermore, LEIA is fully backwards compatible with existing CAN configura-
tion, and is designed such that it can be flexibly implemented, providing different se-
curity vs bandwidth or computational overhead trade-offs.
LEIA has been implemented on a resource constrained MCU, the Atmel AVR AT-
Mega328p (Arduino UNO) and has shown suitable performance, the latency intro-
duced being of only 3ms, therefore respecting the industry standard requirement of
less than 5ms for safety-critical functionality.
Finally, the protocol is proven to provide secure authentication under the unforge-
ability assumption of the MAC scheme under chosen plaintext attacks. Since the same
MAC scheme is used also for key diversification, there is the additional requirement
that the produced MAC values are indistinguishable from the output of the key gener-
ation function.
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4.3 Building Blocks for Authentication Protocols
This section discusses the security definitions for an authentication protocol, as well as
the security definitions for the underlying primitives. Our focus is on a symmetric key
solution, therefore the notions for MAC are given.
4.3.1 Security Notions
An authentication protocol is an interactive cryptographic protocol executed between
a prover P and a verifier V . In an initial phase, both parties run a setup(η) function,
where η is the security parameter, which produces a shared secret s and, potentially,
public parameters ns. After an execution of the protocol, V outputs the identity of the
prover, id, and the message data. An authentication protocol has completeness error
α if for all secrets s generated by setup(η), the honestly executed protocol rejects the
identity and message with a probability at most α.
The main focus of the authentication protocols in this thesis is to be secure against
active attacks. These allow the adversaryA to interact with the honest prover a polyno-
mial amount of times. Then, A interacts with the verifier only, and wins if the verifier
returns accept. The adversary interacts with V only once. An authentication protocol
is (t, Q, η)-secure against active adversaries if every Probabilistic Polynomial Time (PPT)
adversary A, running at most t times and making Q queries to the honest prover, has
probability at most ε to win the above game.
Firstly, some notation needs to be introduced. Let F2 = {0, 1} be the field of two
elements (or the set of Booleans). Fl2 denotes a bitstring of length l and F∗2 is a bitstring
of arbitrary length. ‖ stands for the concatenation of two bitstrings.
Execution environment. Let n be the number of identifiers in the system, and I =
{id0, . . . , idn−1} be the set of all identifiers. Let P = {P0, . . . , Pn−1} be the set of all
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protocol participants, where participant Pi knows the secret parameter si and public
parameters ns.
Definition 4.1 (Protocol setup). Let the function setup : η → (s, ns) be the initialisa-
tion procedure of the protocol parties, where η is the security parameter and (s, ns) is
a tuple formed by the secret parameter s and the public parameters ns.
Definition 4.2 (Authentication oracles). Let Π = {π(si) | si ∈ s} be a set of oracles
such that π(si) emulates party Pi of the authentication protocol.
Definition 4.3 (Protocol output). Let output : P→ I ×F∗2 be the protocol output func-
tion of a protocol participant Pi and outputs a tuple (idj, data) corresponding to the last
successful protocol instance of Pi, where idj ∈ I is the identity of the sender and data
is the message that was sent.
The security notions for symmetric key authentication protocols are introduced be-
low. Most of it is standard, and most of the definitions proposed here are adapted
from [170].
Definition 4.4 (Matching conversations [170]). A matching conversation is a successful
execution of the authentication protocol, between two parties.
The authentication game AuthΠ(η,A) is presented and formally defined below.
The public and secret parameters are generated by calling the setup(η) function. Then
adversary A interacts with the oracles π(si) which emulate the protocol participants
which respond according to the protocol description. At some point the adversary
A terminates. A wins if there is a party Pi which has accepted, and thus outputs,
(idj, data) while Pi and Pj did not have any matching conversation.
By AdvAuthMAC(η,A) the advantage of the adversary A in breaking the authentication
protocol is expressed.




winif ∃ i, j, data : output(Pi) = (idj, data) is the output of
a party Pi and, parties Pi and Pj did not have any matching
conversation.
Definition 4.5 (Authentication Protocol Security). An authentication protocol is said
to be secure if for all PPT adversariesA, the probability thatAwins the game AuthΠ(η,A)
is a negligible function of η:
AdvAuthMAC(η,A) ≤ ε(η)
4.3.2 Message Authentication Codes
A MAC is a set of three algorithms {KG, MAC, Verify}, with associated key space K,
message spaceM and MAC space Φ.
The standard security notion for a MAC is unforgeability under a chosen message attack
(UF-CMA). The secret keyK is generated by calling the key generation algorithm KG of
the MAC. Then, adversary B makes up to Q queries to the MAC(K, ·) and Verify(K, ·, ·)
algorithms. At some point, B terminates and outputs a tuple (m, φ), where m ∈ M is
a message and φ ∈ Φ is a MAC. Adversary B wins if it did not query MAC(K,m) and
φ verifies for message m, under the secret key K.
Advuf–cmaMAC (η,B, Q) denotes the advantage of the adversary B in forging a messaged
under a chosen message attack for MAC, on the security parameter η.
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Experiment UF–CMAMAC(η,B, Q)
K ← KG(1η)
Invoke BMAC(K,·),Verify(K,·,·) which can make up to Q queries
to MAC(K, ·) and Verify(K, ·, ·).
(m, φ)← BMAC(K,·),Verify(K,·,·)
winif
1. Verify(K,m, φ) = accept
2. B did not already request MAC(K,m)
Definition 4.6 (UF–CMA Security). A message authentication code algorithm MAC is
(t, Q, η)-secure against UF-CMA adversaries if for any adversary B running in time t
the experiment above, the following is true:
Advuf–cmaMAC (η,B, Q) ≤ ε(η)
Assumption 4.1 (MAC indistinguishability from random). The output of the MAC al-
gorithm is computationally indistinguishable from random and, the output of the key
generation (KG) function the output of the MAC function have the same distribution.
4.3.3 Adversarial Model
The adversary considered is a Dolev-Yao adversary [50], who controls the network.
In particular, they can passively monitor the network, read all data passing through
the CAN and send messages with any id. They can also send error frames to destroy
current data or remote frames. However, in practice, the CAN error handling limits
the attacker’s capabilities in this respect.
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4.4 LEIA: A Lightweight Authentication Protocol for
CAN
This section outlines the design of LEIA, with a detailed description of each function
of the authentication protocol.
The CAN bus uses a publish-and-subscribe architecture model, where one ECU can
broadcast a message with a certain identifier (idi). The identifier is not a way to identify
the source or destination of a message. Therefore, the protocol provides unidirectional
authentication, with a method of signalling if any of the subscribed ECUs have gone
out of sync or authentication has failed.
Each protocol participant which needs to authenticate data, will need to store a
tuple
〈





per relevant CAN identifier, where:
• the identifier idi is a CAN ID;
• the keyKidi is a 128-bit long term symmetric key that is used to derive the session
key;
• the epoch eidi is a 56-bit counter; the value is incremented at every vehicle start-up
or when the counter cidi overflows; participates in the generation of the session
key;
• the session key Keidi is a 128-bit key used for generating the MAC; re-generating
the session key when the epoch eidi changes ensures that only a small amount of
data is authenticated under the same key; also, if the session key becomes com-
promised, the attacker can compute valid MACs only until the epoch changes
(limited time);
• the counter cidi is a 16-bit counter included in the MAC and is sent within the
data frame containing the MAC, in order to provide freshness.
The long term keys and epochs are assumed to be stored in tamper-resistant mem-
50 4.4. LEIA: A Lightweight Authentication Protocol for CAN
ory. Updating the set of keys (e.g. if adding or replacing a node in the network) should
require direct physical access to the involved nodes and, therefore, could only be done
by an authorised repairs shop. How exactly this can be achieved is beyond the scope
of this chapter, as it is only concerned with the design of a protocol that would authen-
ticate the communication between ECUs.
We describe below the functions of the protocol, for a pair of nodes: sender S, which
is the broadcaster of messages with the identifier idi, and receiver R, which is the node
subscribed to messages broadcast on the identifier idi.
The authentication protocol LEIA has an associated key space K ∈ F1282 , message
spaceM∈ F∗2 and MAC space Φ ∈ F642 .
Protocol setup The function setup : η → 〈s, ns〉 is the initialisation procedure of the
ECUs, where η is the security parameter and 〈s, ns〉 is a tuple formed by the secret pa-
rameter s and the public parameters ns. The secret parameter s =
〈
Kid0 , . . . Kidn−1
〉
is
computed by running the key generation algorithm KG(1η) of the MAC for each iden-
tity idi, with Kidi ∈ K. The public parameters are ns =
〈





where cidi ∈ F162 is the counter and eidi ∈ F562 is the epoch. Both the counter and epoch
are initialised to zero, for each identity idi. The session key generation function is then
called for each identity idi, in order to generate the session key Keidi .
4.4.1 Session Key Generation
Let session_key_gen : K × F562 → K be the session key generation function. This func-
tion (Figure 4.1) takes as input a long term symmetric key Kidi and an epoch eidi , both
associated with an identity idi, and outputs the session key Keidi computed as follows:
1. increment epoch: eidi ← eidi + 1
2. apply MAC algorithm, having as parameters the long term symmetric key Kidi
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Session key generation
session_key_gen(Kidi , eidi)
〈idi, Kidi , eidi〉 〈idi, Kidi , eidi〉
Sender Receiver
increase eidi increase eidi
Keidi = MAC(Kidi , eidi) K
e
idi
= MAC(Kidi , eidi)
reset cidi reset cidi
Figure 4.1: Session key generation be-
tween sender S and receiver R for mes-
sage with identifier idi.
Sending authenticated messages

















, cidi , data)
upd_cnt(cidi , eidi)
Verify MAC
Figure 4.2: Message authentication be-
tween sender S and receiver R for mes-
sage with identifier idi.
and epoch eidi :
Keidi ← MAC(Kidi , eidi)
3. reset counter to zero: cidi ← 0
A session key is generated whenever the ECU is powered on or when the epoch
counter eidi changes, due to the overflow of counter cidi .
4.4.2 Sending Authenticated Messages
Let send_auth : K × F162 × M → M × Φ be the function for sending authenticated
messages. In order to send an authenticated message (Figure 4.2), the sender first needs
to update the counter cidi . If cidi overflows, then the epoch eidi is incremented and cidi
is reset to 0 (Algorithm 4.1). It then calls the MAC algorithm which takes as input the
session key Keidi , the counter cidi and the message data, and produces as output a MAC
φ ∈ Φ computed as:
φ = MAC(Keidi , cidi , data)
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Line 3 in Algorithm 4.1 would never happen in practice, due to the length of the
epoch counter. If we assume an attacker is able to reboot the ECU once per millisecond
to forcefully increment the epoch counter, they would need 2 million years to roll it
over.
The sender then transmits the counter, data and MAC. After reading the values,
the receiver updates the counters and verifies the MAC.
Function upd_cnt(cidi , eidi , Kid):
Input: cidi , eidi , Kid * freshness counter, epoch and long term symmetric key *
Result: cidi and eidi are incremented accordingly
1 if cidi = 0xFFFF then
2 if eidi = 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFF then
3 eidi ← 0x00000000000000 * both counters have maxed out; roll to 0 *
* this would never happen in practice *
4 else
5 eidi ← eidi + 1 * increment the epoch *
6 end if
7 cidi ← 0x0000 * reset the counter *
8 session_key_gen(Kidi , eidi) * new epoch⇒ regenerate the session key *
9 else
10 cidi ← cidi + 1 * increment the counter *
11 end if
end
Algorithm 4.1: Counter (and epoch) update algorithm.
4.4.3 Resynchronisation
Let resync : K×F562 ×F162 ×M→ F562 ×Φ be the resynchronisation function. If a MAC
cannot be verified, the receiver sends an AUTH_FAIL signal to the sender. When an
AUTH_FAIL message is read, the sender S broadcasts a message containing its current
epoch value, a MAC of the epoch and counter cidi , then proceeds with normal data
transmission (Figure 4.3). This will help the receiver nodes resynchronise their epoch
and counter.
The receiverR will update eidi and cidi only if the values are higher (or equal, for the
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Resynchronisation
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check eS‖cS > eR‖cR
Verify MAC of e
upd_cnt(cidi , eidi)
update eidi ← eS , cidi ← cS





, cidi , data)
upd_cnt(cidi , eidi)
Verify MAC of data
where:
- ‖ stands for concatenation
- eS and cS are epoch and
counter received from Sender
- eR and cR are epoch and
counter stored by Receiver
Figure 4.3: Message authentication failure and resynchronisation procedure, between
sender S and receiver R for message with identifier idi.
epoch) than the stored ones. If the new counter is lower than the receiver’s counter, it
means there is an attacker attempting a replay attack, therefore the data is discarded
and the counter not incremented. The most common cause for a MAC to fail veri-
fication, in the context of the CAN bus communication, is the de-synchronisation of
counter cidi and epoch eidi values. Not all nodes join the network at the same time,
therefore the counters will be outdated and the receiver will need to request the cur-
rent values from the sender.
A complete protocol outline is given in Figure 4.4.
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Protocol outline








, cidi , data)
upd_cnt(cidi , eidi)
yes noVerify MAC
resync(Keidi , cidi , eidi , data)
Figure 4.4: Communication between sender S and receiver R for message with identi-
fier idi – LEIA protocol outline.
4.5 Dealing with the Shortcomings of CAN
As some of the ECUs are involved in safety-critical functions such as acceleration
and ABS, latency is of prime concern. Any solution aiming at providing extra secu-
rity features, such as authentication, cannot introduce significant latency (more than
5ms [184]). To this end, lightweight cryptography is best suited. Furthermore, many
ECUs have limited memory available, therefore the implementation of the protocol
should be compact as well. For this reason, the solution uses a MAC algorithm for two
different purposes: authenticating data and deriving session keys.
In order to compensate for the modest security provided by lightweight crypto-
graphic primitives, the long term secret key is not used directly. Instead, session keys
are generated, which are used to authenticate the messages exchanged. A session key



























Figure 4.5: Extended Data Frame CAN 2.0B (29-bit identifier) – placement of command
code (CC) and counter within Extended Identifier field.
is used to authenticate at most 216 messages, after which a new session key is derived,
as the freshness counter cid is 16 bits, the epoch counter eid is incremented whenever
the freshness counter overflows, and a new epoch counter triggers a new session key.
This limits the amount of key-dependent data an attacker has access to. In case a ses-
sion key is compromised, an attacker can use it either until 216 messages have been
authenticated, or until the vehicle is restarted, whichever comes first.
LEIA makes use of the extended identifier data frames. It uses the Extended Iden-
tifier 18-bit field in order to send the 16-bit counter and a 2-bit command code, as
explained below (Figure 4.5). The 29-bit identifier data frames co-exist with the 11-bit
data frames without interfering with the arbitration process of CAN, as the priority of
a message is decided based on the 11-bit Identifier field.
The following transmission channels over CAN are defined:
Data Channel All ids which are used to transmit data and signals constitute the data
channel. The data is transmitted within the payload field of the frame. The counter cidi
which is used to generate the MAC is placed in the extended identifier field. The two
leftmost bits are the command code 00, and signal that data is being transmitted in the
frame.
Authentication Channel All ids which are used to transmit MACs make up the Au-
thentication Channel. The MACs are transmitted on a different identifier than the data.
This id should be a fixed offset from the base id on which the data is sent. It should be
as close as possible to the base id, in order to avoid scheduling issues caused by arbi-
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tration. In the example, idMAC = iddata + 1. This will avoid messages with the same
identifier being overwritten in the CAN controller buffer. The counter is placed in the
extended identifier field. The two leftmost bits, which represent the command code, are
defined as follows:
00: the data frame contains application data;
01: the data frame contains a MAC of data;
10: the data frame contains an epoch value eidi ;
11: the data frame contains a MAC of an epoch eidi .
Authentication Error Channel (AEC) Each node connected to CAN has an Authenti-
cation Error Channel (AEC). This is used for resynchronisation purposes. The AUTH_-
FAIL signal is sent on the ECU. Nodes which are broadcasters of messages with idi
become subscribers of the ECU of the nodes listening to idi. The AUTH_FAIL signal
is defined as a set of two messages. The first data frame contains the id of the mes-
sage which failed MAC verification (idfailed), concatenated with the lower 53 bits of the
ECU epoch counter (lsb53(eidAEC )). Sending the epoch within the data frame ensures
the receiving nodes can verify they have the correct values, and a resynchronisation
procedure for the ECU is not needed. The second message contains the MAC of the
previous one, as shown in Figure 4.6. Sending an AUTH_FAIL signal is considered
a rare event, therefore overwriting messages within the buffer are not of concern, in






























data = idfailed‖lsb53(eidAEC )
MAC = MAC(KeidAEC , cidAEC , idfailed, lsb53(eidAEC ))
Figure 4.6: Data frame structure for AUTH_FAIL signal.
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Identifier Node Node Node Node
A B C D
0x004 S R
0x010 R R S
0x015 S R
→
Identifier Node Node Node Node
A B C D
0x004 S R
0x005 S R
0x010 R R S




0x7FE R S R
0x7FF R S
Table 4.1: Extended communication matrix example. ‘S’ stands for Sender and ‘R’ for
Receiver.
Table 4.1 shows a small example of an extended communication matrix. The iden-
tifiers highlighted are the additional identifiers introduced by LEIA. Identifiers 0x005,
0x011 and 0x016 correspond to the Authentication Channel, while identifiers 0x7FD,
0x7FE and 0x7FF correspond to the Authentication Error Channel.
In the case an attacker fully compromises and takes control of an ECU, for the ids
the node broadcasts or listens on, the attacker will unavoidably be able to generate
valid MACs, but not for any other id. This is not a problem of the protocol but an
inherent limitation of using symmetric key cryptography. An attacker can collect some
AUTH_FAIL answers from the sender, knowing one of the receiver nodes is offline.
When the receiver node joins the network and sends the AUTH_FAIL signal, as it does
not have the correct counter and epoch values, the attacker sends a stored answer. The
receiver will accept the message, provided the stored counter and epoch are lower than
the received ones. However, due to the design of CAN, the initial AUTH_FAIL signal is
also received by the sender node, which will send the correct epoch and counter values.
The attacker can destroy these frames, but S will broadcast them again, due to the error
handling mechanism of CAN. After a number of destroyed frames, the CAN flags the
attacker as error passive, meaning it cannot destroy other frames. Therefore, the correct
message of S will be transmitted and the receiver node will be able to update its values
accordingly. Communication then resumes under the protocol.
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4.6 Performance Evaluation
The following section presents the implementation details for our protocol, as well as
a worst case latency analysis.
4.6.1 Implementation
LEIA has been implemented on Arduino UNO boards1, with Atmel AVR ATMega328p
microcontrollers, clock frequency 16 MHz, 32 Kb flash and 2 Kb RAM, fitted with
MCP2515 CAN controllers. The boards were chosen for their constrained resources,
in terms of memory and computation power. The ECUs in today’s vehicles have more
powerful MCUs, therefore by choosing the Arduinos, an estimate of performance in a
worst-case scenario can be provided. For example, the MCU of a BCM we will research
in later chapters has a clock frequency of 64 MHz, 518 Kb flash and 48 Kb RAM. Kec-
cak sponge 200 with a capacity of 64 was chosen as the underlying MAC algorithm.
The protocol was tested on a network consisting of four nodes, each sending its own
messages, as detailed in Figure 4.7. The boards were connected to a computer and re-
port via serial when they send a message messages or when they successfully verify a
message. The computer keeps track of this and calculates the latency of the protocol.
Node D reads all CAN messages and forwards them to the computer; the node’s pur-
pose was mainly to verify that the other nodes behave as expected. The bus speed was
set at 500Kb/s, which is the most common bus speed used in vehicles.
In the benchmark implementation, every LEIA authenticated CAN message has a
MAC sent alongside it. However, the protocol allows for a trade-off between com-
putational resources and bandwidth usage versus security. The configuration of the
network, and the decision of which CAN ids to authenticate and how often should be
taken by a manufacturer after assessing the security requirements of each ECU and
1Arduino UNO Wikipedia (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arduino_Uno)


















Figure 4.7: Test network architecture for LEIA implementation benchmarking; S.A ids
are sent authenticated.
whether is fulfils a safety critical role. The CAN bus has a static configuration. Due
to this, LEIA can be implemented in two ways, depending on the functionality of the
ECU. As described above, each message sent is authenticated. If applied to all ECUs,
this doubles the communication overhead. However, for nodes not involved in safety-
critical functions, the protocol can be implemented such that one MAC is sent after
n messages, where n can be chosen based on the node’s security requirements. For
CAN-TP messages split across multiple frames, the data payload can be authenticated
before being split into multiple frames, and therefore only one MAC needs to be sent.
With respect to performance, the MAC computation takes on average 738 µs for
every message sent, and the time between receiving a frame and successfully verifying
it is 2.96 ms. At a speed of 100 km/h, the induced latency means a travelling distance
of 8.2 cm.
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4.6.2 Latency analysis
We perform a worst case latency analysis for our protocol, based on the works of Tin-
dell [164, 166, 165]. Tindell defines the worst case response time (Rm) of a given message
m as the maximum time between a scheduler queuing messagem in the transmit buffer
of the ECU, and the latest time the message arrives at a receiver ECU [166]. Mathemat-
ically, the worst case response time is defined as:
Rm = Jm + wm + Cm
where:
• Jm is the queuing jitter of message m (latest time the message can be queued),
• wm represents the worst case queueing delay of message m, given by messages
with a higher priority taking transmission precedence and lower priority mes-
sages that might already be in transmission on the bus,
• Cm is the longest possible time that sending a message on the bus could take
(accounting for extra stuff bits).
The longest time to send a message can be calculated as:
Cm =
(⌊
34 + 8 ∗ sm
5
⌋




• sm is the size of the message m (in bytes),
• τbit is the time required to send one bit on the bus.
The queuing delay of a message m can be calculated as:
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where:
• Bm is the maximum time message m can be delayed by lower priority messages,
• hp(m) is the set of messages with higher priority than m,
• Tj and Jj are the period and jitter respectively of a given message j.
The maximum delay time by lower priority messages can be calculated from the




Based on the SAE dataset [145] used in [164], we calculate Rm for the scenario
in which each transmitted message is authenticated. We use a CAN bus speed of
500Kb/s, as this is the most common found in vehicles currently. This gives us a bit
transmission time of τbit = 0.002ms. We perform the analysis on the aggregated mes-
sages system proposed by Tindell, in which some short, sporadic signals are grouped
together at the sender and sent as part of one periodic message.
Table 4.2 presents the results of our analysis. Messages with the label ‘A’ carry the
MAC on a different CAN id and are all 8 bytes in size. The fourth column, ‘Max latency‘
is the maximum acceptable latency for the given message. The last column represents
the total worst case response time. It is the sum of the R for the message containing
the data, the worst case response time R for the message containing the MAC and the
time required to compute a MAC (738 µs), as the receiver ECU would need to verify it
before being able to consume the data. The table shows there is no worst case response
time for any authenticated message transmission that exceeds the maximum latency
acceptable for that message. We can therefore conclude that LEIA would be suitable
for use in a vehicle, as it does not cause any delays that might negatively impact safety.
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Signal Size
(bytes)
J (ms) T (ms) Max
latency
(ms)
R (ms) R Total
(ms)
14 1 0.1 50 5 0.386
14A 8 0.1 50 5 0.646 1.770
8, 9 2 0.1 5 5 0.792
8, 9 A 8 0.1 6 5 1.052 2.582
7 1 0.1 5 5 1.178
7A 8 0.1 5 5 1.438 3.354
43, 49 2 0.1 5 5 1.584
43, 49A 8 0.1 5 5 1.844 4.166
11 1 0.1 5 5 1.970
11A 8 0.1 5 5 2.230 4.938
32, 41 2 0.1 5 5 2.376
32, 41A 8 0.1 5 5 2.636 5.750
31, 34, 35, 37, 38, 39, 40,
44, 46, 48, 53
6 0.2 10 10 2.858
31, 34, 35, 37, 38, 39, 40,
44, 46, 48, 53A
8 0.2 10 10 3.118 6.714
23, 24, 25, 28 1 0.2 10 10 3.244
23, 24, 25, 28A 8 0.2 10 10 3.504 7.486
15, 16, 17, 19, 20, 22, 26,
27
2 0.2 10 10 3.650
15, 16, 17, 19, 20, 22, 26,
27A
8 0.2 10 10 3.910 8.298
41, 43, 45, 47, 49, 50, 51,
52
3 0.2 10 10 4.074
41, 43, 45, 47, 49, 50, 51,
52A
8 0.2 10 10 4.334 9.146
18 1 0.2 50 20 4.460
18A 8 0.2 50 20 4.720 9.918
1, 2, 4, 6 4 0.3 100 100 4.904
1, 2, 4, 6A 8 0.3 100 100 5.164 10.806
12 1 0.3 100 100 5.290
12A 8 0.3 100 100 5.550 11.578
10 1 0.2 100 100 5.676
10A 8 0.2 100 100 5.936 12.350
3, 5, 13 3 0.4 1000 1000 6.100
3, 5, 13A 8 0.4 1000 1000 6.360 13.198
21 1 0.3 1000 1000 6.486
21A 8 0.3 1000 1000 6.746 13.970
33, 36 1 0.3 1000 1000 6.872
33, 36A 8 0.3 1000 1000 7.132 14.742
Table 4.2: Worst case response time for the SAE dataset used by Tindell [164], if every
message was authenticated using LEIA.
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4.7 Security Analysis
This section analyses the security of LEIA under the unforgeability assumption of the
MAC scheme under chosen message attacks.
4.7.1 Security Proof
While various tools exist for formally proving the security of a protocol, e.g. Tamarin [21],
StatVerif [144], we believe our protocol is fairly straightforward, relying on the proper-
ties mentioned in 4.3, and therefore a manual games proof is equally suitable.
Theorem 1 The LEIA authentication protocol is secure with respect to Definition 4.5 (see
Section 4.3.1). 2
PROOF Assume that there is an adversary A that breaks the AuthΠ(η,A) security of
the authentication protocol LEIA. Then, an adversaryB is built, that breaks the (t, Q, η)-
security of the UF–CMAMAC scheme.
At the beginning, the adversary B randomly picks one target identifier id? and a
target epoch e?. Then, B runs the protocol setup function for each identity idi.
The adversary B executesA. For this, B needs to emulate oracles π(Kidi). Emulating
party Pi means generating the session key, and keeping track of the counters cidi and
epochs eidi , as specified in the protocol description. The session key for an identity
is regenerated every time the associated epoch is incremented. The adversary A has
access to the oracles in Π.
When transitioning from e? − 1 to e?, for identity id?, B will not use the MAC algo-
rithm, as described in the protocol, to generate the session key Ke?id? . Instead, whenever
a MAC needs to be computed under the key Ke?id? , the adversary will use the MAC(·, ·)
oracle from the UF–CMAMAC game. Note that due to Assumption 4.1, this will be in-
distinguishable from the case of using the key generation algorithm KG(·). For all other
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cases, it will compute it herself, by running the MAC algorithm.
At some point, A terminates. With non-negligible probability (> ε(η), where η is
the length of the long term key Kid), there must exist a Pi which outputs an identity
idj and a message m, without having a matching conversation between Pi and Pj . In
order for Pi to produce this output, it means A has sent a message m = (c‖data) and a
MAC φ = MAC(Keid,m) which Pi has verified, and therefore this must be a valid MAC.
If idj = id? and e = e?, the adversary B will output (m, φ); otherwise, it will output
a tuple of random strings. As the identity id? and epoch e? are chosen at random before
the setup(η) phase, the probability that A also attacks id? and e? is:





and recall that n is the number of identifiers in the system.
In order to win the UF–CMAMAC game, the adversary needs:
1. Verify(Ke?id? ,m, φ) = accept;
2. the MAC φ was never queried to the MAC oracle.
Condition 1. holds because φ is a valid MAC, as it was verified by party Pi.
Condition 2. holds because Pi and Pj do not have a matching conversation. 
4.7.2 Security and Safety Trade-off Discussion
As explained in 4.6, LEIA can be implemented by either authenticating every CAN
message for a given CAN id, or by setting a frequency of authenticating messages from
a specific CAN id. The two methods can co-exist on the network. This flexibility comes
with its own challenges. While it allows manufacturers to choose a most suitable trade-
off between security and bandwidth for their vehicles, determining which messages
should fall under which category and, indeed, what frequency is suitable for the sec-
ond method is a complex process with high stakes. An example of network configura-
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tion could be that every message from a safety-critical ECUs would be authenticated
(e.g. brakes, parking, ECM), while messages that have a lesser impact on the safety, but
would cause the driver to be confused or distracted, would be authenticated at a given
frequency (e.g. IPC, HVAC). A safety policy would need to be determined, in the case
the authenticated messages do not pass verification, even after the re-synchronisation
procedure. For frequency authenticated messages, a possible policy is warning the
driver of the inconsistency, but still consuming the messages. For safety-critical mes-
sages, it is a more delicate matter. For example, if the messages in question are related
to the brakes, a decision should be made on whether to act on the received messages
even if they fail authentication, such that the functionality of the vehicle is still re-
spected, or ignore them. The latter case could pose physical safety issues, as the driver
could genuinely be pressing the brakes and the vehicle would not respond, creating
a dangerous situation. A different approach would be to create a fallback system,
whereby if safety critical messages cannot be authenticated, the functionality of the
vehicle would not be affected overall, but there would be caps on e.g. the maximum
speed the vehicle could be driven at, and the driver would be warned the vehicle has
entered a ‘safe mode’.
The CAN is an architecture which is highly susceptible to DoS attacks. LEIA is
not a solution that tackles this issue, as it cannot be solved at application level. It
would require hardware-level changes, e.g. the introduction of a monitor node that
would detect anomalous transmission rates and is able to disconnect the misbehaving
node for a given time. Nonetheless, such solutions raise the question of what happens
if a safety-critical ECU is compromised and used for a DoS attack. Disconnecting it
could have serious repercussions for the functionality of the vehicle. LEIA does not
influence the ease of carrying out a DoS attack, as the Authentication Channel ids have
a lower priority than the corresponding plaintext message ids. In fact, the simplest
way of carrying out a DoS attack on the CAN bus, irrespective of whether the network
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uses LEIA, is to flood the network with messages sent on the highest priority id (0x0),
at the highest possible transmission rate. Nonetheless, DoS attacks do not affect the
security of LEIA. We emphasize that all other proposed authentication protocols from
the literature are susceptible to DoS attacks and do not protect against attackers taking
full control over an ECU.
4.8 AUTOSAR compliance
At the time of publishing LEIA, the standard for AUTOSAR was version 4.2. This
section elaborates how the protocol satisfied the requirements of AUTOSAR 4.2 and
describes what changes are needed to make it AUTOSAR 4.4 compliant, which is the
standards’ version at the time of writing.
4.8.1 AUTOSAR 4.2
Regarding freshness, the specification 4.2 [12] states both sending and receiving sides
need to maintain a Freshness Value (e.g. counter, timestamp). In LEIA, this is achieved
by the 16-bit counters cidi , placed in the extended identifier field of a data frame.
AUTOSAR recommends the use of 128-bit keys, which LEIA respects though Kid. It
also states that, depending on the authentication algorithm chosen, the Message Au-
thentication Code can be truncated, with a minimum recommended length of 64-bit.
As described in the protocol, 64-bit MACs are used, which fit in the 8-byte payload
field of a data frame. Furthermore, the standard requires the MAC to be calculated
based on the id, data and complete FV. In LEIA, the MAC is computed based on
the session key Keidi , which is uniquely associated with an identifier idi, the counter
cidi and the data to be transmitted. Regarding MAC verification failure, SecOC re-
quires the receiver to attempt to verify for a number of times (defined by the parameter
SecOCFreshnessCounterSync Attempts), after which the data is dropped. LEIA
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uses the resync procedure, in order to keep the protocol in sync, and avoid a possible
internal denial of service attack due to the de-synchronisation of counters.
4.8.2 AUTOSAR 4.4
AUTOSAR 4.4 [13] contains clarifications regarding the Freshness Value (FV). It states
the length of the value cannot exceed 64 bits. If a counter is used, this should be created
by concatenating information from four separate counters as depicted in Figure 4.8.
The counters are:
Trip counter: is incremented by 1 when the ECU starts, if it resets or when ignition
changes status from off to on (max 24 bits);
Reset counter: is incremented by 1 at regular time intervals, specified by the variable
ResetCyle (max 24 bits);
Message counter: is incremented by 1 for each message transmitted (max 48 bits);
Reset flag: updated with the reset flag; it contains the length of the reset flag (max 2
bits).




Figure 4.8: AUTOSAR freshness counter composition from trip, reset and message
counters, and reset flag.
The trip counter used in AUTOSAR corresponds to the epoch counter eid of LEIA,
and the message counter corresponds to counter cid. The standard also specifies that
the FV may be truncated, sending the least significant bits out with the authenticated
message. For LEIA, the counter would need to be truncated to the least significant 16
bits. Therefore, instead of sending cid in the extended identified field of a CAN frame,
the protocol would transmit the truncated FV. It also employs a Synchronisation Mes-
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sage, which is sent periodically and contains the values of the trip and reset counters.
The Synchronisation Message should be authenticated. The trip counter should be
stored in Non-volatile Random-Access Memory (NvM) or, ideally, in secure flash.
Using the shorter trip counter instead of the epoch may be seen as a risk. However,
it would take an attacker 194 days to roll over the counter, assuming the ECU reset op-
eration takes 1 second. And even in this case, the attacker can only replay previously
sniffed messages, a task which would require very precise timing. In a normal opera-
tion scenario, if the vehicle was started 10 times/day, it would take 4596 years for the
trip counter to roll over, well beyond the expected lifetime of a car.
The Synchronisation Message AUTOSAR employs resembles the resync proce-
dure of LEIA, and one could argue the re-synchronisation is now redundant. However,
we explain why it is still needed. If the Synchronisation Message is sent too often, it
would add significant bandwidth consumption (it would double the communication
overhead) to what is already a fairly congested CAN bus. However, sending the mes-
sage rarely, would mean that de-synchronised nodes will have a large time window
in which they cannot trust messages and, potentially, discard them. For safety-critical
ECUs, this is not an acceptable outcome. Therefore, we believe that the two solutions
deployed together will give the best security vs overhead balance. The counters will be
kept synchronised via the Synchronisation Message, and in the case an ECU becomes
de-synchronised, it can quickly update its state via resync.
4.9 Summary
We have proposed LEIA, a lightweight authentication protocol for CAN, that allows
ECUs to authenticate each other, therefore preventing a number of attacks presented in
the literature. The protocol is proven to be secure under the unforgeability assumption
of the MAC scheme under a chosen message attack. LEIA has been designed to run
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under the stringent time and bandwidth constraints of automotive applications, and
is backwards compatible with existing CAN configuration. The proof of concept im-
plementation proves that LEIA’s performance is adequate even for ECUs which fulfil
safety-critical functionality. LEIA is the first AUTOSAR compliant lightweight authen-
tication protocol available in the literature. Also, the protocol achieves higher security
levels than previously proposed solutions, without the need of additional hardware
components or substantial implementation costs. Finally, the real-world requirements
and constraints of the CAN bus are taken into consideration, providing a discussion
on how to mitigate and overcome them. The properties of LEIA make it suitable for
deployment in automotive applications as it strikes the right balance between practi-





The insecure communication of the CAN bus is often mentioned in the literature as a
fundamental flaw that has facilitated attacks, such as the ones we described in Chap-
ter 3, with serious consequences to the safety of a vehicle. Several protocols that im-
prove the security of the CAN bus have been proposed. While a very small num-
ber of them explore a design where only an encryption layer is added on the net-
work [55, 88, 117], most works have focused on ensuring that messages are authenti-
cated, with a few of them adding confidentiality as well. In this chapter we will review
and evaluate CAN bus authentication protocols, considering recommendations found
in both academic research and industry standards.
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5.1 Motivation
CAN bus authentication has received significant interest from the research community.
The topic is paramount to securing the in-vehicle communication of ECUs and, with
so many solutions presented in the literature, we believe it is an opportune moment
to reflect on them. Reviewing the designs of the protocols, and evaluating them based
on a set of common properties allows the reader to form an opinion on their security
guarantees, as well as make informed considerations regarding the practicalities of
implementing them.
5.2 Contribution
We present a survey of authentication protocols designed for the CAN bus, which
have been proposed in the literature. Based on research concerned with CAN bus
exploitation, the CAN communication standards (ISO 11898) and the industry stan-
dard AUTOSAR, we derive a set of desirable properties for a CAN bus authentication
protocol. We evaluate the surveyed protocols with respect to the identified proper-
ties. Finally, we discuss the reported performance of the protocols, giving particular
consideration to the increase in latency and overhead the protocols bring. These two
metrics are critical. Greatly increasing the number of frames on the CAN bus can lead
to delays for messages with lower priorities. The latency incurred by computing the
authentication data and verifying it can lead to delays in processing the message and
acting on its contents, which may be unacceptable for safety-critical ECUs.
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5.3 Desirable Properties for CAN Authentication
Protocols
Given the design flaws of the CAN bus mentioned in Section 2.1, it is clear that a so-
lution to stop, or at least mitigate the lapses must be developed. We identify a set of
properties an authentication protocol for the CAN bus should have, based on the liter-
ature presented in Chapter 3, the CAN bus standards (Section 2.1) and the AUTOSAR
guidelines (Section 2.2). We split the properties into two groups: security properties and
compatibility properties. The former refers to the security of the communication on the
bus; the latter reflects the ability of the protocols to be implemented on CAN infras-







P2.2: No additional hardware;
P2.3: Flexibility.
5.3.1 Security properties
P1.1 Sender authenticity: proving the identity of the CAN message source. It should
be possible to verify that the message came from one specific ECU on the network,
and no other ECU can pretend to be any other node on the network. The property is
identified as a key requirement in [179, 69, 91, 19]. Without it, an attacker could, for
example, disable the brakes of a vehicle, through a cellular-enabled device attached to
the OBD-II port [185].
P1.2 Freshness: ensuring the content of the message has not been altered or replayed.
The protocol should protect against unauthorised modification of data. The works of
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[108, 28, 44] highlight freshness as a requirement for securing CAN bus communica-
tion. In its absence an attacker could, for example, remove the airbag module and
replay its messages on the CAN bus, such that the vehicle believes it is installed and
operating correctly, and therefore does not give the driver any warnings; in case of an
accident, the airbag would not deploy, as it does not exist [69].
Attacks carried out by injecting CAN messages into the network will be prevented
if properties P1.1 and P1.2 are satisfied.
P1.3 Key uniqueness: ensuring the sets of keys used are unique to the component.
If the same keys are used, it means that if an attacker is able to extract them from
the firmware of an ECU, or they were recovered through cryptanalysis (e.g. RKE [58]
or UDS security keys [46]), they can compromise other components in the vehicle (if
per-vehicle keys are used), or other vehicles (if per-model keys are used).
5.3.2 Compatibility properties
P2.1 Backwards compatibility: the introduction of authentication should have no
effect on legacy components, and these should be able to operate oblivious of the au-
thentication layer introduced. This will facilitate incremental adoption of the protocol
in existing vehicles, with the incentive of manufacturers being able to stagger the up-
grades over a long period of time, not requiring substantial upgrade costs at one time,
but allowing for the most safety-critical communications to be secured as soon as pos-
sible.
P2.2 No additional hardware: no additional hardware shall be required to enable
authentication. The hardware can be in the form of other ECUs that need to be intro-
duced on the network, or secure storage components. The addition of extra hardware
is a costly venture for manufacturers, therefore it will play a significant role in their
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decision of adopting a protocol.
P2.3 Flexibility: the protocol should allow for manufacturers to decide which mes-
sages need to be authenticated, as not all CAN messages are of safety-critical impor-
tance. Therefore, its design should be flexible enough to allow for periodic message
authentication (every nth message, where n is a parameter chosen by, e.g., the manufac-
turer) or bulk message authentication. The flexibility property also signals a protocol’s
ability to keep communication overheads to a minimum, of significance especially as
the CAN bus is an already congested network.
Security parameters and optional considerations
Security parameters play an important role in understanding the security of a protocol.
If they are not properly chosen, the protocol might be easily bypassed, even though its
design is not flawed. For this reason, we also report on the chosen key size and MAC
size of the surveyed authentication protocols. We also report on whether a protocol
is AUTOSAR compliant, as this may influence a manufacturer’s decision on adopting
it, and discuss whether the protocol could be adapted to fit the standards, if it is not
already compliant.
Key size: the key size directly impacts the security of a protocol. If a key is short
enough to be brute-forced in reasonable time, the underlying algorithm will fail to
fulfil its purpose. NIST recommends key sizes of at least 128 bits for cipher-based
MACs and key sizes of at least 112 bits for hash-based MACs [123].
MAC size: there are two conflicting factors to consider – the fact that a CAN frame
can carry a limited payload of 8 bytes, as well as standards recommendations for MAC
lengths. By NIST standards, MAC lengths of less than 64 bits should not be used [4],
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as they are deemed insecure. Short MACs weaken the security of the protocol in that
they may allow an attacker to “guess” (brute-force) the correct MAC for a message
they want to send [138].
AUTOSAR compatibility: the standards are gaining more popularity, with many
suppliers and manufacturers implementing them. Therefore, a protocol which already
respects the guidelines set out in the standards might be more appealing to a manufac-
turer. We also discuss the possibility for a protocol to be adapted such that it becomes
AUTOSAR compliant, outlining changes that would need to be made, or explaining
why the protocol could not be adapted.
5.4 Overview and Evaluation of Out-of-Band CAN Bus
Authentication Protocols
In the following section, two protocols for lightweight authentication are considered.
Both solutions make use of the CAN+ protocol, an improvement of the existing CAN
protocol. CAN+ is presented first, then CANAuth and LiBrA-CAN are discussed.
The CAN+ protocol was introduced by Ziermann et al. in [190]. It takes advantage
of the fact that, for a bit sent on the CAN bus (as specified in the protocol standard),
extra bits can be sent in-between the transmission and sampling points. This allows
CAN+ to operate alongside CAN-conforming nodes without disturbing their commu-
nication. The authors have identified a grey zone (Figure 5.1) in the transmission of a
CAN bit, delimited by the synchronisation and sampling zones.
The grey zone is used to insert additional information at higher data rates. During
this time the bus can take any value without disturbing the CAN-conforming commu-
nication. The efficiency of the new protocol has been tested by implementing CAN+
on an Field-Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) (as CAN-controller) with a newly built











data 1 0 0 1
start of frame
data bits
Figure 5.1: Transmission of a data bit for normal CAN and CAN+ protocol.
CAN-transceiver which supports data rates up to 60 Mbit/s (no off-the-shelf products
support these). CANcaseXL was used as the Controller Area Network. A usable grey
zone of 15% to 40% of the length of a bit transmission interval has been observed. This
means that for one CAN bit transmitted, 16 CAN+ bits can be inserted.
Both the main drawback and main strength of the CAN+ protocol is the CAN-
transceiver. On the one hand, by being backwards compatible with CAN-conforming
nodes, selected ECUs can be included in the CAN+ network and only they would need
to receive the upgraded transceivers. The rest of the CAN-conforming nodes on the
network would operate normally, oblivious to the CAN+ protocol. While the ultimate
goal would be for all nodes to be able to communicate through the CAN+ protocol,
this can be done progressively, reducing the immediate costs. CAN+ could be used to
add extra functionality to the network, such as authentication. However, vehicles from
the previous generations would not benefit from the message authentication scheme
unless their transceivers would be changed. Various schemes can be used for solving
this issue as well, one being letting the car owners decide if they want this functionality
and offering the upgrade when they come to service the vehicle, at a price.
CANAuth is a backwards compatible lightweight authentication protocol proposed
by Van Herrewege, Singelee, and Verbauwhede in [169]. It guarantees message au-
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thentication and replay attack resistance. CANAuth makes use of the CAN+ protocol.
The authors state that ‘groups of related messages’ should be authenticated using the
same key, and the ECU that transmits the messages is responsible for initiating a key-
exchange protocol with the receiver nodes. The pre-shared key, a 24 bit counter and
a random nonce are used to derive session keys, which are used to authenticate mes-
sages. For message authentication, a 32 bit counter is used, in order to prevent replay
attacks. The key establishment protocol requires each node to have one or more pre-
shared 128 bit keys, and the MAC should be truncated to 80 bits. Due to hard real time
constraints in the environment where the CAN bus is used, the authors recommend
using a fast MAC function, such as HMAC.
The major assumption of the CANAuth protocol is that the adversary cannot mount
invasive attacks on the nodes of the network (ECUs), e.g. obtaining access to tamper-
proof storage (where the counters are stored). However, such attacks are known to be
possible due to the attacks presented by Koscher et al. [93] and Checkoway et al. [34].
Groza et al. introduce the LiBrA-CAN protocol in [60]. It uses MAC mixing and
key splitting, achieving authentication for groups of nodes, rather than for individual
nodes. The authors group nodes based on their manufacturer, considering they should
be trustworthy to each other. The ECU with the most computational power is consid-
ered master and the rest are slaves. The master node manages the key distribution in
its sub-network. One group can use the same key for authentication. Mixed MACs
(LMMACs) are used to integrate multiple MACs in one, through a system of linear
equations. A LMMAC passes verification if all component MACs are correct. A num-
ber of truncated MACs are sent within one data frame. Replay attacks are prevented
by the use of a counter, with a suggested length of 20–40 bits. There is some flexibility
left to the manufacturer, in terms of the sizes of the groups of ECUs. The drawbacks
of LiBrA-CAN are the increase in traffic on the CAN bus, due to the authentication
messages and that all nodes in the system should be aware of it. The protocol can be
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implemented over CAN or over CAN+, taking advantage of the out-of-channel com-
munication the latter provides. The benefit is that only CAN+ nodes see the LiBrA-
CAN data and a compromised CAN-conforming node would not be able to attack the
protocol.
The out-of-band authentication protocols we presented do not respect the additional
hardware property, or the AUTOSAR compatibility property, as they rely on CAN+. By
using CAN+ they are backwards-compatible, as CAN+ ECUs can exist alongside CAN-
conforming ECUs.
We summarise the evaluation of CANAuth and LiBrA-CAN with respect to the
other properties in the first part of Table 5.1.
5.5 Overview and Evaluation of Authentication
Protocols Over Traditional CAN Bus
The second part of Table 5.1 presents a summary of the evaluation of the proposed
authentication protocols over traditional CAN, with respect to the security and com-
patibility properties defined in Section 5.3.
Schweppe et al. present an authentication protocol (c2xCAN1) aimed at securing the
communication of sender ECUs with their receivers, in [149]. Their solution assumes
a Hardware Security Module (HSM) is used for the storage of shared key material. A
key master ECU is responsible for key management. Every ECU shares two keys with
the key master, one for authenticating to the key master, and one for encrypting other
keys. A sender ECU generates session keys and sends it to the appropriate receiver
ECUs, via the key master. A session key has a 48 hours lifetime. The communication
between ECUs and the key master is authenticated. The protocol can (optionally) use
1The protocol was not named; based on the title of the article, Car2x communication: securing the last
meter, we shall refer to the protocol as c2xCAN.
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timestamps, which requires time synchronisation between the ECUs. It is assumed at
least one of the ECUs in a pair of communicating nodes has a real time clock. The
authors propose a modified version of the UDS protocol, which would allow them
to use the frame fragmentation feature for sending the data and the MAC together,
as one Protocol Data Unit (PDU). They suggest using MACs of at least 32-bits, with
other acceptable values being 64, 96 and 128 bits [148]. The protocol is not AUTOSAR
compliant.
LCAP was proposed by Hazem et al. in [64]. Is a lightweight broadcast authentica-
tion protocol, which also provides confidentiality for the data transmitted. The authors
propose the use of a 2 byte magic number, which is appended to the message. However,
the magic number is not computed on the plaintext of the message being sent. The
magic number is inspired by the key derivation function of the TESLA protocol [133],
which uses a chain of keys. Hazem et al. use an HMAC as a one-way function with a
key size of 16 bits. Briefly, the way the magic number is computed is as follows:
1. let KH be the HMAC key
2. let n be a pre-established chain length
3. the sender ECU picks a random number, rn, which will be the last element in the
chain
4. the sender then computes r0, the first element of the chain:
r0 = HMAC
n(KH , rn)
5. the sender sends r0 to the receiver(s)
6. each element in the chain can be computed from rn as
ri = HMAC
n−i(KH , rn)
Authenticated messages will include the magic numbers r1, . . . , rn, which can be veri-
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fied by the receiver as
ri = HMAC(KH , ri+1)
(e.g. if r0 = HMAC(KH , r1), then r1 is part of the chain)
Handshakes are used in order to establish the secure channel, for session key distri-
bution and to keep the nodes synchronised. This requires a significant number of CAN
message identifiers be added to the network (five new ids for each sender-receiver
pair), and therefore, due to the number of new CAN ids that need to be introduced
in the network configuration, LCAP requires a large address space. Setting up com-
munication channels between senders and receivers, and keeping the communication
synchronised, requires a large number of messages to be exchanged. LCAP has a sig-
nificant communication overhead. No additional hardware is required by the protocol,
but LCAP is not AUTOSAR compliant due to its many handshakes. As the data is en-
crypted, the protocol is not backwards compatible, and it assumes all nodes implement
it. The authors use RC4 in their implementation of the protocol, however this cipher is
no longer considered secure [136]. Noureldeen et al. describe a replay attack on LCAP
in [125]. The attack leverages the protocol’s Channel Setup Request message, to which
a paired ECU will respond with 5 messages. By recording CAN traffic, replaying it
message by message, and observing if the message triggers a response of 5 consecu-
tive messages on the same id, the authors can determine if the replayed message was
a Channel Setup Request. Once they know the message, they can repeatedly send it
with short periodicity. As the Channel Setup Request and its responses are assigned
low CAN ids, this means they take priority to other CAN communication, leading to
100% bus load and a DoS.
MaCAN is an authenticated protocol described by Hartkopp, Reuber, and Schilling
in [63]. It is designed specifically for the CAN bus and takes into account the network’s
constraints, such as message length and available resources. MaCAN authenticates at
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most 4 bytes of data with a 4-byte MAC. Timestamps are used as a source of freshness,
and this requires a time server to be added onto the network. The time server broad-
casts a timestamp at regular intervals. A key server deals with key management in the
network. It shares a symmetric long term key with each security-enabled ECU. The
key server mediates the establishment of keys between two nodes that want to com-
municate securely. In the case multiple nodes need to be able to verify the authenticity
of a message, the authors propose using group keys. MaCAN allows for the frequency
of authenticating a message to be set by a special request message. It is not backwards-
compatible, as it redefines the CAN data frame to add a destination field. MaCAN is
not AUTOSAR compliant and adapting it would be a non-trivial task. Bruni et al. give
a formal analysis of the MaCAN protocol in [30]. They formally prove the secrecy of
both long term keys and session keys used by the protocol. However, they found an
attack which leaves one node unauthenticated. They proposed a fix for the protocol.
Lin et al. discuss securing the communication on the CAN bus in a number of arti-
cles ([103, 104, 105]) and propose an authentication protocol (csCAN2) with a minimal
communication overhead. Their solution is based on symmetric key cryptography,
with each pair of nodes that needs to authenticate data sharing a secret key. They do
not suggest a length for the MAC, but they do mention counters should be used for re-
play attack prevention. The protocol allows an ECU to authenticate a message only for
a subset of receiver ECUs. From the description, we understand that multiple MACs
will need to be sent, one for each receiver ECU. This is not detailed in the paper. No
additional hardware is required by the protocol. They also suggest a version of the
protocol which uses groups of receivers, whereby nodes belonging to the same group
share the same secret key. This allows for a lower communication overhead, but weak-
ens the security of the protocol, as direct attacks are possible within the trust group.
2The protocol was not named; based on the title of the first article, Cyber-Security for the Controller
Area Network (CAN) Communication Protocol, we shall refer to the protocol as csCAN.
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The groups protocol assumes the ECUs are AUTOSAR compliant.
CaCAN has been introduced in [94] by Kurachi et al.; their approach is to use a
monitor node, which authenticates the other nodes in the network. It detects and de-
stroys unauthorised data frames by overwriting them with an error frame in real time.
Challenge-response authentication is used in order to establish a secure channel, and
session keys are derived by hashing the program code and a nonce, received from the
monitor node. A 32-bit counter is used to prevent replay attacks. A MAC length of 8
bits is argued to be enough, due to the usage of session keys. The protocol is backwards
compatible in the configuration where the MAC is sent in a separate CAN frame. As
all ECUs have their communication monitored, there is no room for flexibility. The
monitor node requires a modified CAN controller, and is an extra node that needs to
be added on the network. Also, as is the general case with centralised authorities, if
the monitor node is compromised or removed, the entire network is compromised as
well. The protocol is not AUTOSAR compliant, as it is a monitoring system.
VeCure is proposed by Wang and Sawhney in [177]. Their solution relies on trust
groups. ECUs are grouped based on how difficult it is to compromise them. ECUs
without any external interfaces are considered highly-trusted. ECUs with wireless in-
terfaces (e.g. telematics) or nodes with direct access to the CAN network (e.g. OBD-II),
are considered low-trust. All nodes in a group share a key. In the case of multiple tiers
of trust, the nodes of a group also know the keys of other, lower-trust groups. VeCure
allows for a flexible implementation, in the sense that there is freedom in choosing the
number of trust groups, but it cannot tailor the frequency a message is authenticated.
Session counters and message counters are used for protecting against replay attacks.
The length of the MAC is set to 32-bits. ECUs in the lowest trust group do not use
authenticated communication, and therefore do not possess any key material. It is un-
clear how this would prevent e.g. the OBD-II to masquerade as the telematics unit, as it
is suggested by the authors the two nodes should belong to the same low-trust group.
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ECUs in other groups would not be able to tell the difference between distinct ECUs
in the low-trust group, due to the lack of source identifier and authentication. VeCure
is backwards compatible, as the data and MAC are sent in separate data frames. The
protocol is not AUTOSAR compliant and it does not require additional hardware.
Woo, Jo and Lee propose a protocol (spCAN3) which provides both encryption and
authentication in [181]. Their design uses AES-128 and a keyed HMAC. A gateway
ECU is responsible for distributing session keys to the other ECUs on vehicle startup.
The session key derivation protocol is fully explained in the paper, and shows how a
sender ECU obtains its encryption and authentication keys. However, it is not specified
how a receiver ECU obtains those keys as well, such that it can decrypt and verify mes-
sages. The protocol makes use of the extended CAN frames, and splits a 32-bit MAC
in two 16-bit chunks, one sent in the extended id field and one in the CRC field. Due to
the placement of the MAC in the frame and due to the encryption layer, the protocol
is not backwards compatible and does not allow for flexibility in its implementation.
Counters are used to prevent replay attacks. spCAN is not AUTOSAR compliant.
VatiCAN [127] is a CAN authentication protocol proposed by Nürnberger and
Rossow. It is backwards compatible with the CAN bus standard. VatiCAN provides
sender and content authenticity by using 64-bit HMACs, based on KECCAK. Keys
need to be unique per ECU, but the authors mention groups of ECUs can be formed,
in order to save memory. VatiCAN can be implemented in a flexible way, whereby
only some messages are authenticated. The protocol requires one additional ECU to
be introduced on the network, a global nonce generator. One major assumption of the
protocol is that the nonce generator is protected by a hardware-assisted spoofing pre-
vention mechanism, and an attacker cannot impersonate and inject arbitrary nonces.
This is proven to be a weakness by Bulck, Mühlberg and Piessens in [168], where they
3The protocol was not named; based on the title of the article, A practical wireless attack on the connected
car and security protocol for in-vehicle CAN, we shall refer to the protocol as spCAN.
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describe a birthday attack on the nonce generator. While not mentioned in the paper,
VatiCAN is AUTOSAR compliant.
Radu and Garcia present LEIA in [140]. They propose an authentication protocol
which is AUTOSAR compliant, and is backwards compatible with the CAN bus stan-
dard. LEIA provides authentication by using a 64-bit MAC, and uses a 16-bit counter
for protection against replay attacks. The key derivation for session keys, is based on
long term keys associated with a particular CAN id and on epoch counters. LEIA is a
software-only solution, therefore no additional hardware needs to be introduced onto
the in-vehicle network. The protocol can be implemented in a flexible way, where ei-
ther all messages can be authenticated or a per CAN id authenticating frequency can
be configured.
The most recent proposal, TOUCAN, comes from Bella et al. [24]. The protocol
provides both integrity and confidentiality. It is designed to respect the AUTOSAR
guidelines, and it fits one of the profiles defined by the standard (profile 2 — 24Bit-
CMAC-No-FV). TOUCAN uses a 24-bit MAC (Chaskey [118] is recommended) for au-
thentication, and AES-128 for encryption. However, the design does not use a counter,
and therefore it is susceptible to replay attacks. The AUTOSAR standard mentions this
profile should only be used ‘if no synchronized freshness value is established’ [18]. No ad-
ditional hardware is required by the protocol. TOUCAN is not backwards-compatible,
due to the encryption layer. It is not flexible either, as the MAC is appended to the
data, and sent within the same CAN frame. Key material is assumed to be on the ECU
already, and there are no further details.
5.6 Performance Evaluation
Overhead and latency play a crucial role in any design for CAN authentication. Due
to the sensitivity of the communication to time delays, a proven secure protocol can
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be rendered unusable if these two metrics are deemed unacceptable. Due to the dis-
crepancy in hardware used for implementations, a direct comparison cannot be made
among all the schemes, therefore the metrics are reported per individual protocol.
Overhead: we consider how many CAN data frames are requires to send, if we
want to transmit an authenticated payload of 8 bytes. While data frames can carry less
than 8 bytes, from our own experiments4 and from available datasets [99, 43, 42], we
know that most CAN frames carry payloads of 8 bytes. Some protocols fit MACs in the
data field of a frame, and therefore we choose to present the comparison with respect
to a fixed payload.
Latency: some ECUs fulfil safety-critical functionality (e.g. brakes), and therefore
the delay in them being able to process and take action on the data within CAN mes-
sages is crucial. We report on the additional time needed to successfully verify a CAN
frame; in some cases, the authors only benchmarked the cryptographic algorithm used
in the verification, and therefore we can only present this.
The authors of c2xCAN analyse the performance of their key distribution protocol
by modelling it with the DIPLODOCUS UML profile [8] and the TTool simulation en-
gine [92]. Their tests reveal that it takes 9ms for the key distribution to take place, on
a bus speed of 500Kb/s. It requires 9 CAN frames to be sent. For data transmission,
they modelled the simulation in a MATLAB toolkit [32]. They report latency times for
a number of MAC sizes, as presented in Table 5.2. Their model assumes 0.4ms are
needed to send a frame and 0.2ms are needed to process a received frame, without
further reference to the source of these numbers. The overhead of the protocol varies
by the implementation and MAC length chosen. In the best case scenario, 32 bits of
data are authenticated with a 32-bit MAC, which means the communication doubles.
LCAP was implemented on a Freescale Starter-TRAK TRK-MPC5604B board, clock
4We had access to a Ford Focus, for another part of the research presented in this thesis (Part III). We
sniffed the CAN traffic, and from the trace, we could clearly see most messages had a length of 8 bytes.








Table 5.2: Latency of
c2xCAN authenticated




MD5 144 µs 86 µs
SHA1 278 µs 154 µs
SHA224 539 µs 285 µs
SHA256 540 µs 285 µs
Table 5.3: LCAP performance of different hashing
algorithms, used in the magic number computation
— key size was 16 bits.
frequency 64 MHz, 512 Kb code flash and 64 Kb data flash. A number of hash func-
tions are benchmarked, any of which can be used in the magic number computation
(Table 5.3). They also benchmarked using the RC4 cipher for the encryption layer,
which took an average of 160 µs, for a 64 bit input. LCAP has a significant overhead
with respect to the number of new CAN ids it requires. The authors note that 5×ns×nr
new CAN ids are needed, where ns is the number of sender ECUs and nr is the num-
ber of receiver ECUs. The protocol also has a significant communication overhead. Its
Channel setup phase requires 6 CAN frames to be transmitted, Message setup requires nid
frames, where nid is the number of CAN ids used in the vehicle, Data exchange needs one
CAN frame, Chain refresh also requires one frame, but it is done periodically, and there
is no further information of a suitable time window, Soft sync needs 2 + ns−r frames,
where ns−r is the number of CAN ids used by one pair of sender-receiver ECUs, and
Hard sync requires 6 + ns−r CAN frames.
MaCAN has not been implemented, but it would double the communication, for
sending an 8-byte payload, as it authenticates 32-bits of data with a 32 bit MAC.
The authors of csCAN do not provide information on the size of the MAC, and
therefore we cannot draw conclusions on how the protocol influences the bus load.
The protocol does not appear to have an been implemented, but the authors compute
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Q
n P 10−1 10−4 10−7
1
10−3 12.05ms 12.09ms 12.12ms
10−6 12.45ms 12.49ms 12.55ms
10−9 12.93ms 12.96ms n/a
3
10−1 12.12ms 12.19ms 12.22ms
10−2 12.49ms 12.55ms 12.65ms
10−3 12.93ms 12.96ms n/a
Table 5.4: Latency for an authenticated message, using the csCAN protocol. n is the
number of receivers for a message, P is the probability of a successful attack, and Q is
the probability that a counter is desynchronised.
the latency of the authenticated messages, for a bus speed of 500Kb/s, based on the
methodology elaborated in [49, Chapter 3]. Their evaluation depends on the probabil-
ity of a successful attack (P ), the probability that a counter is not synchronised (Q), and
the number or receivers a message has (n). For a number of receivers (for each CAN
message) of one (n = 1), they report the findings for a probability of a successful attack
of 10−3, 10−6 and 10−10. If the number of receivers is three (n = 3), the authors state
that is it infeasible to use the protocol for a probability of attack smaller than 10−3. The
results are summarised in Table 5.4.
CaCAN was implemented on an Altera FPGA development board, clock frequency
50 MHz, 512 Kb flash memory and 20 Kb RAM. The results show that the average time
required to compute the authentication data for one data frame is 2.12 µs (input will
be 52 bits of data + 32 bit counter + 256 bit key5 + 11 bits CAN id). As the protocol
relies on the monitor node to destroy frames, it means that at a bus speed of 1Mb/s,
the monitor has verified the message within the transmission of 3 more bits (the CRC
would be in transmission), and is therefore within an appropriate time window to be
able to destroy the frame, if it cannot verify it.
The VeCure protocol has two phases, when authenticating data: an offline phase,
5The authors mention that the authentication key is derived by hashing the program code and a
nonce, by using the SHA256 algorithm; while it is not explicitly stated the authentication key is 256 bits,
the output of SHA256 is, and it is reasonable to assume it is used in its entirety
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which is calculated based on the ECU id, session counter, overflow counter, MAC
counter and a key, and an online phase, which is computed on the data that needs to be
authenticated and the result of the offline phase. The authors argue this design allows
for a lower latency, as the offline phase can be pre-computed. VeCure has been im-
plemented on a Freescale EVB9S12XEP100 board, 50 MHz clock frequency, 1Mb flash
and 64Kb RAM. SHA-3 was used as the algorithm for the offline phase. The authors
measured the time for each phase. They report the offline phase takes approximately
931 µs, and the online phase needs 50 µs. In terms of overhead, the communication
doubles, as the data is sent in one frame and the MAC in a subsequent frame.
VatiCAN was implemented on Atmel AVR ATMega328p microcontrollers, clock
frequency 16 MHz, 32 Kb flash and 2 Kb RAM. The CAN bus speed was set at 500Kb/s.
The HMAC computation takes 935µs6, and the delay introduced between receiving a
frame and successfully verifying it is 3.3 ms. The protocol doubles the communication
overhead, as the data and MAC are sent in two separate frames (though this is worst
case scenario, as VatiCAN allows for periodic authentication as well).
LEIA has been implemented on Atmel AVR ATMega328p microcontrollers, clock
frequency 16 MHz, 32 Kb flash and 2 Kb RAM. The CAN bus speed was set to 500Kb/s.
The MAC computation takes 738 µs, and the delay introduced between receiving a
frame and successfully verifying it is 2.96 ms. At a speed of 100 km/h, the induced
latency means a travelling distance of 8.2 cm. In the worst case scenario, the proto-
col doubles the communication overhead, as one extra frame needs to be sent, with
the MAC. The protocol allows for flexibility in implementation, being able to choose
periodic authentication, and not all nodes need to be aware of the protocol.
6It is reported in [127] that the MAC computation takes 2950µs. Compared to LEIA’s per-
formance, we found the large difference in timing odd, as they both use Keccak. We ran
timing tests on the code supplied by the authors at VatiCAN Open Source Lighthouse Project
(http://www.automotive-security.net/vatican/) and obtained more comparable readings.
It is possible that the authors have, since publishing, changed the crypto library, opting for one opti-
mised for the AVR microcontroller.
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Protocol MAC (µs) Latency (µs)
VatiCAN6 935 3300
LEIA 738 2960
Table 5.5: VatiCAN and LEIA performance benchmark on Atmel AVR.
Table 5.5 presents the comparison of VatiCAN and LEIA with respect to MAC com-
putation and latency introduced by the protocols. Such a direct comparison is possible
as both implementations were done on the same hardware (Arduino Uno) and use the
same cryptographic library.
Both VatiCAN and LEIA have also been implemented in [168], within the frame-
work VulCAN, a generic design for efficient vehicle message authentication on top of
Sancus, an open-source embedded protected module architecture. Sancus [124] can
extend the CPU with a cryptographic core, therefore providing hardware-level au-
thenticated encryption, key derivation and secure key storage. Both protocols have
been implemented in two variants: unprotected, where only the protocol is part of the
trusted code base, and protected, where the CAN driver is part of the trusted code
base. Table 5.6 presents the results of the experiments. LEIA’s increased timings are
due to the usage of session keys, which add overhead for key generation, raising a
trade-off between security and reaction time.
Scenario Cycles Time Overhead
Sancus+VatiCAN (unprotected) 15570 0.78 ms 91%
Sancus+VatiCAN (protected) 16036 0.80 ms 97%
Sancus+LEIA (unprotected) 18770 0.94 ms 131%
Sancus+LEIA (protected) 19211 0.96 ms 136%
Table 5.6: Overhead to send an (authenticated) CAN message with and without Sancus
encryption and software protection [168].
Table 5.7 presents a comparison of communication overheads in the case of trans-
mitting 8 bytes of data, authenticated under the respective schemes. Additional over-
heads are also presented, according to the specifications of each protocol. The recom-
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mended MAC algorithms are also presented, alongside the number of calls to crypto-
graphic functions each protocol requires, for data authentication and any other setup
requirements.
5.7 Summary
We have evaluated and reviewed a number of CAN authentication protocols which
have been proposed in the literature. We have identified a set of desirable proper-
ties such a protocol should have, both from a security and a compatibility perspective.
When deriving these properties we took into account both related research and indus-
try standards. The aim of this evaluation is to provide a clearer overview of protocols
available, what their security goals are, and what are the strengths and weaknesses of
each. From our evaluation, the LEIA protocol appears to be the most promising candi-
date for securing the CAN bus communication, as it fulfils all the properties defined.













functions, per ECU (to
MAC functions, unless
otherwise specified)
c2xCAN 2 key distribution:




LCAP 1a channel setup: 6;
msg setup: nids;
soft sync: 2 + nrids;




data exchange: 1 enc.;




chain refresh: 1 enc.;
soft resync: nrid enc.;
hard resync: 1 + nrid enc.
MaCAN 2 key distribution:
6 + 6 ∗ (nr + 1)
AES-CMAC 42 data auth: 1;
session key: 1
decryption, 1 CMAC
CaCAN 1a key exchange: 3 HMAC
SHA-256
45 data auth: 1 HMAC;
session key: 1 hash;
VeCure 2 none HMAC
SHA-3
37 data auth: 1;
spCAN 2 key distribution: 3;
key update: 2
HMAC 42 data auth: 1 enc., 1
HMAC;
key distribution: 3 ∗ idt
key update: 1 enc., 1
HMAC;
VatiCAN 2 none HMAC
Keccak
30 data auth: 1
LEIA 2 resync: 3 HMAC
Keccak
26 data auth: 1;
session key: 1
resync: up to 2
Toucan 2 none Chaskey 21 data auth: 1 MAC, 1 enc.
where nr is the number of receivers (ECUs or groups) for an ECU initiating the function; nrids is the number of CAN ids that
receive the given message; λ is the length of the chain (recommended 100); idt is the set of all CAN ids on which an ECU
transmits;
a if using CAN extended identifiers.
b c2xCAN does not provide details of the input for the MAC computation.
Table 5.7: Comparison of communication overheads, for transmitting 8 bytes of au-
thenticated data, and additional overheads for setup/resync functionality.
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EXTRACTING THE CONTROL FLOW
GRAPH FROM ECU FIRMWARE
In this chapter, we describe a method of representing the control flow of firmware
through an annotated Control Flow Graph (CFG). As we will see, one of the issues of
analysing ECU firmware is the diversity of the hardware that they are implemented
on. Extracting the CFG allows us to abstract away from the underlying architecture
and to later build tools on said structure that do not have to deal with the particulars
of any architecture.
6.1 Related Work
In this section we visit concepts relating to firmware analysis, and review relevant
related work, with a focus on embedded device firmware.
Program analysis is widely used for understanding software or firmware function-
ality, in the absence of the source code. Disassembling is the most common technique
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for this, involving a disassembler to translate machine code (from a compiled binary) to
a low-level language, assembly. While program analysis of popular architectures (x86,
x64, ARM, AArch64, Microprocessor without Interlocked Pipelined Stages (MIPS),
PowerPC (PPC)) is a thriving field, with many resources and tools available, ECUs,
unfortunately, tend to use obscure architectures which generally lack support. Further-
more, ECU firmwares are bare-metal systems (they do not have OSes) and the chips
used are automotive-specific. Even state-of-the-art tools have only limited support for
these. Therefore, analysing ECU firmware can be a laborious and tedious manual task.
Firmware is a specific class of computer software which is developed to take advan-
tage of low-level access to the device’s hardware. The term firmware is widely used
when referring to the program(s) running on MCUs. They are widely used in Internet
of Things devices, Industrial Control Systems, routers, smart TVs, etc.
Obtaining the firmware itself can prove to be a difficult task, as noted by [39]. Vari-
ous methods for this exist, from the firmware being available on the vendor’s website,
to intercepting a firmware update, or extracting it directly from the hardware, with
standard flash programmers [46] or by using glitches (e.g. by using the ReadMemory-
ByAdress service of the UDS and glitching the SecurityAccess check, Milburn et al. were
able to extract an ECU’s firmware in three days [112]).
Firmware Structure
Firmware may present itself in two versions:
Operating and file systems: the firmware is composed of an OS kernel, and associated
file system; the file system will contain all software and configuration files that
allow the device to operate and fulfil its functionality.
Single binary: also known as bare-metal firmware, it contains all the functionality of
the device; interaction with the hardware is done in a direct manner; this type of
firmware is highly tailored to the underlying hardware it runs on.
Chapter 6. Extracting the Control Flow Graph from ECU Firmware 99
Most ECUs have firmware which falls in the second category. When referring to
ECU firmware, it should be implied it is a reference to the bare-metal type, through-
out the rest of the thesis, unless otherwise specified. Assessing a recovered firmware
image, in the absence of the source code, is done through binary program analysis.
In order to analyse such firmware, the program’s assembly instructions must be
recovered, though the process of disassembly, performed with the help of a disassem-
bler, which translates binary data into human-readable assembly code. The process is
not perfect, with problems still existing even for the most popular architectures, such
as x86, x64 and ARM. Therefore, the quality of the analysis performed is dependent
on the accuracy of the disassembler. As ECUs run bare-metal firmware, understand-
ing the hardware is an essential part of the analysis. Datasheets are the primary re-
source for identifying the memory layout of the MCU (addresses for Read Only Mem-
ory (ROM), RAM, Input/ Output (IO), Boot sections) and at what memory address
should the firmware be loaded. The datasheets also contain information on where the
reset vector is located in memory, as well as mappings of various registers (CAN, inter-
rupts, SPI, Universal Asynchronous Receiver Transmitter (UART)), which could serve
as entry points for the program.
Firmware is, generally, written in a high-level language (e.g. C), structured through
functions; execution of said firmware means transfer of control between these func-
tions. Control can be transferred though function calls, or though interrupts which
signal to the MCU it needs to pause the execution of the current code and allocate time
for another particular function (e.g. a CAN controller will use an interrupt when a new
CAN message has been received, and the firmware needs to parse its contents and
take action according to its contents). Knowing the relationship between the different
blocks of code is valuable when performing firmware analysis, as it enables visualisa-
tion of the disassembled code in a clearer, more user-friendly manner.
Programs can be represented by a combination of the following:
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Basic Block (bb): the maximal sequence of instructions that does not modify the local
control flow of the program; all instructions of a basic block are executed in a se-
quential manner; basic blocks, generally, end with an instruction which transfers
control to another basic block (transfer may be dependent on a condition).
Control Flow Graph (CFG): a directed graph representing the transfer of control be-
tween the basic blocks; basic blocks are represented as vertices, program branches
are represented as edges.
Functions, in the high-level concept, can be viewed as a set of basic blocks, with one
of the basic blocks being the entry point of the function. A program can be represented
simply, as a set of its functions.
Within the context of CFGs, basic blocks have in-degrees and out-degrees, repre-
senting the number of edges directing towards, respectively from the vertex. Given
two basic blocks, bbi and bbj , and a direct edge bbi → bbj , bbj is a successor of bbi, and bbi
is a predecessor of bbj .
Analysis Methods
There are two main methods through which firmware can be analysed:
Static analysis: analysing a program without executing it, therefore without knowing
the state of the program at each execution step; it involves comprehending the
firmware’s functionality from listed instructions, retrieved via the disassembly
process; as the control flow of a program may be changed, conditional on vari-
ables which have values assigned only during execution (e.g. from RAM), as-
sumptions on these values must be made, possibly leading to an overestimation
of what code/instructions will actually be executed.
Dynamic analysis: analysing a program during its execution, being able to observe
the state of the program at each execution step; this also allows for discovery of
exact interaction between the firmware and the hardware, how output is gener-
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ated, or how the control flow may be affected by input, without the need of as-
sumptions. However, while performing dynamic analysis, the control flow cov-
erage is driven by the structure of the program and the inputs provided, therefore
areas of code may never be reached, if the correct values are not supplied.
In the context of ECUs and their firmware, dynamic analysis is more difficult, if not
impossible in most cases. A key requirement of dynamically analysing firmware, is the
ability to run it, and this can be achieved by:
• running the firmware on the original hardware, and interacting with the program
though on-board debug interfaces (e.g. Joint Test Action Group (JTAG) [87], Serial
Wire Debug (SWD) [102]) if these are available;
• using an emulator, which can imitate the behaviour of the hardware, to some de-
gree, enough such that the program functionality is not massively affected (i.e.
the control flow is not changed).
Emulation tools exist, with the most well known being QEMU [25]. However, as the
MCUs in the ECUs are automotive-specific, these are not supported by the emulators.
When adding the fact that ECUs use a wide variety of architectures and MCUs, and
implement complex combinations of peripherals, each needing its own emulator, it
becomes clear that the cost of performing dynamic analysis of ECU firmware at a large
scale is prohibitive.
6.1.1 Analysing (Embedded) Firmware
Program analysis is concerned with analysing the behaviour of a program, generally in
an automated way, and deriving properties of said program (with the purpose of, for
example, confirming that the software in question does not have malicious or unin-
tended behaviour) [122]. The vast amount of research has looked at analysing various
programs, and it has been concerned mostly with binaries that run on top of an OS.
For the purpose of our research, we are mainly interested in works which have dealt
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with recovering program structure, instruction recovery and function detection.
Costin et al. present a large scale static analysis of embedded firmware in [38], and
they discuss challenges faced while carrying out the research. They mention that due
to the diversity of vendors, architectures and OSes in embedded devices, and the dif-
ficulties in identifying firmware versions, having a representative sample of firmware
was challenging. Moreover, they discuss the issues around unpacking the firmware
and dealing with custom file formats. They point out that single binary firmware is
especially challenging to deal with. Their analysis was performed on 32,000 firmware
images and they discovered 38 new vulnerabilities in 693 of these images. Throughout
the analysis they point out inadequacies in existing tools and highlight that, even with
their automation, parts of the process remain highly manual tasks, concerns that we
also faced while carrying out parts of our own research.
Zaddach et al. introduce Avatar [187], a framework for dynamic analysis of embed-
ded systems firmware. They touch on the two main concerns we have faced while
conducting research into ECU firmware: the lack of documentation and the extensive
variety of hardware used in the components. Their solution combines an emulator
with the real hardware, in order to make complex dynamic analysis of embedded de-
vices scalable.
Andriesse et al. look into the accuracy of modern disassemblers when applied to
x86/x64 binaries in [6]. They study 981 binaries, and 9 of the most popular disassem-
blers, with a focus on the accuracy of program structure recovery and the challenges
they faced. They also compare their findings with the results of similar published
research. Their findings show that the literature tends to focus on corner cases or
very complex constructs, such as in-line data, overlapping instructions or shared basic
blocks, which are not so wide spread in real-world programs, and greatly depend on
the compiler used. As such, the effectiveness of binary-based research is often times
underestimated.
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Andriesse, Slowinska and Bos present Nucleus in [7], a tool aimed at bridging the
gap between disassemblers, which have high accuracy in recovering instructions, but
are not as effective when it comes to detecting functions, in the absence of symbols (in
which case the symbols table contains information about function name, start address
and size). For any form of program analysis, obtaining an accurate representation of
the program, both in terms of instructions and control flow is highly crucial. Instead
of using function signatures, they propose using the Interprocedural CFG, which is
determined by the control flow between basic blocks. They show that by using a linear
disassembly approach [147] and connected component analysis [65] they are able to
detect function entry points and function boundaries better than state-of-the-art tools,
such as Interactive DisAssembler (IDA).
Other methods for function detection exist, such as machine learning based ap-
proaches. Bao et al. [20] propose using supervised learning to identify specific instruc-
tion patterns or byte sequences (opcodes) used in either function prologue or epilogue,
or in function calls. Neural networks are also applied to function detection, by Shin et
al. in [151]. Their algorithm is applied directly to the program bytes, therefore elimi-
nating the uncertainty of instruction decoding. They report much better performance
results, while achieving similar accuracy to the work of Bao.
6.1.2 ECU Firmware Analysis
In the context of automotive security, remote keyless entry systems have received a
lot of attention ([175, 58, 67]). Assessing their security usually involves reverse engi-
neering a (generally proprietary) cipher from the firmware of the immobiliser or ECU
and finding weaknesses. However, the reverse engineering process is never fully de-
scribed, as the cryptographic algorithms are the main scope of the research. Similarly,
ciphers uses in authenticating to Unified Diagnostics Services running on ECUs are
reverse engineered in [46], but there is no description of the process.
104 6.1. Related Work
The only instance of detailed ECU firmware analysis comes from Miller and Valasek
[115]. They reverse engineered the firmware from a V850 chip which was responsible
for dealing with the CAN communication on the ECU they were investigating. They
explain that the procedure took them ‘several weeks’, highlighting the extensive effort
required. They needed to normalise the IDA database, ensure that functions were cor-
rectly created, and amend sections that the disassembler could not figure out on its
own. They automated parts of the process by looking for specific opcodes, represent-
ing combinations of instructions found in functions’ prologues for the architecture they
were working on. They used datasheets to determine the address space and the vari-
ous register and segment areas. They then proceed to understand how the CAN mod-
ules are used within the firmware, with the ultimate goal of modifying the firmware
to accept commands via SPI and send CAN messages based on these. Interestingly,
the authors mention they had disassembled parts of the firmware incorrectly, treating
areas which were supposed to be data as code, and this lead to further delays and con-
fusion. From their research we learn important information, such as the fragility of the
disassembly process and the value of understanding the hardware specification and
architecture.
The diversity of chips and architectures on which ECUs are built makes creating an
automated, ‘universal’ firmware analysis solution difficult, and therefore it is hard to
scale up the processes. Binary Independent Languages (BILs) are designed to fill this
gap (e.g. Binary Analysis Platform (BAP)1 [29], VEX2). They provide an abstraction
layer from the underlying instruction set, and use an Intermediate Representation (IR)
to describe the operations performed by the MCU. However, existing BILs support
a limited number of mainstream architectures, such as ARM, x86, x86–64, PPC, and
MIPS for BAP, whereas VEX requires an OS, not providing support for bare-metal
1The Carnegie Mellon University Binary Analysis Platform (CMU BAP)
(https://github.com/BinaryAnalysisPlatform/bap)
2angr VEX intermediate representation (https://docs.angr.io/advanced-topics/ir)
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firmware [47]. This means that, in order to use an IR, lifters for all the missing archi-
tectures would need to be implemented. This is an extensive task, in the sense that it
would require a lot of time investment, and assumes a high level of knowledge about
the architectures being lifted, and therefore would require specialist skills. The most
suitable solutions is to operate directly on the instruction set of the ECU architecture.
This requires understanding of a subset of instructions, as opposed to all, for lifting to
a BIL, thus requiring less time commitment.
6.1.3 Tools and Frameworks
Program analysis requires the help of tools, in order to be able to carry out the task. In
this section we review such tools and frameworks, considering the architectures they
support and the features they implement.
Commercial tools
The tools presented below are commercial solutions. Free versions of the software are
often offered, but they have very limited support and lack many essential features.
IDA Pro [66] is a state-of-the-art disassembler, with support for a wide range of ar-
chitectures, including x86, ARM, MIPS, PPC and Infineon TriCore. IDA has the highest
number of supported architectures and processors out of all the tools available. IDA’s
functionality can be extended and automated through scripts, either in IDC (C-like
language developed specifically to be used with IDA) or Python. It can also be run
headless, for batch processing. IDA can lift instructions to C-like pseudocode.
Hopper [41] is a disassembler initially developed only for macOS, but can now be
run on Linux as well. It supports x86, x64, ARM and PPC architectures. It can be
extended to other Central Processing Units (CPUs) and file formats through its SDK,
and scripts can be written in Python.
106 6.1. Related Work
Binary Ninja [171] is a newer cross-platform disassembler, which supports x86,
ARM, PPC, MIPS and AVR. It can lift instructions to either a low level or a medium
level intermediate representation, the latter being akin to the C programming lan-
guage. Binary Ninja can also be extended through Python plugins.
Open source tools
The tools presented below are open source solutions. They benefit from large commu-
nities which provide support and extend their functionality.
Ghidra [126] is a new state-of-the-art cross-platform disassembler, open-sourced by
the National Security Agency. It provides support for a variety of architectures, includ-
ing x86, x64, ARM, MIPS, PPC and m68k (Motorola 68000). The software allows extra
functionality or automation to be achieved through Java or Python scripts. Ghidra
can lift the assembly instructions to P-code, its own intermediate representation. Batch
processing of firmwares can be achieved by running the tool in a headless configuration,
and providing a custom script. It also provides multi-user collaboration support and
version control.
Capstone [139] is a disassembler with support for a good range of architectures,
ARM, m68k, MIPS, PPC, x86 and x64 including. It provides bindings for scripting in an
extensive number of programming languages, Python, Perl, PHP, Lua, Rust and Ruby
to name a few. This gives users the flexibility of developing their own tool, tailored to
their specific needs and requirements.
Radare2 [130] is an open-source framework which supports disassembling a wide
range of architectures, including x86, x64, ARM, AVR, m68k, MIPS, JVM, PPC and
SuperH. The framework has a command line text based interface, and therefore a
steep learning curve. A graphical user interface was later developed, named Cutter3.
3Cutter: free, open-source reverse engineering framework, powered by radare2
(https://github.com/radareorg/cutter)
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Radare2 can lift instructions to its own intermediate representation, ESIL (Evaluable
Strings Intermediate Language). It can be extended with scripts in a variety of lan-
guages, such as Python, Go, Rust, Ruby or Java. Radare2 uses Capstone internally as
its default disassembler for a number of popular architectures, but it can also provide
an assembler by integrating the Keystone project4 and emulation with the help of the
Unicorn project5 [160].
angr [154] is a binary analysis platform, with an emphasis on allowing users to
write their own tool using the angr Application Program Interface (API). The frame-
work mainly aims to be a tool to aid discovery of vulnerabilities and flaws within
programs. It has been used widely in the academic community for building various
tools, such as Firmalice [153], a framework for detecting authentication bypass back-
doors or Driller [157], a vulnerability discovery tool which uses fuzzing and concolic
execution. angr supports lifting to the VEX intermediate representation.
Choosing the appropriate tools for our research. Based on our overview of existing
tools, we decided to use IDA in our research, as it had the best support for the architec-
tures we analysed. Its support for custom scripts helped in automating as much of the
firmware analysis process as possible. Choosing any other tool would have required
the additional effort of writing a disassembler for any architecture the tool would not
support. However, it should be noted that IDA does not have support for automotive
profiles of MCUs, and additional annotation with the extra functionality is required.
6.2 Motivation and Challenges
Consider a vehicle’s electronic components, in their entirety. As a car will have over 70
ECUs [93], the manufacturer does not have the resources needed to design the hard-
4Keystone – The Ultimate Assembler (https://www.keystone-engine.org/)
5Unicorn – The Ultimate CPU Emulator (https://www.unicorn-engine.org/)
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ware and develop firmware for each ECU individually. Instead, they will outsource
the tasks to first tier suppliers. The degree of outsourcing will vary depending on
the requirements, and a manufacturer may work with any number of suppliers they
wish. Manufacturers may request suppliers to design hardware, based on some re-
quirements, and produce the firmware in-house, or the other way around, or may
subcontract the whole design of an ECU to one or more suppliers. Similarly, a supplier
may work with a number of manufacturers. First tier suppliers may, in turn, outsource
some tasks to other companies. The many stakeholders and complexities of the supply
chain make tracking of responsibility a difficult task.
In the cases where firmware is outsourced, the manufacturers receive only the
firmware image, which they then program to the dedicated hardware. The source code
is not shared with the manufacturer, which means no code auditing can take place, and
the testing of the component is limited to what the requirements specify or white-box
testing.
The research presented in this part arises from the lack of transparency between
suppliers and manufacturers and, ultimately, with the vehicle owner. If a supplier
may provide services to multiple manufacturers, and multiple manufacturers request
firmware for the same component, the core functionality will be similar, with a few
differences. Code reuse is a common practice in software development, but it has
been shown it can also enable vulnerabilities to seep into software [62, 135, 182]. Find-
ing bugs is not the only task where static analysis is useful. Representing an ECU’s
firmware through its CFG can also help in identifying the CAN ids an ECU sends its
messages on, or which ids it listens to, which is useful when interacting with an ECU
in a grey-box manner, without further information (as we will see in Section 7.6.3).
Furthermore, differential static analysis can be used to determine the similarity of two
firmwares, e.g. what differences are there in the firmware of a Ford Fiesta 2010 BCM,
compared to a 2011 one. It can also help determine what parts of the firmware an
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upgrade has modified, especially if the update could not be analysed by itself, for ex-
ample if it was encrypted.
ECUs are very diverse when considering the underlying hardware and architec-
tures. Furthermore, most ECUs have bare-metal firmware, which means they directly
interface with low-level hardware and peripherals. A user is required to have strong
knowledge of the device’s architecture, as tasks such as distinguishing code from data
sections or being able to discern between genuine code and wrongly interpreted code
is left to a human. Even simply loading the firmware correctly into a disassembler re-
quires creating the memory layout, identifying the entry point(s), mapping of registers
for automotive-specific functionality (e.g. CAN communication), and all of this needs
to be done manually.
Analysing bare-metal firmware requires more knowledge about the underlying
hardware, and documentation is an important resource. Obtaining the user manu-
als for the automotive-specific chips proved to be a hard task, as they were often not
available.
When loading bare-metal firmware into a disassembler, further information needs
to be supplied, such as reset vectors. These are considered the entry points of the
firmware. Nonetheless, IDA will only be able to disassemble by itself minor parts
(if any) of the firmware. To achieve maximal code coverage, we propose a number of
solutions in Section 6.6. Extracting an accurate CFG from a binary and ensuring cor-
rect function detection is an ongoing open problem ([121, 90, 31, 7, 151, 20]), especially
with respect to resolving indirect branch instructions. The solutions are architecture
specific, some taking advantage of instructions patterns which appear in the func-
tion’s prologue or epilogue6. Some manual guidance and clean-up is still required,
but the time needed to bring the disassembled code to a satisfying level is consider-
6A function prologue refers to a set of instructions that is found at the beginning of the function; they
are usually related to setting up the stack for that function. A function epilogue is the equivalent, but is
found at the end of a function, and restores the stack to its previous state
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ably reduced. By manual guidance and clean-up, we refer to the user going through
the disassembly and making informed decisions whether the instructions recovered and
functions created are correct.
6.3 Contribution
Given the constraints discussed in Section 6.2, we wanted to automate as much as pos-
sible of the firmware analysis process. We propose a method to abstract from the un-
derlying architecture by extracting the Control Flow Graph (CFG) from the firmware.
The CFG is annotated with information that will later be useful, such as start and end
addresses of basic blocks and last instruction of basic blocks. The CFG is then used
in building a fuzzer, as described in Chapter 7. We describe the techniques we used
in order to reduce the time spent manually guiding the disassembler in function and
instruction recovery, and extracting the CFG. Where the solutions are specific to a cer-
tain architecture, from the ones studied (ARM, PPC and Infineon Tricore), we state so
within the sections of this chapter.
6.4 Targets
Firmware acquisition. We analysed the firmware of three ECUs. We obtained the
firmware from the ECUs’ flash memory by using automotive programmers [3].
The ECUs tested are show in Figure 6.1:
• Volkswagen Passat IPC — ARM architecture (ARM CDC 3297G-C MCU);
• Ford Fiesta BCM — PPC architecture (SPC560B);
• Ford Kuga ECM — Infineon TriCore architecture (SAK-TC1793F MCU).
It should be noted that ECUs are not limited to these families of MCUs, with many
others being available, on other architectures (e.g. Renesas SH-2A, V850E, M16C; NXP
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One of the first issues tackled is IDA’s lack of automotive-specific knowledge about the
MCUs. For example, for the ARM ECU (ARM CDC 3297G-C MCU), one can choose the
ARM processor, and specify the start address and size for the RAM and ROM sections,
as well as the offset at which the binary should be loaded. IDA presents the user with a
warning that it cannot analyse the binary automatically, and displays the byte values of
the firmware. The MCU datasheet provides information of the memory layout, where
the RAM, ROM, Input/Output (IO) segments are, etc. This information needs to be
manually transferred into IDA, in order to create a correct MCU profile.
In order to help document the registers, we created an IDAPython script. Regis-
ters are described in JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) format in a separate file, and
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the script will annotate the names, create the appropriate sizes, and comment them.
Figure 6.2 shows an excerpt from such a file and Figure 6.3 shows the applied map-
ping to the IDA database. If the keyword "payload" exists, the object is considered
a ‘group’ of registers. The "base_addr" keyword contains the address from which
the group starts, and each register will contain an "offset", which is added to the
base address to obtain the register’s address. If the "payload" keyword does not ex-
ist, the structure is considered one single register. The size of the registers within the
group can be specified with the "reg_size" property, but it can also be declared for
one specific register (e.g. registers in the "general_ROM" group have 4 bytes, but the
"ROM_ID" register has only 2 bytes). The "code" keyword means that instead of con-
verting the address to a byte/word/dword, the script will try to create an instruction.
Setting the "include_label" property to True (1) will prepend the "label" to the
register name. In some cases, objects are mapped to registers, such as in the case of
the CAN Communication Objects, for the ARM IPC ECU. Multiple such objects are
defined in the CAN-RAM area of the IO segment, and contain CAN messages either
received or scheduled to be broadcast. The size of the object can be defined by us-
ing the "size" keyword, and the number of objects to be mapped can be specified
through the "iterations" property.
Mapping interesting registers, such as CAN, CAN message buffers, Interrupt Source
Nodes (ISNs) or ports, helps improve the readability of the code when manually in-
specting it. By documenting them in JSON format, together with the mapping script,
the aim is to have a structured and extensible way of dealing with the lack of support
and of easily adding the missing information to IDA. The method can be improved
by combining the script with a Portable Document Format (PDF) scraper, which could
automatically generate the JSON file, as many datasheets have tables which specify
the base address, offset and name of each register. We have not tackled creating a PDF
scraper, as it is a programming exercise and it was not needed for the work carried out













































Figure 6.2: Example describing registers as JSON, for the ARM CDC 3297G MCU.
IO:F80000 CO0_CTRL % 1
IO:F80001 CO0_ID28.21 % 1
IO:F80002 CO0_ID20.13 % 1
IO:F80003 CO0_ID12.05 % 1
IO:F80004 CO0_ID04.00_CTRL % 1
IO:F80005 CO0_DLC_CTRL % 1
IO:F80006 CO0_Data0 % 1
IO:F80007 CO0_Data1 % 1
IO:F80008 CO0_Data2 % 1
IO:F80009 CO0_Data3 % 1
IO:F8000A CO0_Data4 % 1
IO:F8000B CO0_Data5 % 1
IO:F8000C CO0_Data6 % 1
IO:F8000D CO0_Data7 % 1
IO:F8000E CO0_timestamp_low % 1
IO:F8000F CO0_timestamp_high % 1
Figure 6.3: IDA excerpt, after applying the registers mapping for the first CAN Com-
munication Object. The %1 value for each register denotes the size (1 byte).
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in this chapter.
IDA allows additional annotation of registers, interrupts and ports through its own
.cfg files. However, in the .cfg files, each register needs to be defined individu-
ally. In the case of the example above, for CAN Communication Objects, each register
would have to be defined 5 times (as the number of iterations is 5). Our method is
much more flexible, and more compact. It can, in fact, be used to generate IDA .cfg
files, if so desired, in a much more efficient way.
6.6 Disassembling Electronic Control Unit Firmware
As previously mentioned, we used IDA for disassembling the firmware, automated
by developing our own IDAPython scripts. We used the igraph Python module for
storing and working with the CFG, as it allows labelling of vertices and edges, and has
good support for efficiently saving the graph to storage.
A word on the IDA Pro interface. IDA comes with a multitude of useful functions
and options, as one would expect from the state-of-the-art disassembler and program
analysis tool. While leveraging the IDAPython API has helped us automate many
parts of the process, we found one graphical user interface feature particularly useful.
This is the program navigation bar (Figure 6.4). The navigation bar displays the entire
address space of the program being analysed and colour-codes areas. Therefore, when-
ever we had to do manual code inspection, or wanted to look for code areas which did
not belong to functions, as we will see in the following section, it was very useful to
use the navigation bar and look for chunks coloured as Instructions. The navigation bar
can also be zoomed, and this allows for revealing small areas that require inspection.
As IDA does not recognise the entry point of the firmware binary, guidance needs
to be provided. A number of heuristics have been tested, some architecture dependent,
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Figure 6.4: IDA navigation bar.
and some which can be applied across architectures.
Firstly, the reset vector is given as entry point. Based on the datasheets, the reset
vector is, generally, at the first address in ROM. This will reveal the main loop of the
firmware. Other registers can be considered entry points, such as the ISNs, Software
Interrupt vector or CAN Interrupt Index Register. This applies to all MCUs in the test
set and can be used across architectures. However, using these entry points does not
guarantee that the whole program will be covered. Indirect jumps or jump tables may
not be recognised by the disassembler, and therefore would need manual interven-
tion. Also, there may be areas of unreachable code, possible leftovers from testing the
firmware. The remainder of this section explains the methods tested on each architec-
ture.
6.6.1 Disassembling ARM
First of all, it needs to be mentioned that most ARM MCUs support both ARM and
Thumb instruction sets. The difference between them is that while ARM instructions
are 32 bits, Thumb instructions are 16 bits. All Thumb instructions have correspond-
ing ARM instructions. Thumb code is about 65% of the size of the ARM code, and
provides better performance, especially if targeting MCUs with low memory (up to
160% improvement) [101].
With respect to our ARM ECU, once we have loaded the firmware, other archi-
tecture options can be set, such as the version of the ARM instruction set, whether the
board has a Variable Floating Point co-processor, or it uses the advanced single instruc-
tion multiple data extension (mainly used in signal processing for media applications).
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All these pieces of information require a strong understanding of the hardware we
are working with. The datasheet of the CDC 3297G chip specifies it uses ARM7TDMI
MCU, which leads us to believe it uses the ARMv4T instruction set (Thumb enabled)7.
One of the heuristics tested was forcefully creating functions at each address in the
ROM segment of the firmware. As IDA cannot distinguish between .code and .data
areas in the ROM, there will be areas where data is stored, but is wrongly disassembled
as code. In order to overcome this, the functions that were successfully created are
logged into a file, and a clean database of the firmware is loaded. Code is created only
at the addresses which were previously logged.
Next, instructions patterns which are used in the prologue of functions are identified,
and used to recover more code. Thumb instructions make up the majority of the
firmware, therefore these instructions are targeted for analysis. Specifically, combi-
nations of the following instructions are sought within the firmware:
• PUSH [...] SUB
• PUSH [...] BL
• PUSH [...] LDR
• PUSH [...] MOVS
The instructions are represented by 2 bytes (except BL) and are identified based on
the opcodes they use. The PUSH instruction has the opcode 0xb5 (if the Link Register
(LR) is also pushed) or 0xb4 (without LR), followed by a byte representing which of
the registers R0-R7 are used. For the other instructions, masks and filters are defined,
in order to determine if the instruction following a PUSH is indeed one of the previously
mentioned ones. Table 6.1 shows the values defined. The filter determines which bits
are of interest, and the mask determines what the value of those bits should be. The
7ARM7TDMI first appears in MCUs from the 1990s, which used the ARMv3 instruction set.
However, it also appears in MCUs from the 2000s and later, which use the ARMv4 instruc-
tion set. No further information is given in the datasheets, but the brief document for the
CDC 32xxG MCU family, detailing their suitability as car dashboard controllers, is dated 2000
(http://pdf.datasheetcatalog.com/datasheet/MicronasIntermetall/mXvsrxz.pdf),
and therefore it is more likely our component uses ARMv4.
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Instruction (bits) Filter Mask
7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0
SUB 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 X
0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 X
LDR 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 X
0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 X
MOVS 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 X
0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 X
BL 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 X
(offset low) 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 X
BL 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 X
(offset high) 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 X
Table 6.1: Filter and mask for determining Thumb instructions. Together with the PUSH
instruction, they are used for recovering more code from the target firmware.
branch with link instruction (BL) is represented by 4 bytes, first containing the upper
11 bits of the target address, then the 11 bits of the lower half of the address.
The result is a fairly clean version of the firmware with code made at relevant ad-
dresses. However, due to the mixed usage of both ARM and Thumb instructions, some
parts of the code were created as ARM, when they were in fact Thumb, and thus are
not recognised as valid functions. This behaviour is observed due to the misinterpre-
tation between ARM and Thumb, and it still appears, even if the ROM segment is set
to Thumb mode, or the even if the segment register Thumb is set before each function
creation. Switching between ARM state and Thumb state (and inverse) is done by the
MCU when it encounters a BX rA (or BLX) instruction, where rA is a register. If the
least significant bit of the register rA is 0, the MCU changes to (or remains in) ARM
state. If the bit is 1, the MCU changes to (or remains in) Thumb state.
In order to deal with this, we wrote a small IDAPython script, which determines
the changes in the Thumb segment register, undefines the sections which are ARM
code, and re-sets the Thumb register. It then iterates through the whole ROM segment
and logs the addresses where the changes from Thumb to ARM still happen, and these
can then be used to manually inspect the code around that address. Some parts of the
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recovered code will belong to genuine functions, but the end of the functions is set at
an earlier address. This is solved by adding the chunks of instructions to the original
functions. The code navigation bar helped in identifying end areas for the code being
inspected. We found that the script greatly aided the process by targeting specific areas.
Using these methods, 60.21% of the firmware was converted into explored addresses8.
17.52% of the firmware is a block of 0xFFs, therefore only 22.27% of the firmware code
could not be automatically disassembled and requires further manual inspection.
6.6.2 Disassembling PowerPC
For the PPC firmware, we had to make sure the IDA settings are correct. We set the
processor as big-endian PPC, select the Signal Processing Engine (SPE) instruction set
and enable Variable Length Encoding (VLE). IDA has support for a few PPC devices,
and we can select mpc5xx, as this is the generic version of the board our ECU uses.
For this ECU we were able to obtain the flash and the RAM contents. Therefore, we
have to create the RAM segment, at the correct address, according to the datasheet. We
also create the IO segment. From the datasheet we know that the reset vector is located
at address 0x04, and this is the point from which we start our analysis. The vector
points to ROM address 0x160. Once we create code at that address, we can analyse
the functions that spawn from there (in our case, 94 new functions were created). We
can notice that for the created functions, 66% of them started with the se_mflr r0
instruction, which moves the contents of the Link Register into register 0. We wrote
a script which looks for the opcode of the instruction and operand, 0x00 0x80. The
last nibble of the opcode indicates the register number to be moved in LR (in our case,
0). 5063 new functions are created using this method. Using MakeFunction(ea),
from the IDAPython API, we can tell IDA to create a function at a specific address,
ea. If the function returns false, it means it has failed, and we use MakeUnkn(ea)
8IDA marks an address as explored if it is correctly recognised as code or data.




where rA represents a general register, and DMR rep-
resents a Direct Memory Reference.
Figure 6.5: Load address to control register pattern and branch to address in control
register.
to undefine it. As with the ARM code, some of the functions have the ending set
before the function actually ends, leaving some instructions on the outside. Therefore
we need to manually adjust these, and the code navigation window comes in handy.
Identifying whether the instructions which do not belong to any function should, in
fact, be part of the function that exists before them is fairly straightforward, as in this
case functions tend to end with se_blr, which is the branch to the address contained
in the LR instruction (or, in a few other cases, some other form of branch instruction).
Otherwise, we mark the set of instructions as their own function, and inspect the code
around it. Next, we observe that indirect jumps are used (a control register is used in
controlling the flow of the firmware). A set of three instructions is used (Figure 6.5);
first, a general register is loaded with an address from the ROM. Then, the control
register is loaded with the address the register points to. The flow of the program then
branches to the address contained in the control register. Therefore, by extracting the
addresses referenced by the Direct Memory Reference (DMR), we can discover more
functions of the firmware.
Lastly, the processor options require us to supply the address for the Table of Con-
tents, which is the address of the second general register, and the address of the Small
Data Area, which is also the address of the 13th general register. Searching within the
firmware for a load instruction into R2 or R13 reveals the addresses.
Using this method 52.77% of the ROM was recognised as explored addresses. The
firmware contains two large blocks of bytes with the value 0xFF, and they are located
towards the end of the ROM address space. The blocks represent 23.21% of the size
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of the firmware. Therefore, 24.02% of the firmware needs to be further manually in-
spected.
6.6.3 Disassembling Infineon TriCore
The Infineon TriCore ECU was the most challenging out of the components we worked
with. The documentation for the MCU was sparse, and the Infineon website did not
contain the user manual for the TC1793 MCU, and instead linked to the user man-
ual of the TC1798 MCU. The two MCUs are from the same family, though compar-
ing the datasheets of the two revealed a few minor differences, such as the TC1793
having fewer Analog-to-Digital Converters (ADCs) and fewer General Purpose In-
put/Outputs (GPIOs) lines. Conflicting information was found in datasheets and user
manuals with respect to the location of the reset vector, with some specifying the re-
set vector is at offset 0x0 in the flash memory, and others placing the Interrupt Table
Vector at that address. Regardless, our firmware had a bank of zeroes as the first 16393
bytes, so neither sources seemed to be correct.
Furthermore, while IDA does have support for TriCore, none of the device pro-
files match the TC1793/TC1798. Therefore, we start off with a device IDA does know,
TC1797, remove all segments which do not match the specification of the TC1793, and
create the correct ones. The flash memory of the TC1793 is divided between two ad-
dress ranges, each of 2 Kbytes, and so we need to split and load the firmware at the
appropriate offsets. Once the memory map was correctly recreated and the firmware
loaded, we started considering retrieving functions.
Unlike ARM and PPC, TriCore has eliminated the need for function prologues and
epilogues, through code optimisation [162]. Therefore, searching for opcodes would
not help for this particular architecture. We used the forceful code creation method,
combined with manual inspection of code. While more time consuming, this method
successfully led to 54% of the total address space being recognised as explored. The
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firmware contained three large blocks of byte values 0xC3, amounting to 11.81% of its
size. 34.19% of the firmware required further inspection.
6.7 Control Flow Graph Extraction
This section describes how we extract the CFG, in order to later use it with the fuzzer.
In order to create an accurate CFG, we use an intermediary object, named a Control
Flow List (CFL). The CFL is obtained by calling the Flowchart() function provided
by the IDAPython API. The function returns a list of BasicBlock objects, which
contain information about the start and end address of the basic block, as well as two
lists, one being the predecessors of the basic block, and one containing the successors.
Once satisfied the CFL is accurate, it can be used to create the graph, using the
Python igraph module. The start and end address of the basic block are added as
vertex attributes.
The vertices will later be labelled with a static data value, if the branch of the basic
block is dependent on a comparison with it (more details in Section 7.5). The edges
will be labelled with the condition that needs to be met in order to go down that path.
Edges that point from a vertex to itself are ignored.
6.7.1 CFG Extraction from ARM Firmware
As previously mentioned in Section 6.6.1, calls to Thumb addresses are not correctly
handled by IDA. It does not correctly identify a call to a Thumb function as the end
of a basic block. Therefore, the CFG would not be an accurate representation of the
firmware running on the ECU without amending these. Thumb functions are called
using a pattern of three instructions, as represented in Figure 6.6. The value of the
DMR determines the address of the Thumb function. These are logged to console, and
can be manually inspected, to make sure they are correctly formed.




where rA represents a general register, and DMR rep-
resents a Direct Memory Reference.
Figure 6.6: Pattern for branch to THUMB function, from ARM code.
Given a CFL created strictly with the results returned by the Flowchart() func-
tion, along with a list of the previously identified Thumb function calls, we amend
the CFL by splitting the basic blocks containing calls to Thumb functions, adding the
Thumb function to the successors of the first new basic block, and the second new basic
block as a successor to the first one.
6.7.2 CFG Extraction from PowerPC Firmware
As discussed in Section 6.6.2, some functions are accessed by being referenced through
a DMR. The Flowchart() function of the IDAPython API does not recognise these
as part of the control flow of the firmware.
Similarly to the procedure used for the ARM firmware, we create the CFL by calling
the Flowchart() function, then we look for the pattern of instructions presented
in Figure 6.5. We extract the address referenced by the DMR, and amend the basic
blocks to include the function correctly.
6.7.3 CFG Extraction from Infineon TriCore Firmware
The CFG extraction is straightforward for the TriCore firmware, as there are no func-
tions loaded through DMR accesses. The Flowchart() function returns the correct
CFG, and we only need to create the Graph object, based on its information. Figure 6.7
shows the extracted CFG of one function, from the ECM ECU (Infineon TriCore). It
shows the labelling of the vertices with basic block information, such as start and end
addresses and the last instruction of the basic block, as well as static data used in de-
ciding the control flow of the firmware.





































































Figure 6.7: Extracted CFG, representing the basic blocks of one function. Each basic
block was tagged with information about the start address (sEA), end address (eEA),
static data used in comparisons (d) and the last instruction of the basic block (i). The
function is from the ECM ECU, Infineon TriCore architecture.
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6.8 Summary
In this chapter we have proposed a method for analysing ECU firmware by extracting
the CFG, thus abstracting away from the underlying architecture. The CFG can be
annotated with information useful for creating other tools (such as a fuzzer). Due to
the large number of architectures ECUs are built on, the sparsity of documentation
and the insufficiently documented attempts at ECU firmware analysis, this has been a
challenging task, and we believe it presents a high entry barrier for possible researchers
having an interest in the field. As there is only one other description of analysing ECU
firmware (Miller and Valasek, see Chapter 3), we strongly believe the methodologies
presented in this chapter add significant value to the field of automotive research.
CHAPTER 7
FUZZING ELECTRONIC CONTROL UNITS
The role of the work described in Chapter 6, is to enable the design of a CAN fuzzer
which uses static data extracted from the ECU firmware to create CAN messages. This
chapter describes how the data is extracted and the design of the fuzzer, together with
the evaluation of running the fuzzer on the three devices we mentioned in the previous
chapter.
7.1 Related Work
Fuzzing is the technique of automating the testing of programs, with the aim of dis-
covering bugs and vulnerabilities. The principle of fuzzing is providing the program
under analysis with inputs which may not be valid, or which the program does not
expect, and observing the behaviour of the program.
American Fuzzy Lop (AFL) [188] is a state-of-the-art fuzzer, employing several de-
terministic mutation strategies, such as bit flip, byte flip, arithmetics, and randomised
strategies. AFL uses a modified version of QEMU [25], which informs it whether an
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input has discovered a new path in the program being tested. AFL has been used as
the basis of many other fuzzers in the literature, such as Ifuzzer [172], FairFuzz [100]
or Neuzz [150], which shows the high impact AFL has had on advancing the field of
fuzz-testing. As AFL requires the fuzzed program to be emulated, or to be fed infor-
mation about what execution path the given input has triggered within the program,
it is not particularly suitable for use with ECUs, as there are no viable emulators for
automotive MCUs.
Driller [157] uses a hybrid method of fuzzing and selective concolic execution (port-
manteau for symbolic + concrete execution) in order to efficiently discover bugs or
vulnerabilities at a deeper level within the evaluated program. Their approach aims to
solve the issues each method has on their own: for fuzzing, generating a good set of
inputs to drive the program execution, and for concolic execution, the path explosion
issue. Driller uses fuzzing to explore initial paths, then relies on concolic execution to
overcome complex checks. It then goes back to fuzzing the newly discovered paths, until
it encounters again a check it cannot resolve, applying concolic execution once more.
This cycle is used repeatedly until a vulnerability is discovered or all paths have been
been explored. Driller’s evaluation shows its hybrid approach allows it to perform
better than fuzzing or concolic execution used independently.
VUzzer [142] is an application aware fuzzer, which aims to create inputs that are more
interesting, or relevant, to the program being tested. They use lightweight static and
dynamic analysis to extract the program’s control flow and data flow features. VUzzer
uses control flow information to determine priorities for paths, and data flow informa-
tion to extract bytes from branch constraints. Therefore, VUzzer can target paths with
higher importance, and can determine which input offset enables the program to go
via a specific path. The authors argue their approach is more scalable, as compared
to Driller, as it does not use symbolic execution. Their evaluation shows that VUzzer
performs significantly better, as compared to AFLPIN [163], an AFL-based fuzzer.
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Yun et al. introduce QSYM [186], a lightweight symbolic execution engine, which
aims to solve the performance issues hybrid fuzzers suffer from, increasing their scal-
ability. Their approach removes the usage of intermediate representations used as ab-
straction layers to the underlying architecture, by other symbolic execution engines.
Instead, they focus on a specific, small subset of instructions to be symbolically exe-
cuted, as opposed to traditional methods which use a basic block approach. The eval-
uation of the engine shows it outperforms Driller in approximately 82% of the tested
binaries.
Muench et al. [119] point out in their research that fuzz-testing embedded devices is
different from fuzzing desktop systems, due to the limited IO and computing power.
They argue that silent memory corruptions are much more frequent on embedded de-
vices and they pose a challenge when trying to detect what was the exact state of the
device when it crashed. They also define six categories for the unexpected behaviour
of a device, with various implications for the difficulty of dealing with them: observ-
able crash or reboot (immediate observable effect), hang or late crash (they imply a
device could take some time to crash, and therefore the input that triggered it is hard
to identify), malfunction (there are no crashes per se, but memory corruption causes
the device to not compute some requests correctly) and no effect (no observable ef-
fect in the time window immediately following the memory corruption, but unfore-
seen behaviour might occur at some point in the future). Their arguments are entirely
transferable to ECU fuzzing.
7.1.1 ECU Fuzzing
A few instances of applying fuzzing to test the security of automotive components and
the CAN bus exist, and are presented below.
When fuzzing an ECU, performing an exhaustive search over the whole space
would not be feasible, as 275 values (for the CAN 2.0A 11-bit identifier + 64 bits of
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payload), would take too long computation-wise. Also, as an ECU typically listens to
only a handful of ids, it would mean a lot of wasted resources. Randomly choosing the
payload does yield better results, but it cannot reason about the meaning of clusters of
bytes, and their potential relations to one other.
Lee et al. [98] demonstrated they could sniff the packets from a vehicle, through
an OBD-II Bluetooth dongle, and then leverage the knowledge acquired about which
CAN ids are in use. They then fuzzed each byte of the 8 bytes of the possible payload,
setting the rest to zero. They used the random byte strategy. They observed changes
in the IPC signals or in physical components in the vehicle (e.g. lights).
Bayer and Ptok [22] present a UDS fuzzer, which is able to create messages with
sequence numbers, as expected by the protocol. They claim the fuzzer is block-based,
in that it understands and is aware of what specific fields within the message mean. It
can therefore automatically produce correct values for these (e.g. for a checksum field).
No other information is given about the strategies the tool uses. The fuzzer was eval-
uated on an ECU simulator and performed approximately 40,000 tests. It uncovered
6 results which the authors categorise as ‘exploitable’, though no exact definition for
such a result is given. A further 695 results were categorised as ‘probably exploitable’
(with 29% of them being reproducible), and they involved no timely negative response
from the ECU, which is in contradiction with the expected behaviour, as defined by the
standards.
Fowler et al. [56] argue that the existing design process should be extended with
automated fuzz-testing, informed by the in-vehicle network design (what ECUs are
inter-connected, their interfaces and the directions of the data-flow). They then de-
scribe in [57] such a fuzzer. Their tool fuzzes CAN packet payloads and ids, and uses
the bit flip strategy. The fuzzer can be configured to flip from one single bit in one
message to every bit in every message. Therefore, the CAN payloads are randomised.
They evaluated the tool against a simulator, an actual ECU (which was an IPC) and
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against a vehicle, though with limited scope. The simulation and IPC tests revealed
that the fuzzer was able to trigger odd behaviour, such as negative RPM, activating
warning lights and sounds, and displaying a crash message. The latter behaviour per-
sisted through power cycles of the IPC. In light of this, the authors decided to test the
fuzzer only with a small subset of CAN ids on the target vehicle, as to not render it
completely useless.
Patki, Gothindikar and Mane [131] present another UDS fuzzer, which uses valid
UDS messages and ‘mutates’ the payload in order to create invalid messages, which
are then sent to the ECU being tested. They create invalid messages by using invalid
values in the DLC field, invalid values for the service sub-functions or invalid inputs
in which all bytes are 0x00 or 0xFF. Similarly to Bayer and Ptok’s UDS fuzzer [22],
the authors report that some services do not respond according to the specification of
the standard.
7.1.2 Tools and Frameworks
Caring Caribou [1] is a security exploration tool for the vehicular CAN bus, initially
developed as part of the HEAVENS project [2]. The tool has a fuzzer module, which
supports random payload generation, brute-forcing, and mutation (randomising nib-
bles in CAN ids and/or payloads). The fuzzer also allows for replay of previously sent
messages and features an identify method, which provides supports in determining
which message may have triggered a specific behaviour in the ECU being tested. The
strategies used by the tool completely rely on randomising CAN messages, even if a
user can define which part of the message should be subject to said randomisation.
Peach Fuzzer [161] is a commercial fuzzer by Peach Tech1, which claims to be able
to interface with the CAN bus and can be extended to support any custom protocol.
They also claim ‘over 50 algorithms’ for mutation strategies. However, no further in-
1Peach Tech Website (https://peach.tech)
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formation on what the strategies are is given for the non-paying audience. Therefore, it
is hard to draw any conclusions on whether the commercial version of the tool is suit-
able for our intended research. A Community Edition is also available, with stripped-
down functionality. Sequential and random mutation strategies are included within
this version.
7.2 Motivation and Challenges
The goal of this research is to create a tool that can automatically test the ECU for
bugs, vulnerabilities or hidden functionality, in the absence of the firmware source
code. This could expose implementation vulnerabilities, incorrect configurations or
backdoors into systems, either inserted maliciously or being the results of forgotten
debug functionality.
For the fuzzer, one of the main challenges pertained to defining what it means for
an ECU to misbehave or crash. In embedded systems, unexpected or unintended be-
haviour can take many forms. One of the most common ways of determining crashes
is the output the program-under-test gives. But when working with ECUs via CAN
communication, the output from the devices is very limited. The CAN bus is a broad-
cast network, where ECUs have pre-established message ids they use to send their data
on, and there is no bi-directional communication (except for UDS). Therefore, there is
no real method of establishing the internal state of the ECU, or if any error occurred.
Also, obtaining execution traces from a component is a difficult, if not impossible task,
as the ECUs have limited debugging support.
Furthermore, when fuzzing CAN communication, the ids the component listens on
must be taken into account. In a scenario where nothing is known about the ECU, the
ids become part of the search space. Sending a payload on all possible ids significantly
increases the time needed for fuzzing. The communication matrix of a vehicle, or of
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an ECU, describes which signals are sent and received by which ECU, and on which
ids. Such knowledge would be very useful for the fuzzing process, as it would allow
us to target only ids the ECU listens to. However, a communication matrix is a well
kept industry secret, and therefore not commonly available. One possible solution to
reduce the id search space is to sniff CAN communication from a car that uses the same
ECU that will be tested. The ids that appear in the trace can then be targeted for use
with the fuzzer. Experimentally, this helped reduce the number of ids to test from 211
values to only 50, for a Ford ECU.
7.3 Contribution
Continuing on the work from Chapter 6, we present a fuzzer for ECUs that uses the
CFG extracted in the previous chapter. The CFG is annotated with more information.
We annotate it with the static data that is used in comparisons which influence the
control flow of the firmware, and which branch instruction was used. We also compute
probability and weight metrics for the edges and vertices of the CFG. The probability
of an execution path (edge in the CFG) represents the likelihood that the edge will be
taken, given the number of successors its originating basic block has. The weight of a
basic block (vertex in the CFG) is used in order to cover execution paths which are hard
to reach, and is calculated as the inverse of the weight of a basic block. This information
is used in order to compute a set of input seeds for the fuzzer. It is also used in adapting
the input messages during the fuzzing process. Using the CFG in creating messages
enables us to retain message structure and the relationships between the bytes in a
message. We evaluate the fuzzer on three ECUs, with three different architectures, and
from different manufacturers. To the best of our knowledge, this work presents the
first fuzzer which uses static analysis in guiding the fuzzing of ECUs and does not
solely rely on randomness in forming CAN messages.














Figure 7.1: Fuzzer hardware setup.
7.4 Tools and Setup
The diagram in Figure 7.1 shows the hardware setup required by the fuzzer. In order
to communicate with an ECU we used the PeakCAN USB interface (2) together with
the OBD-II connector (3), which are connected to the laptop (1) running the fuzzer. We
used a breadboard (4) for wire management. The PeakCAN is connected to the target
ECU though the CAN pins on the OBD-II connector (3) and on the device under test
(6). An external power supply (5) provides the required 12V. The PCAN Python API
provides the module PCANBasic, which handles the initialisation and configuration
of communication channels, as well as transmitting and receiving CAN messages. We
continue using the igraph module for manupulating and working with the program
CFG and we use the pickle2 module for storing the graph to disk.
2Python module for serialising and de-serialising object structures (Python pickle documentation:
https://docs.python.org/3/library/pickle.html).










e_cmpi cr0, rA, IMMED
se_bne ADDR
e_lis rB, IMMED1




jne32 rA, IMMED, ADDR jz16 rA, ADDR
mov16 rA, IMMED
jge.u rA, rB, ADDR
Figure 7.2: Example of instruction patterns for identifying comparisons with static data
for the three architectures studied. IMMED refers to an immediate value, rA and rB are
general registers and ADDR is a ROM address within the firmware.
7.5 Data Extraction
The first step towards creating the fuzzer is the data extraction step. Labelling the CFG
with the data still requires the firmware disassembly, but after this step, any further
work can be done without the need of IDA.
7.5.1 Control Flow Graph Tagging
The CFG is labelled with the static data values used in comparisons by looking for in-
struction patterns. These patterns are architecture-dependent, as shown in Figure 7.2.
The data is then set as an attribute for the vertex corresponding to the basic block. The
edges of the graph are labelled with the instruction the program control would take in
order to go down that path. For this purpose we define an Antonyms dictionary (de-
tailed in Appendix A), through which we map the opposite instruction for each branch
or jump instruction we encounter (e.g. BEQ – BNE). The instructions will later be used
by the fuzzer in determining what values could a byte take, while still respecting the
condition of the branch or jump instruction.
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Lastly, the vertices are also labelled with probability and weight metrics, and the
edges with the probability metric. Inspired by VUzzer [142] (see Section 7.1), we cal-
culate the probability that a basic block will be reached. For this, we take as starting
point a vertex which has an in-degree of 0 and we identify all vertices that can be
reached from it, by performing a breath first search. Then we iterate over the search
result and calculate the probabilities accordingly. For vertices, the weight is the inverse






where pe(i,j) is the probability of the edge between vertices i and j, and out_deg(i) is the
out-degree of vertex i.
The module sympy is used to solve the probabilities of vertices which are part of a
cycle. The metrics will be used by the fuzzer to determine which byte of the payload
to fuzz. Bytes corresponding to basic blocks with high weights will be given priority.
From this step onwards the firmware disassembly is not required, as all the information
needed is contained within the CFG. The CFG file can now be saved to storage, in pickle
format, and will be later given as input to the fuzzer.
Figure 7.3 shows the CFG for one function, from the BCM firmware, having its
vertices tagged with basic block start address, static data that influences the branch
condition, probability and weight, and its edges tagged with the probability and the
instruction satisfying the specific paths.
7.5.2 Forming Input Seeds for the Fuzzer
In creating the data chains we take advantage of the small payload of the CAN frames,
by creating payloads with at most 8 bytes. Algorithm 7.1 describes the process of






































































































































Figure 7.3: Example CFG of one function (from the BCM, PPC architecture), after it has
been tagged with probabilities and weights (by applying Equation 7.1 to each basic
block) and with the static data on which the control flow is decided.
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extracting the data chains. We iterate through the vertices of the CFG and look for
those which have been tagged with data (function startEA_with_data). These will
be the starting points for the exploration algorithm. For each starting point, we then
perform a depth-first search of the CFG, through the function find_paths (line 6). We
begin at a given vertex start_vertex, up to a maximum depth of max_depth, and
search for as long as comparisons with static data occur in consecutive vertices. The
function stores a list of vertex sequences that have been explored in paths_found.
This leaves us with a list of vertex sequences stored in vids. In lines 9–13, we extract
the static data associated with those vertices and build the list data. Each path in vids
has a corresponding path in data.
def explore_cfg(cfg):
Input: cfg * CFG of firmware analysed *
Output: vids, data
* vids contains the lists of vertex indexes, *
* data contains the lists of data payloads *
1 data_startEAs = startEA_with_data(cfg) * retrieve a list of vertices *
* where comparisons with static data occurs *
2 vids = list() * declare new list *
3 for start_vertex in data_startEAs:
4 explored_vids = list() * declare new list *
5 paths_found = list() * declare new list *
6 find_paths(cfg, start_vertex, explored_vids, paths_found,max_depth)
7 vids.extend(paths_found) * add all found paths to list *
8 data = list() * declare new list *
* for each path of vertices found, create a corresponding list of the static data values *
9 for path in vids:
10 path_data = list() * declare new list *
11 for vertex in path:
12 path_data.append(cfg.vs[vertex][”data”]) * extract data from CFG *
13 data.append(path_data) * add the list with the data sequence to the list *
14 return (vids, data)
Algorithm 7.1: Exploring the CFG, extracting data and vertices chains.
After the chains have been extracted, a list of Payload objects is created. Each
instance has as attributes the data chain list, the vertex IDs list corresponding to the
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data, a fuzzed list which will keep track of which bytes have been modified, as well
as a probabilities list and a weights list for the basic blocks corresponding to the data.
The list can now be saved to storage, in pickle format, and given as input to the fuzzer.
7.6 Fuzzer Design
The following section is concerned with the design and implementation of the fuzzer.
It presents the heuristics for the seed transformation, as well as the options the program
has implemented.
7.6.1 Fuzzer Prerequisites
The program takes as input the following arguments:
> python2 fuzz.py <arch> <suffix> <cfg-file> <queue/payload>
<USB-device> [resume]↪→
where
<arch> is the architecture of the target ECU firmware (arm/ppc/tricore) – manda-
tory argument;
<suffix> is the suffix of the vertices and data file; it helps distinguish files in the
case multiple ECUs with the same architecture have been analysed – mandatory
argument;
<cfg-file> is the CFG file of the firmware, saved in pickle format – mandatory ar-
gument;
<queue/payload> is the method of fuzzing; the program can either fuzz one byte for
each payload in the queue and wrap around or can fuzz all bytes in each payload,
then move on to the next payload; argument can take values q/p – mandatory
argument;
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<USB-device> is the number of the PCAN interface, as seen on the host computer –
mandatory argument;
[resume] signals to the fuzzer it should continue from the last known state – optional
argument.
Based on the arguments specified, the program looks for the following files:
payloads_<arch>_<suffix>.pickle: the file contains the list of Payload ob-
jects, containing the data chains, vertex IDs, probabilities and weights;
payloads_resume_<arch>_<suffix>.pickle: the file contains the list of fuzzed
Payload objects (see Section 7.6.3); this file is sought only if the resume option
is enabled; if it does not exist, but the option has been specified, it notifies the
user and proceeds as if the option was disabled;
ids_<arch>_<suffix>.pickle: the file contains the CAN ids the fuzzer will send
messages on; if the file does not exist, it will try all possible ids.
7.6.2 Input Transformation
For each branch/jump instruction, a function is defined that will choose a random
value such that the condition is still respected. This is used in the input transformation.
In Python, a list object can also be treated as a queue, with methods of popping
the first element and appending to the end. We use the notion of queue below, as
to emphasise the first-in-first-out order of the elements and to allow for a language-
independent explanation of the algorithms. Python does provide the module queue,
which is thread-safe, but for our usage this is not necessary.
The fuzzing process is iterative and works as follows. Given a queue of Payload
objects (Listing 7.1), the first value is popped, and the payload is subject to transfor-
mation. If the program is run with the queue option, one of the bytes of the payload is
chosen to be modified. A new value is chosen, such that the instruction condition is re-
spected. The new message is sent over the CAN interface, and a new Payload object,
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class Payload(object):
def __init__(self, payload, vids, probability_score, weight):
self.payload = list(payload)
self.vids = list(vids)
self.fuzzed_bytes = [ False for _ in len(self.payload) ]
self.probability_score = list(probability_score)
self.weight = list(weight)
Listing 7.1: Definition of the Payload class, with its member attributes.
with the modified payload, is added to the end of the queue. If the payload option is
chosen, all the bytes of the payload are subject to transformation, and this whole new
value is sent over CAN to the ECU, and added to the queue.
The transformation function operates on one Payload object at a time. It looks
if there are any bytes which have not yet been fuzzed, then looks at the probabilities
of these bytes. It will choose the byte with the lowest probability, and it will choose
a random value that still respects the condition of the instruction that defined it. For
example, if the instructions sequence was:
CMP rA, 0x40
BGT ADDR
and we are on a path that takes the branch, the value has to be in the interval (0x40, 0xFF].
Once the byte has been fuzzed, it is marked accordingly in the fuzzed_bytes list. If
a new value cannot be chosen, the initial value of the payload is retrieved and the
process is repeated3. Once all the bytes have been fuzzed, in the queue mode, the
fuzzed_bytes list is reset. For the payload mode, the fuzzed_bytes list is not used,
as all bytes are fuzzed in each iteration.
3There may be cases in which a byte cannot get another new value, for example if the immediate
value of a BLT instruction has been fuzzed to 0x0 in a previous iteration, the values interval would be
[0, 0). In order to avoid this, we retrieve the original value of the payload and operation can resume
normally.
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7.6.3 Additional Features
As the fuzzing process can be a lengthy one, we implemented functionality for the
program to be able to resume from a previous state. The fuzzer saves the state of
the payloads queue to disk after a number of payloads have been fuzzed (in a file
payloads_resume_<arch>_<suffix>.pickle). This parameter can be chosen as
desired, reflecting the trade-off between how recent a state is needed and the time it
takes for the payloads file to be written to disk (approx. 160 ms in our tests4).
The fuzzer also implements logging of the fuzzed payloads sent on the CAN net-
work in a human-readable format. The program writes a number of files to a logs-sent
folder, with the name format log_<arch>_<suffix>_<n>, where <n> is the index
of the payload being fuzzed, within the order of the corresponding Payloads pickle file.
When resuming, the vids list of the first payload object in the
payloads_resume_<arch>_<suffix>.pickle file is used to determine the in-
dex value of the payload in the original payloads_<arch>_<suffix>.pickle file,
therefore assuring the correctness of the logging process. The logs are also useful when
encountering an unexpected behaviour. They are used in order to replay the messages
previously sent, in order to see if the condition can be reproduced.
As mentioned in Section 7.2, knowing which CAN ids an ECU listens to is not a
trivial task. The ideal case scenario is having access to a vehicle which has the ECU
under test. Then, a trace from the car can be used. The CAN traffic can be sniffed via
the OBD-II port, and all ids that are seen on the network can be used as candidates.
This reduces the search space considerably. For the BCM we used a trace from a Ford
Fiesta, same year as the vehicle our component came from (2015). While there is no
guarantee the CAN ids are all the same (even though the two vehicles have the same
make, model and year, additional features of the car may be reflected in additional
4Run on Kaby Lake Intel Core i7-7500U 2.70GHz with Hyper-V enabled, 4 vCPUs.
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ECUs or messages), there will be a significant overlap. The trace reduced the number
of ids to try from 211 to 50.
Searching within the disassembled firmware may also yield the CAN ids. We ex-
perimentally tested the feasibility of this idea, as we had both a trace and the firmware
for the BCM. We looked for comparisons with static data with a value lower than
0x800, the maximum a CAN id can take. We also checked for comparisons with bytes
in two consecutive basic blocks which, when put together, would give a value lower
than 0x800. We retrieved 473 values matching the requirements from the firmware,
and 26 of them were also found in the trace from the vehicle. We were unable to verify
the correctness of the ids, as we did not possess the communication matrix for the ECU.
However, the overlap between the extracted data and the trace ids signals could be a
good method for reducing the CAN ids search space (in our case, to 23% of all possible
values).
Finally, we provide a utils.py file, with various functions we have found useful
throughout the development of the fuzzer. The algorithm for computing the probabili-
ties and weights is included, as well as the CFG exploration algorithm. We also provide
a function which removes identical Payload objects. If two paths have the same data
and the same branch/jump instructions, we allow for their removal, in order to reduce
the number of elements to fuzz. A function for transforming a PeakCAN View5 trace to
the format expected by the ids_<arch>_<suffix>.pickle file is provided; this is
helpful in the previously mentioned case of access to a vehicle with an ECU of interest.
The quickest way to obtain a trace from the car is by using the PCAN View software,
which has its own custom format, and we supply a parser for it. Lastly, we include the
function for extracting potential CAN ids from the firmware.
5PCAN-View: Windows Software for Displaying CAN and CAN FD Messages
(https://www.peak-system.com/pcan-view.242.0.html?&l=1)
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7.7 Crash Detection
As discussed in Section 7.2, knowing what a crash means with respect to an ECU is
difficult, due to the limited output and feedback they provide. Without access to the
internal state of the ECU, the whole task becomes even more difficult. Furthermore,
as ECU firmware logic is mostly driven by interrupts, reproducibility of a result is
problematic. This is due to the difficulty of guaranteeing the ECU is in the same state
on two different execution runs, and becomes a problem of perfectly tuning the timing.
For a large scale approach, this method significantly increases the time required for
testing.
Our fuzzer uses two methods of detecting crashes, depending on the information
available about the ECU: message timeout or the UDS Tester Present service. Both meth-
ods detect crashes based on the CAN traffic the ECU under test outputs. Before the
fuzzing process starts, the program listens for all the messages the ECU sends data on
and keeps a record of them. While sending fuzzed payloads, it also listens to incoming
traffic. If a message on a new CAN id is recorded, it will flag this up for inspection.
For the timeout method, if the ECU stops sending messages for a specified time
(parameter), it considers the ECU to have crashed. For the Tester Present service, the
CAN id for UDS needs to be known. After each fuzzed payload is sent to the ECU, a
request is made to the Tester Present service (0x3E). If the service responds, regardless
of whether it has a positive or negative reply, it means the ECU is still functioning.
If there is no response, within a specified time, it considers the ECU to have crashed.
The delay in response is also logged, and this can be analysed and potentially provide
clues as to whether certain messages introduce a greater delay. This could mean the
ECU was in a possibly unexpected state.
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7.8 Evaluation and Results
The evaluation process consisted of two steps: first, we tested whether the input seeds
we extracted from the firmware were relevant to the appropriate ECUs, without any
transformation being applied; we then ran the fuzzer on the ECUs. We use the same
ECUs mentioned in Section 6.4.
For the first step, after we extracted the byte sequences, we tested the validity of the
data chains. As previously mentioned, working with ECUs is tricky, due to the lack of
feedback, as CAN communication is unidirectional by design. The best target for test-
ing was the Volkswagen IPC with an ARM chip, as it has a multitude of visual outputs,
in the form of gauges and indicators. As we did not know the CAN ids the ECU was
programmed to listen to, we sent the data chains extracted from the firmware to all
possible ids, without any further modification. We could then monitor the IPC and see
if any of the gauge needles moved, if indicators changed status or if the information of
the display was modified. The test was successful, as seen in Figure 7.4. The sent CAN
messages did indeed trigger the various lights the panel had and moved the speed and
the tachometer needles, in rapid succession. Therefore, our initial hypothesis that data
on which the control flow of the firmware is decided is more likely to be meaningful to the ECU
than randomly chosen messages is validated.
We then tested the fuzzer on the three ECUs, with positive results. We reiterate that
due to the limited feedback the ECUs provide, the results cannot always be explained,
and we can only hypothesise about them. During the tests we have observed unex-
pected behaviours from the ECUs, where they stopped communicating via the CAN
bus. For most situations, rebooting the ECU enabled it to resume normal function.
However, for the BCM, on three separate occasions, the ECU did not work as expected
after reboot. It required a cool-off time of about 2-4 hours, but we cannot explain the
need for it. The ECU PCB does not have any large capacitors, the one possible expla-
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Figure 7.4: Volkswagen IPC in testing.
nation we could consider feasible for the ECU to be able to retain its state for such a
long time. Furthermore, the results were not reproducible by replaying the same set of
CAN messages to the BCM. This is not highly surprising; as previously discussed, the
ECUs are driven by interrupts, therefore making sure it is in the exact same state twice
is highly difficult without debug capabilities.
Nonetheless, our results are highly promising. We demonstrate that data extracted
from the ECU firmware is more meaningful than randomly chosen data, and that
fuzzing with this data as input seeds does indeed lead to crashes and unexpected be-
haviours. This research lays the ground work for what we hope will be further research
into the security of ECUs. As long as there is a lack of transparency between automo-
tive suppliers and manufacturers, and the end users, creating automated frameworks
and tools for analysing the firmware of electronic components is crucial.
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7.9 Summary
We have presented a fuzzer for ECUs, which communicates with a target component
via the CAN bus. The fuzzer uses data extracted from the firmware running on the
ECU and is guided by the CFG of the firmware in its seed transformation process. We
have evaluated the fuzzer on three ECUs, with positive results. To our knowledge, this
is the first automotive fuzzer available in the literature that relies on something more
complex than randomly choosing the messages to send. Our tests show that indeed






DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
To conclude this thesis, in this chapter we highlight various problems that are still
open questions within the area of vehicle security. Furthermore, we discuss possible
improvements to the fuzzer we presented in Chapter 7.
8.1 Key Management for Secure CAN Communication
Key management is a critical part of an authentication protocol. Currently, ECUs
do not have enough memory to securely store a large set of keys efficiently, making
key management in the context of automotive security even more challenging. As
described in Chapter 4 and discussed in Chapter 5, most of the proposed CAN au-
thentication protocols in the literature rely on symmetric key cryptography. However,
many do not not deal with key management in the design of the protocol, simply as-
suming that the keys were somehow securely loaded onto the ECUs. The few that do
approach the subject of key management propose the use of a central node to serve as
a key server and distribute the necessary keys to the other ECU as needed (e.g. LiBrA-
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CAN, MaCAN, CaCAN).
Without an appropriate key management solution, any of the existing protocols are
difficult to implement in a vehicle network, and manufacturers have no incentive to
adopt an authentication protocol, if it is not a complete solution. Furthermore, the dis-
tribution of trust and control among the various stakeholders (vehicle manufacturers,
repairs shops and owners) is hard to satisfy. The right to repair legislation in force in
the European Union means that owners are not obliged to service or repair their cars at
a franchised dealer. This implies that any vehicle repairs shop should be able to replace
an ECU, and update the cryptographic material on it, while manufacturers might not
feel inclined to share such information. Therefore, research is needed, in partnership
with manufacturers, to design a system that would encompass these opposing require-
ments. A hierarchical key derivation system could be considered, as it would reconcile
the requirements for control of the manufacturers. The system would need to allow
for quick key revocation, such that if any of the involved parties misbehaved (i.e. keys
were leaked), they could be removed from the chain.
8.2 The Future of Automotive Networks and
Architectures
Looking at the future trends within the automotive industry, there are two areas which
are tightly entwined: in-vehicle network topologies and technologies, and Vehicle-to-
Everything (V2X) networks. While we will not discuss advances on the latter, as this
thesis is concerned with in-vehicle networks, it is worth mentioning that requirements
coming from V2X will influence decisions regarding future in-vehicle technologies.
As vehicles inter-connectivity is increased, and more functionality is delegated to
automation software, the communication bandwidth requirement increases. As cars
become more autonomous, they require more sensors – radar, lidar, cameras – and




















Figure 8.1: In-vehicle network technologies by data rate [129].
faster communication between these components and the ECU processing and taking
real-time decisions based on the incoming data. It has long been known that current in-
vehicle network technologies are a bottleneck for speed and performance. Figure 8.1
presents an overview of the current network technologies used in vehicles, by their
data rate. While MOST is widely used in cars for networking infotainment ECUs,
and would provide sufficient speed for the future vehicle architectures, it is a network
designed for audio, video and voice data transfer and has high resource demand [109],
making it unsuitable for the more resource-constrained ECUs. For these reasons, the
industry’s interest in Automotive Ethernet has increased.
Automotive Ethernet started being used in cars in the early 2000s, when manufac-
turers began seeking out a way of improving the ECU update process. As networks
had more ECUs, and the firmware increased in size, updates became a very time con-
suming task, which could take up to 16 hours [109]. Standardised in 2011, as ISO
13400 [78], Ethernet is mainly used for Diagnostics over IP, and could soon see wider
adoption. The differences between normal Ethernet and automotive Ethernet mainly
reside in the physical layer. Automotive Ethernet is able to function as full duplex
(simultaneous transmit and receive) on a cable containing a single twisted pair, with
improved electromagnetic characteristics, keeping both the manufacturing costs and
the overall added weight to the car low. Of interest will be the changes in network
152 8.2. The Future of Automotive Networks and Architectures
architecture that will come with automotive Ethernet. While CAN is a broadcast net-
work, IP over Ethernet communication will be addressed, therefore improving one of
the major flaws of CAN (lack of source identification). Furthermore, while domain (e.g.
Body & Gateway, Powertrain & Chassis) separation is currently achieved by physical
separation in CAN, Ethernet will allow for virtual configurations, which will be more
flexible, and easier to maintain and modify. The trend seems to indicate Ethernet will
eventually be used as the “backbone” communication technology in cars, connecting
the various domains, with CAN, LIN or FlexRay being used within the domains [61].
But a more imminent use of Ethernet will be for Advanced Driver-Assistance Sys-
tems (ADAS), infotainment and camera systems. As Ethernet is an already established
technology, solutions for securing it from the IT and IoT areas can be used (virtual
networks, firewalls, IDSes).
Besides changes to in-vehicle networks, functional architectural shifts are expected.
Currently, each ECU fulfils one specific function. As more powerful ECUs are intro-
duced, it is anticipated that functionality will be aggregated, with one ECU fulfilling
multiple tasks. This will reduce the complexity of the systems, and therefore the cost.
However, as the application software would still be delivered by various suppliers
questions about liability and security arise. Who would be responsible if an ECU fails?
Who performs testing of the final, integrated ECU? Who is responsible for protecting
supplier IP and how should it be done? If one application contains vulnerabilities, how
to prevent a potential attacker to reach other co-located applications? Virtualisation
could provide a solution that would ensure application separation, increased avail-
ability in the case of ECU failure, separation of critical driving-relevant applications
from less critical ones, as well isolation for security-critical functionality [132]. One
of the key advantages of virtualisation is the flexibility to host various types of guest
OSes or bare-metal applications. Additionally, Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs)
are very good candidates for supporting security services (e.g. the AUTOSAR Crypto
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Figure 8.2: Example of virtualised ECU architecture, running a guest OS and bare-
metal applications, supported by a TEE.
Stack and SecOC). Briefly, a TEE is an isolated environment (secure world) which runs
in parallel to other OSes or applications (normal world) on a processor, and which has
confidentiality and integrity guarantees with respect to data or code loaded within it.
Moreover, each world has a number of hierarchical execution modes. Figure 8.2 shows
how such a system could look, based on the ARM TrustZone TEE [11], which has four
execution modes. One important mention is that scheduling becomes of utmost im-
portance for such applications, due to the real-time communication requirements of an
automotive system, but also due to the fact that vulnerabilities or bugs in higher priv-
ileged layers may result in undesired outcomes (e.g. a call to a Crypto Service residing
in the secure-world from a normal world application may not return if there is a bug in
the hypervisor, with the application never regaining any execution time on the CPU).
To summarise, the move to Ethernet can be seen as imminent, at least for parts of
the in-vehicle communication. It can also be seen as an improvement, both in terms
of bandwidth offered and security over the more popular automotive networks. How-
ever, Ethernet was not designed with security as one of its core principles, and this
should not be disregarded. The technology is sufficiently wide-spread that security so-
lutions from other areas can be ported to Automotive Ethernet. Additionally, the nodes
that will be connected through Ethernet are seeing architectural changes as well. While
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virtualisation can reduce costs for manufacturers and can increase security by provid-
ing isolation mechanisms, the real-time communication requirements of ECUs need to
be taken into consideration.
8.3 Security in Autonomous Vehicles
As mentioned, the automotive industry is moving towards more advanced automated
driving systems. Figure 8.3 depicts the driving automation levels, according to the
standard SAE J3016 [146]. The first three levels are defined as driver support features,
with the human still being the primary driver of the vehicle, their full attention be-
ing required. The latter three levels are defined as automated driving features, with the
automation system performing the driving task, and human intervention being pro-
gressively eliminated.
Currently, commercial vehicles offer driver assistance of the Levels 0-2, with level
2 solutions found in Tesla, General Motors, Nissan or Mercedes-Benz vehicles. Audi
announced in 2017 plans to bring a Level 3 system, AI Traffic Jam, but have since
abandoned their plans due to legislation shortcomings [45]. Vehicles aiming for levels
4 and 5 exist only in prototype form, with the most notable projects being Weymo [178]
by Google, Level 5 [107] by Lyft and Advanced Technologies Group [167] by Uber.
Uber’s fatal accident in 2018 drew new attention to the safety of autonomous ve-
hicles, even though the incident was deemed to have been a result of the driver’s er-
ror [97]. With driving decisions being increasingly reliant on data from sensors, such
as lidar, radar, GPS and cameras for automated driving systems, securing the input of
said sensors becomes of interest. It has already been shown that radar and lidar signals
can be jammed, spoofed or relayed [134, 152, 33, 183]. This could result in a vehicle not
sensing an obstacle in its vicinity and failing to act in a safe manner. GPS spoofing
would affect a vehicle’s ability to reach a target destination, effectively “hijacking” the
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Levels 0 - 2 : Driver support features – the human performs all or part of the driving
task.
No automation
The driver performs the en-
tire driving task. Assistance
systems may provide warn-
ings (e.g. lane departure).
Driver assistance
Either steering or break sup-
port for the driver (e.g. lane
centering or cruise control).
Partial automation
ADAS. Both steering and
break support for the driver
(e.g. lane centering and
cruise control).
Levels 3 - 5: Automated driving features – automated driving system performs the
driving task when engaged.
Conditional automation
Automated system can per-
form driving task under lim-
ited conditions. Driver re-
quired to take over driving
when automated system re-
quests (e.g. traffic jam chauf-
feur).
High driving automation
Automated driving system can
perform driving task in most
circumstances, without driver
intervention (e.g. driver-
less taxi). Manual override
possible if desired.
Full driving automation
Automated system can per-
form driving task in all circum-
stances and do not require hu-
man attention and intervention
(i.e. the human is only a passen-
ger). No controls.
Figure 8.3: Driving automation levels, according to SAE J3016 [146].
car and guiding it to an attacker-desired location [189]. Furthermore, camera sensors
are heavily used for object detection and reading road-side signs, and adapting the ve-
hicle driving style to the road restrictions. This is done thought computer vision and
machine learning algorithms that “see” the sign and then use classifiers to predict its
information [54, 155, 137, 26]. However, what happens if the algorithms predictions
can purposefully be manipulated? Nguyen, Yosinski and Clune [120] were among the
first to show it is possible to fool a computer vision system into believing, with high
confidence, that e.g. TV static is a motorcycle. Other researchers have also shown that
current algorithms can be tricked into wrongly classifying traffic signs by making small
modifications to the signs (Figure 8.4) [156, 53].
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Speed limit 120 sign which was classified as
speed limit 30 in [156], 85% attack success rate.
Stop sign which was classified as
speed limit 80 in [53] with 80%
success rate.
Figure 8.4: Example of modified traffic signs which are wrongly classified.
To summarise, considerable research needs to investigate how to prevent sensors
inputs from being tampered with, and how to build more adversary-resilient machine
learning algorithms, before we can safely enjoy the comfort of a level 5 autonomous
driving vehicle.
8.4 Automotive Fuzzing
As we discussed in Chapter 7, the field of automotive fuzzing is still in its infancy.
While inspiration can be drawn from fuzzing embedded devices, ECU firmware comes
with its own challenges. From a high-level view, the tasks of creating a robust automo-
tive fuzzing system can be broken into three main areas: firmware analysis, firmware
execution and feedback loop. We discuss below each of these areas, exploring how
they can be improved.
Firmware analysis still has a number of open research questions, such as control
flow recovery, function identification and data structure recovery, the former two upon
which we touch in this thesis and are pertinent to embedded bare-metal firmware.
While control flow recovery is a feature of some existing tools (including IDA), the
solutions are often architecture-dependent, and custom heuristics need to be hand-
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written for non-trivial control flow transfer. Handing indirect function calls and in-
direct branch instructions are the main challenge for this, especially in cases where
control flow is transferred via function pointers or the destination address may be dy-
namically computed [48]. Function pointers complicate function detection as well,
therefore a heuristic cannot only rely on explicit function calls. Tail calls also need to
be considered, as the functions called in this manner might be mistakenly included in
the parent function [48]. Lastly, data structure recovery in the context of ECU firmware
could have as prime use the identification of parsers, such as the one for parsing CAN
messages. Improvements in these areas will allow for a more accurate CFG recovery,
having a better representation of the firmware analysed, and therefore improving any
heuristics inferred from said analysis.
Firmware execution Evidently, executing the firmware we are trying to test is a cen-
tral part of a fuzzer. In our solution, we chose a hardware-in-the-loop system, but
this is not a highly scalable option, as it requires additional hardware to parallelise
the procedure. Firmware emulation would be able to overcome this problem. How-
ever, emulating ECUs, with their architectural diversity and their many peripheral
configurations is a challenge. Existing tools for full emulation support only a limited
set of architectures and would require significant engineering commitments to bring
ECU firmware support to them, an effort which academic views seem to deem not
worthwhile. Partial emulation could cover some of the pitfalls of full emulation. For
example, the core can be emulated using an existent tool, and a model for the periph-
erals can be created from actual executions on the device under test, if the firmware
was written using hardware abstraction libraries [36]. Frankenstein [143] solves the
issue of unknown memory map of embedded devices by emulating the firmware and
delegating any memory map functionality back to the device, such that it is retrieved
straight from an execution run. While both these solutions would improve our system,
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their main limitation remains that they support a limited number of architectures.
Feedback loop The feedback loop mechanism is a crucial part of a fuzzer, as this is
the way the fuzzer knows whether the input provided to the firmware under testing
has triggered new behaviour. For our solution, we used physically observable be-
haviours or gaps in the communication with the device. However, the loop can be
improved by identify the root cause of the events and, as we mentioned earlier, by
establishing what the state of the device is when a crash occurs, which would also im-
prove reproducibility. Using instrumentation in order to track the specific execution
path taken when provided with an input would also increase the performance of the
fuzzer, as this would allow for better control flow coverage, and enable a more efficient
exploration of the firmware functionality. Alas, this method would currently suffer
from pollution from the additional paths that time-based interrupts would introduce,
and a method of distinguishing them within the trace would need to be developed.
Lastly, an interesting idea to be explored is using side-channels (e.g. electromagnetic
measurements, power analysis) for the feedback loop. This could be done in a coarse
manner, in the sense of distinguishing if two executions follow the same control flow,
or finer-grained, profiling specific parts of the code and detecting whether that code
was executed.
To summarise, in order to create an efficient, accurate and scalable fuzzer for ECUs,
significant engineering efforts need to be invested in the area of reverse engineering
and emulating automotive embedded devices.
CHAPTER 9
CONCLUSION
In this thesis we have studied the security of the in-vehicle network, focusing on the
Controller Area Network, as it allows ECUs to communicate with each other, and the
security of the ECU firmware.
We have explored CAN bus authentication, both by presenting a new design, and
by evaluating and reviewing other protocols available in the literature. Our protocol,
LEIA, provides uni-directional source authentication for CAN messages, protecting
against attacks that rely on the ability of an adversary to replay messages or imper-
sonate other ECUs. LEIA was designed to be AUTOSAR compliant, and backwards
compatible with the CAN standard. It is a software-only solution, and therefore ve-
hicles can benefit from it by a simple firmware upgrade. It has flexibility at its core,
and allows for authenticated and unauthenticated messages to co-exist and not dis-
turb each other’s communication. This means the upgrade to a secure CAN bus can
be done gradually, softening the costs for a manufacturer. From our evaluation, LEIA
emerges as the best authentication protocol option, and should be considered for adop-
tion within in-vehicle networks.
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After researching the security of the in-vehicle network communication, we turned
our attention to the components connected to it. Due to the complexity of the ECUs
supply chain, manufacturers often do not have the ability to review the code of the
firmware that runs on their ECUs. Furthermore, ECU firmware has not been exten-
sively researched. The diversity of hardware and architectures used in building the
ECUs is a contributing factor to the lack of research. In order to bridge this gap, we
presented an automated tool, a fuzzer, which can be used to test ECUs without the
need for a large amount of knowledge about the device. The tool abstracts from the
underlying ECU architecture by extracting the Control Flow Graph of the firmware
and augmenting it with information which is then used to adapt the input messages.
The tool currently relies only on static analysis and there are a number of possible
directions for further research. Dynamic analysis would greatly improve the accu-
racy of the fuzzer. Information about the execution path a specific input has triggered
could be incorporated into the input transformation process of the tool. This could
be achieved by running the firmware in an emulator; however, there are no mature
projects for automotive emulators. Existing emulators could be extended, by adding
automotive MCU profiles, but this would be a tremendous task, due to the large num-
ber of MCUs used in ECUs, as well as the the difficulty of managing the many periph-
erals ECUs have. Writing an emulator involves both knowledge about the architecture
of the device, as well as expert understanding of the hardware of the device.
From the attack-related literature we discussed in this thesis, to the many different
solutions for securing the in-vehicle network, it is clear the academic world has been
invested in improving the security of cars. However, it is now up to the manufactures
to implement these solutions and usher in the era of cyber secure vehicles. This is im-
portant, as consumers deserve to be protected against cyber attackers, especially due
to the grave implications successful breaches have been shown to have.
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APPENDIX A
ANTONYMS
Antonyms for ARM architecture
ANTONYMS = { \
"BLE" : "BGT", \
"BGT" : "BLE", \
"BEQ" : "BNE", \
"BNE" : "BEQ", \
"BGE" : "BLT", \
"BLT" : "BGE", \
"BPL" : "BMI", \
"BMI" : "BPL", \
"BCC" : "BCS", \
"BCS" : "BCC", \
"BHI" : "BLS", \
"BLS" : "BHI", \
"BL" : "", \
"B" : "", \
}
Antonyms for PowerPC architecture
ANTONYMS = {
"e_b" : "", \
"e_beq" : "e_bne", \
"e_bge" : "e_blt", \
"e_bgt" : "e_ble", \
"e_ble" : "e_bgt", \
"e_blt" : "e_bge", \
"e_bne" : "e_beq", \
"se_b" : "", \
"se_beq" : "se_bne", \
"se_bge" : "se_blt", \
"se_bgt" : "se_ble", \
"se_ble" : "se_bgt", \




Antonyms for Infineon TriCore architecture
ANTONYMS = {
"j16" : "", \
"j32" : "", \
"ja" : "", \
"jeq.a" : "jne.a", \
"jeq16" : "jne16", \
"jeq32" : "jne32", \
"jge" : "jlt", \
"jge.u" : "jlt.u", \
"jgez16" : "jltz26" , \
"jgtz16" : "jlez16", \
"ji16" : "", \
"jlez16" : "jgtz16", \
"jlt" : "jge", \
"jlt.u" : "jge.u", \
"jltz16" : "jgez16", \
"jne.a" : "jeq.a", \
"jne16" : "jeq16", \
"jne32" : "jeq32", \
"jned" : "", \
"jnz16" : "jz16", \
"jnz16.a" : "jz16.a", \
"jnz16.t" : "jz16.t", \
"jnz32.a" : "jz32.a", \
"jnz32.t" : "jz32.t", \
"jz16" : "jnz16", \
"jz16.a" : "jnz16.a", \
"jz16.t" : "jnz16.t", \





List of References 167
[1] (NO DATE) Caring caribou. URL https://github.com/CaringCaribou/
caringcaribou [Accessed 25/09/2019].
[2] (NO DATE) HEAVENS: HEAling Vulnerabilities to ENhance Software Security
and Safety. URL http://www.sp.se/en/index/research/dependable_
systems/heavens/Sidor/default.aspx [Accessed 25/09/2019].
[3] (NO DATE) Tools for automotive repairing. URL http://www.usprog.ru/
index.php/en/news/usp.html [Accessed 27/07/2020].
[4] (2005) Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: The CMAC
Mode for Authentication. URL https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/
SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-38B.pdf [Accessed 20/07/2019].
[5] Al-Jarrah, O.Y., Maple, C., Dianati, M. et al. (2019) Intrusion detection systems
for intra-vehicle networks: A review. IEEE Access, 7: 21266–21289
[6] Andriesse, D., Chen, X., Van Der Veen, V. et al. (2016) “An in-depth analysis of
disassembly on full-scale x86/x64 binaries.” In 25th USENIX Security Sympo-
sium (USENIX Security 16). pp. 583–600
[7] Andriesse, D., Slowinska, A. and Bos, H. (2017) “Compiler-agnostic function de-
tection in binaries.” In 2017 IEEE European Symposium on Security and Pri-
vacy (EuroS&P). IEEE. pp. 177–189
[8] Apvrille, L., Muhammad, W., Ameur-Boulifa, R. et al. (2006) “A uml-based envi-
ronment for system design space exploration.” In 2006 13th IEEE International
Conference on Electronics, Circuits and Systems. IEEE. pp. 1272–1275
[9] ARINC (2006) ARINC specification 812: Definition of standard data interfaces
for galley insert (GAIN) equipment, CAN communications. Standard, Aeronau-
tical Radio, Incorporated (ARINC).
[10] ARINC (2007) ARINC specification 825: General standardization of CAN (con-
troller area network) bus protocol for airbome use. Standard, Aeronautical Ra-
dio, Incorporated (ARINC).
[11] ARM (NO DATE) Arm truszone. URL https://developer.arm.com/
ip-products/security-ip/trustzone [Accessed 27/07/2020].
[12] AUTOSAR (2015) AUTOSAR classic platform specification 4.2. URL
http://www.autosar.org/specifications/release-42/ [Accessed
24/04/2017].
[13] AUTOSAR (2019a) AUTOSAR classic platform specification 4.4. URL
https://www.autosar.org/standards/classic-platform/ [Accessed
30/07/2019].
168 List of References
[14] AUTOSAR (2019b) Requirements on crypto stack. URL https://www.
autosar.org/fileadmin/Releases_TEMP/Classic_Platform_4.4.
0/Crypto.zip [Accessed 30/07/2019].
[15] AUTOSAR (2019c) Specification of crypto interface. URL https://www.
autosar.org/fileadmin/Releases_TEMP/Classic_Platform_4.4.
0/Crypto.zip [Accessed 30/07/2019].
[16] AUTOSAR (2019d) Specification of crypto service manager. URL
https://www.autosar.org/fileadmin/Releases_TEMP/Classic_
Platform_4.4.0/Crypto.zip [Accessed 30/07/2019].
[17] AUTOSAR (2019e) Specification of key manager. URL https://www.
autosar.org/fileadmin/Releases_TEMP/Classic_Platform_4.4.
0/Crypto.zip [Accessed 30/07/2019].
[18] AUTOSAR (2019f) Specification of secure onboard communication. URL
https://www.autosar.org/fileadmin/Releases_TEMP/Classic_
Platform_4.4.0/Communication.zip [Accessed 30/07/2019].
[19] Avatefipour, O. and Malik, H. (2018) State-of-the-art survey on in-vehicle net-
work communication (can-bus) security and vulnerabilities. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1802.01725.
[20] Bao, T., Burket, J., Woo, M. et al. (2014) “BYTEWEIGHT: Learning to recognize
functions in binary code.” In 23rd USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Se-
curity 14). pp. 845–860
[21] Basin, D., Cremers, C., Dreier, J. et al. (2013) Tamarin prover. URL https://
tamarin-prover.github.io/ [Accessed 27/07/2020].
[22] Bayer, S. and Ptok, A. (NO DATE) Don’t fuss about fuzzing: Fuzzing controllers
in vehicular networks.
[23] BBC (2015) Fiat chrysler recalls 1.4 million cars after jeep hack. URL https:
//www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-33650491 [Accessed 12/08/2019].
[24] Bella, G., Biondi, P., Costantino, G. et al. (2019) “Toucan: A protocol to secure
controller area network.” In Proceedings of the ACM Workshop on Automotive
Cybersecurity. ACM. pp. 3–8
[25] Bellard, F. (2009) QEMU the FAST! processor emulator. URL https://www.
qemu.org/ [Accessed 05/08/2019].
[26] Berkaya, S.K., Gunduz, H., Ozsen, O. et al. (2016) On circular traffic sign detec-
tion and recognition. Expert Systems with Applications, 48: 67–75
List of References 169
[27] Bogdanov, A. (2007) “Linear slide attacks on the Keeloq block cipher.” In In-
formation Security and Cryptology, Third SKLOIS Conference, Inscrypt 2007,
Xining, China, August 31 - September 5, 2007, Revised Selected Papers. pp.
66–80
[28] Bozdal, M., Samie, M. and Jennions, I. (2018) “A survey on can bus protocol:
Attacks, challenges, and potential solutions.” In 2018 International Conference
on Computing, Electronics & Communications Engineering (iCCECE). IEEE.
pp. 201–205
[29] Brumley, D., Jager, I., Avgerinos, T. et al. (2011) “Bap: A binary analysis plat-
form.” In International Conference on Computer Aided Verification. Springer.
pp. 463–469
[30] Bruni, A., Sojka, M., Nielson, F. et al. (2014) “Formal security analysis of the
MaCAN protocol.” In Integrated Formal Methods. Springer. pp. 241–255
[31] Bruschi, D., Martignoni, L. and Monga, M. (2006) “Detecting self-mutating mal-
ware using control-flow graph matching.” In International conference on de-
tection of intrusions and malware, and vulnerability assessment. Springer. pp.
129–143
[32] Cervin, A., Henriksson, D., Lincoln, B. et al. (2003) Analysis and simulation of
controller timing. IEEE Control Systems Magazine, 23 (3): 16–30
[33] Chauhan, R. (2014) A platform for false data injection in frequency modulated
continuous wave radar.
[34] Checkoway, S., McCoy, D., Kantor, B. et al. (2011) “Comprehensive experimental
analyses of automotive attack surfaces.” In 20th USENIX Security Symposium.
San Francisco.
[35] CiA (2011) CANopen application layer and communication profile. Standard,
CAN in Automation.
[36] Clements, A.A., Gustafson, E., Scharnowski, T. et al. (2020) “Halucinator:
Firmware re-hosting through abstraction layer emulation.” In 29th USENIX Se-
curity Symposium (USENIX Sec). pp. 1–18
[37] Committee, S.V.E.S.S. et al. (2016) Sae j3061-cybersecurity guidebook for cyber-
physical automotive systems. SAE-Society of Automotive Engineers.
[38] Costin, A., Zaddach, J., Francillon, A. et al. (2014) “A large-scale analysis of
the security of embedded firmwares.” In 23rd USENIX Security Symposium
(USENIX Security 14). pp. 95–110
[39] Costin, A., Zarras, A. and Francillon, A. (2016) “Automated dynamic firmware
analysis at scale: a case study on embedded web interfaces.” In Proceedings of
170 List of References
the 11th ACM on Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Secu-
rity. ACM. pp. 437–448
[40] Courtois, N., Bard, G.V. and Wagner, D. (2008) “Algebraic and slide attacks on
Keeloq.” In Fast Software Encryption, 15th International Workshop, FSE 2008,
Lausanne, Switzerland, February 10-13, 2008, Revised Selected Papers. pp. 97–
115
[41] CrypticApps (NO DATE) Hopper v4, the macos and linux disassembler. URL
https://www.hopperapp.com/ [Accessed 19/09/2019].
[42] Daily, J. (NO DATEa) Dodge can messages. URL http://tucrrc.utulsa.
edu/DodgeCAN.html [Accessed 01/10/2019].
[43] Daily, J. (NO DATEb) Interpreting the can data for a 2010 toyota camry. URL
http://tucrrc.utulsa.edu/ToyotaCAN.html [Accessed 01/10/2019].
[44] Dariz, L., Costantino, G., Ruggeri, M. et al. (2018) A joint safety and security
analysis of message protection for can bus protocol. Advances in Science, Tech-
nology and Engineering Systems Journal, 3 (1).
[45] Davies, C. (2020) Audi abandons self-driving plans for
current flagship. URL https://www.slashgear.com/
audi-a8-traffic-jam-pilot-level-3-cancelled-tech-self-driving-legislations-28618493/
[Accessed 27/07/2020].
[46] den Herrewegen, J.V. and Garcia, F.D. (2018) “Beneath the bonnet: A breakdown
of diagnostic security.” In 23rd European Symposium on Research in Computer
Security (ESORICS 2018), Proceedings, Part I. Springer. Lecture Notes in Com-
puter Science, vol. 11098, pp. 305–324. URL https://doi.org/10.1007/
978-3-319-99073-6.
[47] Developers, V. (2017) Valgrind supported architectures. URL http://www.
valgrind.org/info/platforms.html [Accessed 23/07/2019].
[48] Di Federico, A., Payer, M. and Agosta, G. (2017) “rev. ng: a unified binary anal-
ysis framework to recover cfgs and function boundaries.” In Proceedings of the
26th International Conference on Compiler Construction. pp. 131–141
[49] Di Natale, M., Zeng, H., Giusto, P. et al. (2012) Understanding and using the
controller area network communication protocol: theory and practice. Springer
Science & Business Media.
[50] Dolev, D. and Yao, A.C. (1983) On the security of public key protocols. Informa-
tion Theory, IEEE Transactions on, 29 (2): 198–208
[51] Elektrobit (NO DATE) Elektrobit and autosar. URL https://www.
elektrobit.com/products/ecu/technologies/autosar/ [Accessed
20/09/2019].
List of References 171
[52] ESOL (NO DATE) Aubist classic platform. URL https://www.esol.com/
embedded/aubist_cp.html [Accessed 20/09/2019].
[53] Eykholt, K., Evtimov, I., Fernandes, E. et al. (2018) “Robust physical-world at-
tacks on deep learning visual classification.” In Proceedings of the IEEE Con-
ference on Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition. pp. 1625–1634
[54] Farag, W. and Saleh, Z. (2018) Traffic signs identification by deep learning for
autonomous driving.
[55] Farag, W.A. (2017) “Cantrack: Enhancing automotive can bus security using in-
tuitive encryption algorithms.” In 2017 7th International Conference on Mod-
eling, Simulation, and Applied Optimization (ICMSAO). IEEE. pp. 1–5
[56] Fowler, D.S., Bryans, J. and Shaikh, S. (2017) Automating fuzz test generation to
improve the security of the controller area network.
[57] Fowler, D.S., Bryans, J., Shaikh, S.A. et al. (2018) “Fuzz testing for automotive
cyber-security.” In 2018 48th Annual IEEE/IFIP International Conference on
Dependable Systems and Networks Workshops (DSN-W). IEEE. pp. 239–246
[58] Garcia, F.D., Oswald, D., Kasper, T. et al. (2016) “Lock it and still lose it - on
the (in)security of automotive remote keyless entry systems.” In 25nd USENIX
Security Symposium (USENIX Security 2016), to appear. USENIX Association.
[59] Greenberg, A. (2015) Hackers remotely kill a jeep on the high-
way – with me in it. URL http://www.wired.com/2015/07/
hackers-remotely-kill-jeep-highway/.
[60] Groza, B., Murvay, S., Van Herrewege, A. et al. (2012) “LiBrA-CAN: A
lightweight broadcast authentication protocol for Controller Area Networks.”
In Cryptology and Network Security. Springer. pp. 185–200
[61] Hank, P., Müller, S., Vermesan, O. et al. (2013) “Automotive ethernet: In-vehicle
networking and smart mobility.” In 2013 Design, Automation Test in Europe
Conference Exhibition (DATE). pp. 1735–1739
[62] Hanna, S., Huang, L., Wu, E. et al. (2012) “Juxtapp: A scalable system for detect-
ing code reuse among android applications.” In International Conference on
Detection of Intrusions and Malware, and Vulnerability Assessment. Springer.
pp. 62–81
[63] Hartkopp, O., Reuber, C. and Schilling, R. (2012) “MaCAN - Message authenti-
cated CAN.” In 10th Int. Conf. on Embedded Security in Cars (ESCAR 2012).
[64] Hazem, A. and Fahmy, H.A. (2012) “LCAP - A lightweight CAN authentication
protocol for securing in-vehicle networks.” In 10th escar Embedded Security in
Cars Conference, Berlin, Germany. vol. 6.
172 List of References
[65] He, L., Ren, X., Gao, Q. et al. (2017) The connected-component labeling problem:
A review of state-of-the-art algorithms. Pattern Recognition, 70: 25–43
[66] Hex-Rays (NO DATE) About ida. URL https://www.hex-rays.com/
products/ida/ [Accessed 19/09/2019].
[67] Hicks, C., Garcia, F.D. and Oswald, D. (2018) Dismantling the aut64 automotive
cipher. IACR Transactions on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Sys-
tems, pp. 46–69
[68] High Speed, C. (1999) for vehicle applications at 500kbps. SAE J2284.
[69] Hoppe, T., Kiltz, S. and Dittmann, J. (2008) “Security threats to automotive
can networks–practical examples and selected short-term countermeasures.”
In International Conference on Computer Safety, Reliability, and Security.
Springer. pp. 235–248
[70] Hoppe, T., Kiltz, S. and Dittmann, J. (2011) Security threats to automotive can
networks—practical examples and selected short-term countermeasures. Relia-
bility Engineering & System Safety, 96 (1): 11–25
[71] IEC (2008) 61162-3:2008 Maritime navigation and radiocommunication equip-
ment and systems – Digital interfaces – Part 3: Serial data instrument network.
Standard, International Electrotechnical Commission.
[72] IEC (2014) 62026-3:2014 low-voltage switchgear and controlgear – controller-
device interfaces (CDIs) – part 3: DeviceNet. Standard, International Electrotech-
nical Commission.
[73] IEC/ISO (1994) ISO/IEC 7498-1: 1994 information technology – open systems
interconnection–basic reference model: The basic model. Standard, Recommen-
dation, ITUTX.
[74] Indesteege, S., Keller, N., Dunkelman, O. et al. (2008) “A practical attack on
Keeloq.” In Advances in Cryptology - EUROCRYPT 2008, 27th Annual Inter-
national Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Tech-
niques, Istanbul, Turkey, April 13-17, 2008. Proceedings. pp. 1–18
[75] ISO (2003) 11898-1: 2003 - Road vehicles - Controller Area Network. Interna-
tional Organization for Standardization, Geneva, Switzerland.
[76] ISO (2008) 26021: 2008 – Road Vehicles – End-of-life activation of on-board py-
rotechnic devices. Standard, International Organization for Standardization.
[77] ISO (2010) 15031: 2010 – Road Vehicles – Communication between vehicle and
external equipment for emissions-related diagnostics. Standard, International
Organization for Standardization.
List of References 173
[78] ISO (2011) Road vehicles. diagnostic communication over internet protocol
(DoIP). Standard, International Organization for Standardization.
[79] ISO (2012) 27145: 2012 – Road Vehicles – Implementation of World-Wide Harmo-
nized On-Board Diagnostics (WWH-OBD) communication requirements. Stan-
dard, International Organization for Standardization.
[80] ISO (2013a) 14229-1: 2013 – Road Vehicles – Unified diagnostic services (UDS)
– Part 1: Specifications and requirements. Standard, International Organization
for Standardization.
[81] ISO (2013b) 14229-2: 2013 – Road Vehicles – Unified diagnostic services (UDS)
– Part 2: Session layer services. Standard, International Organization for Stan-
dardization.
[82] ISO (2013c) 14229: 2013 – Road Vehicles – Unified diagnostic services (UDS).
Standard, International Organization for Standardization.
[83] ISO (2013d) 14229: 2013 – Road Vehicles – Unified diagnostic services (UDS) –
Part 3: Unified diagnostic services on CAN implementation (UDSonCAN). Stan-
dard, International Organization for Standardization.
[84] ISO (2015) 11898-1: 2015 – Road Vehicles – Controller Area Network – Part 1:
Data link layer and physical signalling. Standard, International Organization for
Standardization.
[85] ISO (2016) 11898-1: 2016 – Road Vehicles – Diagnostic communication over Con-
troller Area Netwrok (DoCAN). Standard, International Organization for Stan-
dardization.
[86] ISO (2019) ISO/SAE CD 21434: Road Vehicles – Cybersecurity engineering. Stan-
dard, International Organization for Standardization.
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